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During the nineties, Colombia experienced a two-fold process o f restructuring. First, the 
political system underwent a process of constitutional reform in order to strengthen the 
state and increase its legitimacy, surpass the exclusionary character o f the political 
regime, and achieve greater equity in the distribution o f social resources. Second, the 
economy made the transition from a Keynesian development strategy to a strategy of 
"opening" or liberalization and internationalization o f the economy, in order to increase 
the economic efficiency by reducing the “size” o f the state and its regulatory role. The 
purpose o f this dissertation is to analyze the interplay and contradictions o f economic 
and political factors in the restructuring o f the Colombian politico-economic system.
The main finding o f this dissertation is that the simultaneous adoption o f a 
neoliberal economic strategy and o f the Political Constitution o f 1991, have had a 
contradictory relationship: while the “political opening” has produced favorable 
conditions for fostering programs of democratization and social integration, the 
“economic opening” has counteracted that possibility given that it implies a social
exclusionary process. This tension has aggravated the problems o f political and social 
integration that have traditionally characterized Colombian society.
This crucial tension has also been characteristic o f Latin America in the nineties. 
However, it has been neglected and undertheorized in most o f the democratization studies 
of American comparative politics. Most o f them lack consideration o f structural aspects.
I
According to those studies, the cause of regime change is determined by the strategic 
elections o f actors. Contrary to these approaches, I develop a structural perspective. I 
consider that social phenomena are partly determined by structural factors, and scientific 
research should, assign them decisive importance, since a fundamental basis for social 
action and transformation is to be found in the dynamics o f relationships between 
individuals and structures and the development o f contradictions within structures.
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Introduction
Colombia, like most Latin American countries, is currently undergoing profound 
transformations in the state structure, complex processes of economic restructuring, and 
formidable demographic and cultural transformations. This situation is compounded by 
disintegrating tendencies produced in recent decades by the convergence o f a series of 
factors such as: a) accelerated, chaotic urbanization caused by industrialization processes 
that have promoted migration of the rural population to the large cities, as well as by 
uprooting caused by the multiple forms of violence that have afflicted the Colombian 
countryside in recent years; b) tensions and ambiguities in the relationship between 
processes of economic modernization and democratization; c) persistence o f a weak 
democratic culture, and d) difficulties of identifying the state with the nation. This 
process of social modernization is related to dynamics that links the country to the 
present process of economic, political, and cultural globalization that further accentuates 
problems of social integration.
During the nineties, Colombia experienced a two-fold process o f restructuring. 
In the first place, the political system underwent a process of constitutional reform in 
order to strengthen the state and increase its legitimacy, surpass the exclusionary 
character of the political regime, and achieve greater equity in the distribution of social 
resources. In the second r • ice. the national economy made the transition from a 
Keynesian development strategy - imports substitution industrialization - to a strategy of 
"opening" or liberalization and internationalization of the economy. The objetive of that 
process was to increase the economic efficiency by reducing the “size” of the state and
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its regulatory role. This two-fold restructuring has deepened Colombia's political and 
social crisis and has transformed relations between the state, the civil society, and the 
economy. For this reason, the analytical dimensions in this thesis will revolve around 
the tensions and contradictions between political and social democratization, the 
restructuring of the state, and the structural economic adjustment which requires the 
adoption of a neoliberal development strategy.
A better comprehension of the present political, economic and social processes 
of Latin America is achieved if one begins with the notion that those processes are a 
result of the combination of exogenous and endogenous factors. The former consists of 
globalization and the generalized diffusion of the neoliberal accumulation model. The 
latter consist of a series of factors present in varying degrees in all Latin American 
societies, such as the weakness of the state and civil society, the precarious legitimacy of 
their political regimes, and their social heterogeneity. The result of the conjunction of 
these exogenous and endogenous factors has been the worsening of the problems of 
integration that have traditionally characterized the societies of the region.
Thus, from the perspective of this dissertation it is impossible to examine and 
comprehend the current crisis of the countries of the region without an interdisciplinary 
view of the way in which the relations among the state, society, and the economy have 
been estructured in Latin America in general and in Colombia in particular since the 
early nineties. Any attempt to approach the subject from only one o f these angles, 
would lead to a unilateral and distorted view of of that process. Closed-minded
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"economistic" or "politistic" perspectives limit the construction of models o f both 
analysis and interpretation. This dissertation therefore constitutes an effort to carry out a 
comprehensive and systematic analysis to show the complexity generated by the 
interaction of the political and economic phenomena that are determining Colombian 
reality.
The first chapter o f this dissertation consists of a critical review of the 
bibliography that has been produced by scholars in the United States to analyze both 
political regime change and structural economic adjustment in Latin America. 
According to most of the studies reviewed in that chapter, both phenomena are 
determined by the strategic elections of the actors in the democratization and economic 
adjustment processes. With the exception of some authors who emphasize international 
and domestic structural factors in determining the economic restructuring of the Latin 
American countries, in most of the studies there is a lack o f consideration of the 
structural elements; of the contradictions between the demands of the democratization 
process and those of neoliberal economic restructuring; of the implications of the change 
of economic model in the transformation of the political regime; and, of the decisive role 
of the international factors. The majority of these studies base their explanations of the 
rise of neoliberal restructuring on the action and the interests of elites in both the public 
and the private sectors, and the institutional limits within which that action is carried out, 
or on the basis of the influence, the interests, and the demands o f other social actors, 
such as the organized popular sectors.
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For the above reasons, the second chapter presents an alternative framework that 
seeks to contribute, from a structural perspective, to a better understanding of the effects 
that economic and political restructurings have had on Latin American societies. 
Emphasis will be placed on the sharpening of tendencies toward fragmentation and 
social disintegration that the transformation o f the capital accumulation model has 
generated.
The main hypothesis of this dissertation is that globalization and adoption of a 
neoliberal economic strategy as its clearest expression, on the one hand, and 
simultaneous adoption of the Political Constitution of 1991, on the other, have 
aggravated the problems of political and social integration that have traditionally 
characterized Colombian society. The effects of neoliberal strategies on social 
integration are associated with an increased weakening of the state, the limits it imposes 
on the continuity o f the clientelist political regime, and the the ruling class' inability to 
elaborate and agree upon a societal project that is broad enough to articulate the diverse 
social interests involved.
Therefore, the crisis Colombian society has experienced in the past ten years is 
the result of the convergence of tendencies of political and social disintegration. The 
former are expressed in the precarious legitimacy of the state due, among other things, 
to its de-institutionalization, the breaking down of various of its basic functions, the 
exacerbation of clientelism, the high degrees of violence, and the public's lack of trust in 
political institutions. The latter are expressed in the ruling classes' inability to elaborate
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and agree upon a societal project broad enough to integrate the diverse social interests; 
in the fragility o f the social fabric; and, in the degradation in the ways in which the 
social actors assume the conflict, diversity, and disagreement. The analysis o f this 
situation is the objetive of the third chapter.
In the fourth and fifth chapters, it is argued that the crisis o f integration in 
Colombia has been aggravated by the failure to reach a minimum agreement regarding 
the bases o f social order. In this respect, the societal project that arose from the 
Constitution of 1991 competes with one that is rooted in the neoliberal economic model. 
While the former was promoted by the progressive forces in the Constitutional 
Assembly o f 1991, the latter has been promoted by the exogenous forces of 
globalization and by a new technocratic domestic elite. These two projects have 
advanced in parallel form since 1991, and neither of the two has achieved enough of a 
consensus to impose its will. In the initial euphoria o f democratization caused by the 
constitutional assembly, Colombian society did not realize the acute contradictions that 
existed between the two projects, which have since then resulted in the present situation 
in which it seems impossible to reach an agreement on the fundamental principles of 
social order.
The effects o f the neoliberal development strategy on social integration are also 
associated with the ruling class' inability to elaborate and agree upon a societal project 
broad enough to articulate the diverse social interests. That model has generated a 
division among the economic elites and it is also exclusionary in nature due, among
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other things, to its attempt to reduce work benefits, public social spending and state 
subsidies, and to the generation of unemployment. Both dimensions of the economic 
restructuring process limit the elites' possibilities of forming alliances among themselves 
and with other social sectors, in order to construct democratically the new rules o f the 
game to regulate the relations between the social and political actors. The main objetive 
of neoliberal economic restructuring has been to develop a market logic in the allocation 
of resources, the search for fiscal balance, decreased state regulation, and insertion o f the 
Colombian economy into the world market, all imposed by the imperatives of 
globalization which, among other things, has implied a loss of both the sovereignty and 
the autonomy of national societies in favor of supra-national regulatory agencies.
Regarding appropriate criteria for allocating social resources, the neoliberal 
strategy has established that the "laws of economics" and the principles of scarce 
resources, budget restriction, legal security and supply and demand should govern in 
these matters. In contrast, the Constitution of 1991 opposed these very principles of 
commutative justice with the principles of distributive justice, in which the criterion for 
allocation is not economic but extra-economic, i.e., political. This has a negative effect 
on neoliberal efforts to reduce public spending, but it was the result of a collective 
foundational decision in which the criteria and the priorities to be applied in the 
allocation of social resources were questions that were decided politically. What the 
confrontation between the two societal projects is showing is that there is no agreement 
on either the fundamentals of social order or on whether the assignment of liberties, 
goods and social opportunities should be done on the basis of political criteria and legal
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norms or on the basis of the principles of economic science. The objective of the sixth 
chapter is to analyze these contradictions.
Finally, it is concluded that if  Colombian society wishes to surmount the crisis, it 
is necessary to generate an agreement on a broader and more inclusive societal project. 
However, the processes of restructuring the economy associated with the free market 
and globalization, do not seem to leave room for the social dimension and distributive 
justice. Nevertheless, the construction of an ethical foundation for agreement regarding 
a new social order, constitutes the very essence of democracy.
Chapter 1 
Literature Review: 
A Critical Appraisal of Two Approaches 
to Understanding Latin American Politics
The point of departure of this dissertation is that Colombian society has suffered, for 
several decades, a severe crisis of legitimacy and integration, understood as the 
weakness of the state, political and economic exclusion, high levels of violence, a lack 
of trust on the part of the citizens in public and political institutions, and the absence of a 
ruling class with a project of society strong enough to articulate different social interests.
Institutions are formal and informal rules which structure social life. They 
constrain social action in order to give political, economic and social relations a
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minimun of covergence. Institutions also facilitate capital acumulation to the extent that 
they establish property rights and reduce uncertainty, and information and transaction 
costs (North, 1990). For this reason it is important for society to have an adecuate 
relation between political and economic institutions. However, in Colombia the 
simultaneous adoption o f a neoliberal economic model and a constitutional reform in the 
nineties, has deepened problems of political and social integration. To resolve such a 
crisis, Colombia would need to adopt strong and inclusive political and economic 
institutions in order to integrate society and mediate its conflicts. But the process of 
political and economic restructuring of the state and economy have evidenced a 
contradictory relationship. While the “political opening” has produced favorable 
conditions for fostering programs of democratization and social integration, the 
“economic opening” has counteracted that possibility given that it implies a social 
exclusionary process. This crucial tension between the weak state and the structural 
constraints of neoliberal economic adjustment has been characteristic of Latin America 
in the nineties. However it has been neglected and undertheoized in most of the 
democratization studies.
This double restructuring is the outcome of the confluence of international and 
national factors. Regarding the international factors, I maintain that the search for 
democracy and free markets in Latin America in general, and in Colombia in particular, 
is, in part, the effect of the current worldwide political and economical restructuring 
toward globalization that reduces the state’s room for maneuver in the domestic sphere. 
This tendency is determining a new relationship between the state, the economy, and
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civil society under the aegis o f neoliberalism, producing the emergence of a new 
situation in Latin America that cannot be analyzed with the traditional democratization 
approach.
The interplay of economic and political factors in the restructuring of the 
Colombian politico-economic system, engenders a contradiction between the two pillars 
of state action: legitimacy and economic efficiency. This contradiction stems from a 
new constitutional order which claims “more state” as a condition to overcome the 
legitimacy crisis and integrates society, and a development model which requires “less 
state” in order to allow the free allocation of society’s resources by the market. This 
contradiction determines the incapacity of the Colombian state and political regime for 
integrating and orienting society, and redistributing its resources.
Given that the abovementioned tendency is similar in most of the Latin American 
countries, in this chapter I will discuss my differences with the democratization and 
political economy approaches that examine political regime change and economic 
adjustment in the region, neglecting structural political and economic factors. 
According to most of the studies reviewed in this chapter, the cause o f both phenomena 
is determined by the strategic elections of actors in the democratization and economic 
restructuring processes. With the exception of some authors who emphazise 
international and domestic structural factors, in most of studies there is a lack of 
consideration of structural aspects of the contradictions between the demands of 
democratization and those of the neoliberal restructuring; of the implications of change
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of the economic model in the transformation of the political regime, and the influence of 
international factors.
For purposes of analysis, I will identify whether the literature on democratic 
transition and transition to a market-oriented economy belongs to one or the other of 
the two major theoretical perspectives in which it can be classified: a) the human 
agency approach, which in turn, is manifested in two different versions: voluntarism 
and rational choice theory, and b) the structural approach. The human agency 
approach places emphasis on the "micro" level, where social phenomena are 
considered as the result of actors’ actions, interests, beliefs, preferences, and choices.
The structural approach places emphasis on the "macro" level where social 
phenomena are explained as the result of transformations in the relationships 
between political, social or economic conditions, forces and institutions.
It is necessary to highlight these theoretical distinctions in order to establish 
the framework for the perspective I will maintain in this dissertation, since I consider 
social relations to consist of the actions o f human beings, which are constrained by 
unintentional forces arising from their actions and interactions.
1.1. The Democratization Approach
Owing to the wave of re-democratization that has been sweeping across Latin 
America since 1980, the study of the region's political processes has been dominated 
by the democratization approach for the past two decades. By this I refer to the
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entire area o f comparative political studies that aims to analyze different patterns o f 
change from authoritarian regimes to democratic ones and the degree of 
consolidation of democracy in Latin American countries, as well as the relationship 
between the actions o f different political actors and the kind o f democratic 
institutions that arise therefrom.1
Although said studies contributed in part to an understanding o f the factors 
that caused the process o f transition from authoritarian to democratic regimes in 
Latin America and the role performed by the military, political parties, and civil 
society in these processes, they display serious limitations such as “theoretical denial, 
voluntarism, barefoot empiricism and intellectual recycling” (Remmer, 1991: 490). 
From my viewpoint, there are five facts that limit the conceptual and explanatory 
possibilities of the democratization approach and prevent better understanding of 
Latin American politics.
First o f all, it is not clear that such studies provide “a model of regime 
change that can be applied around the globe,” as asserted by Frances Hagopian 
(1993:465). Indeed, despite the heterogeneity and complexity o f the democratization 
processes, due to the heterogeneity o f socioeconomic conditions and types of 
regimes that constitute the starting point for democratization, this approach tends to 
what may be called “south-cone-ization, ” i.e., it tends to generalize and to apply the
1 The most representative studies within said current o f  analysis are those by Guillermo O’Donnell, 
Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (1986); James M. Malloy and Mitchell A. Seligson 
(1987); Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour M. Lipset (1989); Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne 
Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens (1992); and James Petras and Fernando I. Leiva (1994).
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analysis o f the Argentine, Chilean, Uruguayan and Brazilian political processes to all 
o f Latin America. Consciously or unconsciously, such analysis starts from the 
premise that democracy may only be interrupted by a military or authoritarian 
regime; that democracy existed before the authoritarian regimes emerged and that it 
may be resumed through the simple substitution o f military regimes by civilian 
governments. From this perspective, James M. Malloy, in an attempt to elaborate a 
general framework within which to compare different cases o f transition to 
democracy in Latin America, has had to conclude that the great diversity o f national 
cases prevents the development o f general models or theories regarding the shift 
from authoritarian to democratic regimes in Latin America (1987: 237).
Indeed, since there are cases like Mexico, Costa Rica, Venezuela, and 
Colombia, in which non-authoritarian civilian regimes - by agreement among the 
respective political elites - restrict the democratic character o f the political system, 
the transition to democracy approach cannot be applied as a generally valid model. 
This is especially clear with respect to the Colombian case, which some analysts 
have asserted is difficult to categorize because,
unlike many of its continental neighbors, Colombia has avoided both military 
rule and chronic political and economic instability since 1958, when the 
leaders of the two major parties came together to form the con-sociational 
National Front (...) The rigid con-sociational practices (relaxed in the post- 
1974 period), combined with other restrictions and have limited the 
democratic nature of the regime (Hartlyn, 1989: 292-293).
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Secondly, the democratization approach neglects the crucial role that
socioeconomic structures play in determining social phenomena. This is a
consequence of the theoretical displacement from structuralism to human agency,
that has taken place in Latin American political studies in the past decade. One
example of this displacement is the change in the theoretical position of O'Donnell
(1973), who, after having explained the breakdown of democracy in Latin America
in terms o f political and economic contradictions engendered by the industrialization
process, asserted, along with Schmitter, that “What actors do and do not seems much
less tightly determined by "macro" structural during the transitions we study here
than during breakdowns of democratic regimes (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986: 19).
For these authors, what determines outcomes in the social realm are:
unexpected events (fortuna), insufficient information, hurried and audacious 
choices, confusion about m otives and interests, plasticity, and even  
indefinition o f  political identities, as w ell as the talents o f  specific  
indivuduals (virtu ) (Ibidem: 4-5).
It is theoretically and methodologically incoherent, to say the least, to try to explain 
the breakdown of democracy as the result of structural factors and its resumption as 
the result of actors’ intentions or human agency. The same is true o f Malloy (1987: 
239), who, in spite of recognizing that the main structural problem of political 
economy in Latin America is the contradiction between the need to accumulate 
capital and the need to achieve political legitimacy by responding to the demands of 
key social sectors, concludes that the solution to the dilemma lies in the governments' 
capability to solve key public policy issues. Malloy's adherence to voluntarism 
appears clearly when he asserts that
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changes in regim e are significantly influenced by the decisions o f  the 
political leaders w ho have frequently sought total control o f  the state. I f  this 
assertion is correct, there is obviously a key voluntary dim ension to the 
process that not only makes it difficult to formulate a general theory but also 
precludes neat deterministic theories based on general laws (ibidem: 237).
These authors’ theoretical turns exhibit methodological incoherence, given that a
single variable, i.e. regime change, is explained by structural factors in cases of
transition to authoritarianism and by human agency in instances of transition to
democracy (Remmer, 1991).
Przeworski also develops an approach centered on human agency, in the 
rational choice version, aimed to highlight the strategic character of democracy. As 
he points out,
I am convinced that arguments about whether dem ocracies are supported by 
acting out o f  values or by strategic pursuit o f  interests are not resolvable by 
direct reference to evidence. The tw o orientations have to and do com pete 
with each other in making sense o f  the world around us. The only claim  I am 
trying to substantiate is that a theory o f  dem ocracy based on the assumption 
o f  a self-interested strategic com pliance is plausible and sufficient 
(Przeworski, 1991: 24).
Therefore, this author defines democracy in very restrictive terms as a political 
competition, organized by rules where there are periodic winners and losers and 
contestation open to participation (ibidem: 10). If there are periodic winners and 
losers in a democratic system, Przeworski asks himself why political actors accept 
the rules of the game even when they do not benefit from them in the same way as 
others? To answer this question, the author develops a preference model to conclude 
that political actors accept short-term losses in the democratic game if they expect 
some gains in the future. Thus, democratic consolidation occurs when, despite the
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fact that not ail political actors benefit from the democratic arrangements, no one can 
imagine acting outside the democratic institutions, due to expectations of future 
winnings, but especially due to the fact the costs o f failing to overthrow the 
democratic regime are higher than those of maintaining it (ibidem: 26),
Przeworski reduces democracy to mere game theortic dynamics,2 wherein the 
democratic character of institutions depends exclusively upon collective actors’ rational 
preferences and choices and on the degree of uncertainty in the correlation o f political 
forces: i.e., the more unknown and uneven the correlation, the more democratic the 
regime that arises from it will be (ibidem: 81-82). However, this perspective fails to 
consider two aspects. The first is that individual behavior is ruled not only by rationality 
but also by norms and institutions embedded in the culture of a given society (Elster, 
1992). Secondly, regimes and institutions are also significantly influenced by changes 
in international politics and economics, class structures, specific historical conjunctures, 
and crises of consent or legitimacy. This last aspect is expressly rejected by Przeworski 
who considers that “explanations of regime breakdown in terms of legitimacy are either 
false or tautological.” (ibidem: 54, fn. 2). He considers that legitimacy crises can best be 
understood as the effect of the organization of “counter-hegemony”, but although he 
recognizes the Gramscian inspiration of this hypothesis, which would therefore seem to 
have a class character, he rejects the concept of hegemony due to Gramsci's framework
2 Although in these pages I use Przeworski's work as an example of political analysis based on rational 
choice theory, it is necessary to mention Youssef Cohen 's analysis o f the breakdown o f democracy in 
Brazil and Chile (1994), and Barbara Gedddes study of state reform in Latin America (1994).
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of duality of coercion and consent [which] is not sufficiently specific institutionally to 
serve as a guide to the problem at hand (ibidem: 55, fn. 3).
Due to its lack of attention to structural factors, the democratization approach
also fails to recognize the fact that the transition to democracy in Latin America
occurred in a new context: the global processes of internationalization o f the
economy and the rise of neo-liberalism, which synthesizes an array of structural
factors that are reshaping the relationship between the state, politics, economics, and
civil society, thus requiring a new theoretical framework to analyze the relationship
among them and the problem of fostering democracy. As Remmer points out,
every one o f  the regime transitions that have occurred since the late 1970s (...) 
has taken place against a background o f  major change in the international 
econom y, mounting econom ic difficulties, and a pro-democratic policy shift 
on the part o f  the region's hegem onic power. Studies o f  democratization, 
however, have characteristically denigrated the significance o f  exogenous 
variables, leaving us with com plex and idiosyncratic explanations o f  
individual cases that establish no basis for understanding how  and w hy such a 
large and heterogeneous collection o f  authoritarian regim es cam e to give up 
power at more or less the same point in time (1991: 486).
Thirdly, for the aforementioned reason, the democratization approach 
neglects the role of the state as both subject and object of the process of transition to 
democracy since its explanatory emphasis is placed primarily on the conjunctive 
analysis of regime change. For some authors of this current of analysis, Latin 
American politics is seen to be the result of an eternal oscillation between democratic 
and authoritarian regimes. It is illustrative in this respect to mention Mitchell 
Seligson, who believes that the whole Latin American region undergoes cyclical 
periods of democracy and authoritarianism about every twenty years (Seligson, 1987:
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3-4). In a more recent work, Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan have recognized that the 
democratization approach has paid virtually no attention to the problem of stateness, 
and they try to fill the gap by showing that no form of democracy is possible without 
the existence o f a sovereign state (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 17).
Three exceptions to this tendency to concentrate exclusively on the rational 
choices made by agents and regime change are the studies done by Rueschemeyer, 
Stephens and Stephens (1992), Lipset, Kyoung-Ryung and Torres (1993), and Petras 
and Leiva (1994), who, with a structural approach, place the emphasis on the 
interplay between the capitalist economy, the state, social classes, and regime. 
Rueschemeyer et.al., comparing historical tendencies of democratic development in 
Latin America, the Caribbean, and Europe, maintain that the possibility of 
democratization processes is determined by changes in class structure and the 
autonomy of the state engendered by capitalism. Drawing from Barrington Moore 
(1966), these authors define class structure as the specific historical articulation of 
socioeconomic antagonisms that are embodied in different forms of organization and 
become actors of social and political transformation. However, contrary to Moore, 
the concept of class of Rueschemeyer et.al. encompasses not only traditional agrarian 
class relations and landlord-bourgeoisie relations, but urban workers as well, 
assigning the latter a decisive role in the democratization process (Rueschemeyer et. 
al., 1992: 58-59 nad 271). Class struggle for participation and distribution of scarce 
economic and social resources is mediated by the state, which must be autonomous 
in the face of diverse antagonistic interests. The relative autonomy of the state is
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another central condition for democratic development, which means that the state
must have sufficient margin for maneuverability with respect to the dominant classes
in order to allow for the expression of other non-dominant but competing interests.
As Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens point out,
if  the state is sim ply a tool o f  the dominant classes, dem ocracy is either 
im possible or mere form. Such autonomy o f  the state is in fact but one aspect 
o f  the differentiation between political collective decision making and the 
wider structures o f  inequality (1992: 64-65).
In synthesis, these authors maintain that capitalist development engenders 
democracy because it weakens the agrarian dominant class and strengthens organized 
labor, which in turn, shifts the balance of class power. Indeed, urban workers as a 
factor o f social transformation can explain the democratization process which 
accompanied the industrialization of Latin America, precisely because the latter 
process entailed a strengthening of the working class, a key social sector needed by 
hegemonic classes to set the basis for the new social order, expressed in a “social 
contract” between politics, capital and labor that gave rise to the welfare state. 
However, there is a limitation in the framework that Rueschemeyer, Stephens and 
Stephens propose for explaining the democratization processes of the 1980s and 
1990s, since those decades were characterized by the adoption of a neo-liberal 
development model based on a new relationship between state, economy, and society 
that redefines the old class-coalitions in which workers played a key role. In the new 
class arrangements, organized workers are no longer the agents of democratization. 
Indeed, neo-liberal policies such deregulation of economic process and 
"flexibilization" of the labor market, weaken workers' ability to respond forcefully 
and to act collectively and organize in nationwide labor unions. Their negotiating
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power is reduced because it would otherwise interfere with the goal of reduced 
public spending, which is another pillar of the neo-liberal order.
More than forty years ago, Lipset considered that the level of socioeconomic
development determined the degree of democracy. Comparing democratic and non-
democratic countries across four different indices (wealth, industrialization,
urbanization, and education), he found that democratic countries had the highest
levels in each variable (Lipset, 1959: 80). In 1993 Lipset, along with Kyoung-Ryung
and Torres, published the results of a study which basically confirmed Lipset’s 1959
conclusion, i.e., “economic development is the single most important predictor of
political democracy when controlling for other variables” (Lipset,Kyoung and
Torres, 1993: 160). In order to reinforce their findings, these authors argue against
O’Donnell's first analysis of the origin of authoritarian regimes in Latin America:
before the w ave o f  transition to dem ocracy beginning in the m id-1970s, som e 
argue that the relationships hypothesized in the 1950s did not hold. But the 
subsequent record argues for the interconnections between democratic 
structures and rising levels o f  incom e, although econom ic growth does not 
determine political democracy by itse lf (ibidem: 170).
Petras and Leiva depart from the idea that
discussions o f  political regime, whether electoral-civilian or military, need to 
refer to the state-class relation upon which they depend. Regim es cannot 
defend them selves or promote the accumulation process when they act 
contrary to the state interest (1994: 9).
From this structural perspective, they analyze the Chilean transition to democracy
taking into account the contradictions that engender the change of ruling elites which
must act within a state and economy whose structures were transformed through
authoritarian rule. By the "state", these authors mean the permanent institutions that
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exert a monopoly over the means of coercion and those that control the economic 
levers of the accumulation process, and “the concomitant ensemble of class relations 
that have been embedded in these same institutions” (Petras and Leiva, 1994: 7). 
The "regime," on the other hand, is constituted by the political officials who occupy 
the executive and legislative branches along with the rules that determine the actions 
of political forces. According to these authors, the new Chilean civil regime 
inherited an undemocratic state as a consequence of the authoritarian constitution of 
1980, and the adoption of the neo-liberal model of economy. The result was the 
centralization of capital and “the dramatic growth in social inequalities in income 
and widespread conditions of poverty, conditions that both broadened and deepened 
in the process of recovery and economic expansion" (ibidem: 38). Although the 
conceptual distinction that Leiva and Petras make between "state" and "regime" 
exhibits methodological problems and requires further theoretical elaboration, it may 
prove useful in helping to understand the difficulties o f fostering democratic 
development in countries like those of Latin America where states are weak and 
regimes, owing to their exclusionary and patrimonial character, may counteract such 
a process.
Fourth, the democratization approach fails to take into account the role 
played in Latin American polities by societal factors such as the lack of social 
integration, the weakness of both the state and civil society, and the persistence of 
pre-modern forms of social and political relations such as clienteslim and
patrimonialism3, and the consequent existence o f informal rules and non­
institutionalized forms o f behavior (North, 1993; O’Donnell, 1996). In combination, 
these factors generate hybrid societies and regimes in Latin America that perform in 
ways notoriously different from what the formal societal norms prescribe, thus 
affecting the possibility for political and economic reforms to produce the expected 
results. Due to its neglect o f this aspect, the democratization approach cannot 
provide an adequate explanation, as Hagopian affirms, for “even after rotation of 
office and partial economic recovery, many of the region’s democracies barely 
manage to limp in an unconsolidated state"4 Given this situation, O'Donnell (1996) 
recognizes the ambiguity o f the concept o f democratic consolidation and suggests 
that it should be abandoned in favor of a more realistic approach which takes the 
persistence of clientelism and other informal rules into account. He therefore resorts 
to Robert Dahl's concept o f polyarchy5 in order to identify different types o f political 
institutional agreements in Latin America. Dahl, however, distinguishes between 
democracy as an ideal type and polyarchy as
the institutional arrangements that have com e to be regarded as a kind o f  
imperfect approximation o f  an ideal, and experience show s, I believe, that when  
the same term is used for both, needless confusion and essentially irrelevant 
semantic arguments get in the w ay o f  analysis (1971: 9).
In spite o f this warning, Dahl's statement has a bearing on democracy studies,
generating a true explosion o f typologies o f democratic regimes which Collier and
Levitsky (1997) have termed “democracy with adjectives.” Nevertheless, scholars
3 Clientelismo is a political patronage system, whereas patrimonialismo refers to the use o f  public 
resources for private purposes.
4 Hagopian (1993), p. 465.
5 As in known, Dahl defines polyarchy as the political order that possesses the following seven attributes: 
elected officials, free and fair elections, inclusive suffrage, the right to run for office, freedom o f  
expression, alternative information, and associative autonomy (Dahl, 1971: 1; 1989: 220).
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do not seem to realize that the use o f qualifiers in terms such as "limited-suffrage 
democracy", "one-party democracy", "illiberal democracy", "tutelary democracy", 
"delegated democracy", "oligarchic democracy", "restricted democracy", "democracy 
under siege", and so on, simply permit the creation o f euphemisms to refer to the 
structural social problems o f the Third World and its lack o f the basic requisites that 
characterize truly liberal democratic regimes.
Finally, the concept of democracy used in the democratization approach seems 
very narrow since it is conceived strictly in terms o f its political dimension, i.e., as free 
elections and representative government, while the social and economic dimensions are 
overlooked precisely at a moment in which neo-liberal restructuring in Latin America is 
negatively affecting the democratic goal o f distribution in the region. To quote just one 
example, O’Donnell maintains that all the polyarchies he has studied in Latin America 
“are such because o f a simple but crucial fact: elections are institutionalized” 
(O’Donnell, 1996: 36). This is a minimalist conception of democracy which reduces the 
task o f constructing democracy to mere institutionalization o f a political system but 
which does not take the ethical contents o f the resulting institutional order into account. 
“In this conception, democracy a set o f abstract rules, can pose only ‘technical’ 
problems of governance and administrative efficacy” (Boron, 1995: 190). However, 
beyond the electoral politics and instrumental problems o f governing are the problems 
that constitute the very essence o f politics: collective deliberation about, among other
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things, the distribution of economic and social goods. Latin American countries 
underwent (under the authoritarian regimes) or are undergoing (under the civilian 
ones) a neo-liberal restructuring o f their states and economies, which is redefining 
the concept of democracy and sketching an institutional framework which is 
determining the conditions in which civilian governments have to act and thereby 
reducing the spectrum of social and economic policies from which they may choose. 
Such restructuring is displacing the locus of social justice and distribution from the 
state to the market, thus affecting the possibilities for the state to pursue a more 
egalitarian order in societies like those of Latin America which are characterized by 
extreme inequality.
For the above-mentioned reasons, it is necessary to celebrate the publication 
of studies with a broader and more critical perspective. Such is the case of the book 
edited by Agiiero and Stark (1998) in which they call on comparative political 
analysts, in the first place, to elaborate a more complex vision of current Latin 
American politics, that will take multiple aspects of the normative, historical, 
cultural, and structural context of Latin American democracy into account, such as 
gender, ethnicity, administration of justice, “economic reforms, large-scale social 
restructuring, changes in political practices, and the influence of globalization” 
(ibidem: ii). In the second place, they are called on to abandon minimalist 
conceptions of democracy in favor of rethinking the “decoupling between procedural 
and substantive versions of democracy” (ibidem: 373).
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1.2. The Transition to a Market Oriented Economy
The 1980s brought a profound economic crisis to Latin America, characterized by 
high levels of foreign debt, fiscal deficit, hyperinflation, and low economic growth 
rates. This situation determined a shift in comparative political studies towards 
political economy approaches. Initially, these studies, as well as the economic policy 
measures taken by public policy makers, were of a conjunctural nature, oriented 
towards generating domestic savings, reducing the fiscal deficit and equilibrating the 
balance of payments. But reality soon showed that those reforms were due to a 
process o f a structural nature and a new international correlation of forces, expressed 
in the so-called “Washington consensus” (Williamson, 1990a and 1990b). The result 
of that process was an actual transition from the model of industrialization through 
substitution of imports to one of liberalization and internationalization o f the 
economy. This transition required the abandonment of state intervention in the 
economy along with profound market-oriented reforms. In other words, at the end of 
the 1980s, Latin America faced a radical transformation in the political, economic 
and social spheres. Since the mid-1980s this process was articulated with the 
tendency towards re-democratization of the region, which gave rise to another 
theoretical approach to analyzing Latin American politics: i.e., that which places 
emphasis on the transition to a market-oriented economy (the neo-liberal 
restructuring) and its interplay with the transition to a democratic regime.
Initially, the analysts explored the relation between economic restructuring 
programs and authoritarian and democratic regimes. Remmer (1990), Haggard
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(1990), Haggard and Kaufman (1992), Bates and Kruger (1993), Przeworski and 
Limogni (1993), Diamond, Linz and Lipset (1995), and Geddes (1995), all reached 
the conclusion that, to the contrary o f what had been held in the past, authoritarian 
regimes do not possess any advantage over democratic ones in relation to the 
performance of the economy and the possibility of adopting policies that altered the 
economic and social well-being of the diverse social groups. Other analysts explored 
the relation between that performance and the quality of the bureaucracy and state 
institutions, and concluded that the role of the public sector was of vital importance 
for developing successful processes of economic restructuring, for which state 
autonomy and bureaucratic capacity were required (Evans, 1995; Waterbury, 1992).
Przeworski (1991) examines the interplay between “marketization” and 
democratization. He develops the argument that the temporary social and economic 
deterioration caused by market-oriented reform can undermine democratic 
consolidation or vice versa (ibidem: 137). The costs of economic adjustment will be 
high for weaker collective actors, especially labor unions. In the face of this 
situation, governments have two options to carry out the economic adjustment: either 
to concert and negotiate with the negatively affected groups, which Przeworski 
considers improbable in developing countries, or to insulate themselves from social 
pressure, which undermines democracy.
Using rational choice theory, he focuses on the way and the opportunity to make 
economic adjustments and asserts that political leaders, technocrats and voters all want
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the period of adoption of radical adjustment programs to be as short as possible. This is 
so because of each actor’s pursuit of its rational interest: “people want to eat, technocrats 
want to succeed, and politicians want to enjoy support” (Przeworski, 1991: 163-164). 
After having done a complex analysis of different actors' courses of action and their 
corresponding expectations of maximized utility, Przeworski reaches a conclusion with 
respect to the sake of the economic reform, which reflects Latin American reality better 
than other actor-centered analyses do: i.e., given the adoption o f radical economic 
programs
that are eventually slow ed or partly reversed, initiated again in a more 
gradual form with less popular confidence, and again slow ed or reversed, 
until a new government com es in and promises a clean break, and the cycle  
starts again ... [because political parties reject restructuring w hile they are in 
the opposition and pursue it when they are in office], w e should expect 
reforms neither to ‘succeed’ nor to ‘fa il’ , but to proceed in spurts: advancing, 
stumbling, retreating, and advancing again (ibidem: 179).
However, Przeworski's book does not deal with the question o f why politicians 
in Latin America and Eastern Europe should adopt market-oriented reforms. He takes 
the economic liberalization programs as a matter of fact, without considering the 
national and international structural factors that engender the need to make the transition 
from politically-regulated economic models to market-oriented ones. He does not take 
into account the existence of an international economic and political system, or global 
economic changes and transnational forces have produced a worldwide political and 
economic restructuring, which in turn, internationalizes national decision-making and 
determines the type o f reforms that governments can implement.
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Joan Nelson (1990), and Haggard and Kaufman (1992) also emphasize 
domestic factors in explaining the adoption o f economic restructuring programs and 
relegate the role of external factors to a second plane, given the variation of national 
cases of econonic restructuring that can be observed within the framework formed by 
international factors. However, exogenous factors are among the important constraints 
that politicians and state agents face in elaborating public policy. The fact that there has 
been notable coincidence in the adoption of neo-liberal reforms in most Third World 
countries in recent years, has led some scholars to analyze the role o f external factors in 
determining this policies. Barbara Stallings (1992), among others, analyzes the 
conditions imposed by international financial agencies such as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB). In doing so, the author is inspired by 
the relation among three factors used by dependency theory to elaborate its explanatory 
framework: a) the dependency of Third World exports with respect to international 
markets of goods and capital, b) the links between the economic elites o f the Third 
World and the interests of international actors, and c) international leverage, understood 
as the direct use of the power that international financial agencies have over this 
countries. This approach, however, does not take into account the fact that international 
markets and actors are also undergoing a profound process of economic and political 
restructuring. The actions of the international financial agencies in particular are the 
expression of a new form of economic regulation generated by the globalization process. 
From this viewpoint, it can be seen that, as structural adjustment deregulates national 
economies, economic regulation is moved to the international plane, as a consequence of 
worldwide political, economic and technological transformations that cause production
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and trade to become “planetized”, and the regulatory capacity of states to be limited 
since it was designed to function effectively only within national territories. From this 
standpoint, the globalization process as a whole, even more than the international 
financial agencies, acts as a constraint of a truly structural nature.
Gamarra (1994) considers the processes of international restructuring of 
capital and globalization to be the main forces that have induced economic 
restructuring in Latin America and reduced the margin of maneuverability on the part 
of public policy makers, but he does not stop to analyze the relation between the 
exogenous factors. He concentrates on domestic factors and considers the economic 
crisis the region suffered to have served as a learning process for the new, 
democratically elected leaders, based on the errors and experiences of their 
authoritarian predecessors. This permitted democratically elected rulers to develop 
more effective and successful policies and to create political coalitions to carry them 
forward. Therefore, Gamarra (1994: 4-7) argues, solution of the economic crisis was 
not simply a question of good faith, but also one of political capacity and leadership. 
Nonetheless, the new democratically elected rulers maintained the exclusionist type 
of decision making as their authoritarian predecessors. This generated tensions 
between democratization processes and economic restructuring processes since, on 
the one hand, Those rulers successfully introduced measures to reduce 
hyperinflation, for which they had popular support, while on the other hand, they 
adopted measures that led to deterioration of the social indicators, a fall in per capita 
income, and an increase in social inequality (ibidem: 6). Thus, the democratization
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and economic restructuring processes not only did not reinforce each other but, 
instead, the implementation of the latter required strong executives with the capacity 
to isolate themselves from diverse social demands and pressures which, in turn, 
entered into contradiction with the need for broad participation and inclusion that are 
essential to the democratization process. This same idea is expressed by Bresser 
Perira, Maravall and Przeworski (1994), for whom the stabilization measures not 
only aggravated the economic crisis but also “generates social costs that make the 
continuation of reforms politically unpalatable under democratic conditions. 
Moreover, the technocratic style in which these policies tend to be formulated and 
implemented undermines the consolidation of democratic institutions (ibidem: 182). 
Therefore, far from having achieved the consolidation of truly liberal democracies, 
Latin America in the 1990s, was characterized by hybrid regimes (ibidem: 6, 12) that 
combined, and still combine, authoritarian and technocratic decision-making 
processes with weak democratic legitimization processes and judicial systems 
(Acuna and Smith, 1994: 18). Acuna and Smith coincide with Gamarra in the idea 
that economic restructuring led both to the exclusion o f the popular sectors from the 
decision-making process and to concentration of political power in the executive.
In contrast with other simplified concepts of democracy, Gamarra considers 
that neo-liberal reforms led to two different concepts of democracy in Latin America: 
a technocratic one, on the part of government officials and international credit and 
economic regulation agencies, which consider democracy to be simply a question of 
effective and efficient management of the economy, and another participatory one,
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held by most o f the social sectors, for whom democracy means broad access to 
decision-making processes. From the viewpoint of the former, the legislative and the 
judicial branches have both proved to be obstacles to the instutionalization of neo­
liberal adjustment policies since their political demands have endangered fiscal 
equilibrium (Gamarra, 1994: 11).
The hybrid nature of Latin American political regimes also finds expression 
in the fact that the new technocratic style o f politics induced by the neo-liberal model 
is articulated with the traditional form of political action in Latin America, i.e., 
clientelism. According to Gamarra, “many analysts, especially economists, argue that 
the distribution of patronage undermines the logic o f a modem market economy. 
However, the Latin American record o f the late 1980s (and the history o f most 
regions of the world) suggests that patronage was an important instrument in the 
implementation of neo-liberalism and in securing political stability. It has always 
been an important tool available to political leaders and the implementation of 
‘modem’ economic reforms did not alter this historical reality” (1994: 7). Although 
this affirmation is correct, while Latin American clientelism is being used by 
technocratic decision-makers, it is also beginning to face its limits in economic 
restructuring and in the new international conditions, as will be seen in the next 
chapter. Fiscal adjustments and public spending cuts deprive clientelist political 
action of resources whereas the existence of international agencies like Transparency 
International creates pressures to reduce political corruption and to establish more 
direct, rational, impersonal relations between the state and civil society.
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In relation to the support for and the opposition to economic restructuring,
Gamarra holds that the former originated in the private sector, which supported the
privatization of public enterprises in exchange for beneficial tax reforms (1994: 10),
while the latter arose among public employees and social sectors that had previously
benefited from public social spending. However, a review o f the bibliography on
this topic makes it possible to conclude that the participation o f business interests has
been ambiguous and has not played a very active role in stimulating and orienting
economic restructuring policies, whereas the seriously weakened popular sectors are
hardly able to oppose the process. Conaghan y Malloy (1994) have expressed
themselves in this sense with respect to various countries of the Andean region, as
have Sola (1994) with respect to Brazil, and Geddes (1995) who, after analyzing
various studies on the subject, holds that
the case studies do not support the stylized view  that state policies reflect 
straightforwardly the desires o f  interest groups ... one encounters little ‘on- 
the-ground’ evidence that groups that have benefited from liberalization or 
other major changes in econom ic strategy lobbied for them. C onversely, 
groups that have borne the costs, especially organized urban labor, have 
shown less capacity to exert political influence than observers expected  
(G eddes, 1995: 196).
Mettenheim and Malloy (1998) share the idea that the convergence of 
democratization and economic restructuring has led to a strengthening of the 
executive branch in Latin America but, contrary to the authors mentioned 
previously, they hold that rulers have avoided the extremes of both 
authoritarianism and liberalism. To the political capacity of the new 
democratic leaders already dealt with by Gamarra, Mattenheim and Malloy add
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the factors of creativity and statecraft as crucial to the political, economic and 
social development of Latin America. The optimism of these two authors 
contrasts with the realism of other scholars such as Vacs, Ai Camp, Gamarra 
and Carrion, who collaborated on the edited volume and who point out, on the 
one hand, the need of those strong executives to isolate themselves from 
different social sectors in order to successfully implement the neo-liberal 
policies in open contradiction to the idea of democracy and, on the other hand, 
the obstacles that political parties and interest groups constitute with respect to 
the adoption of said policies. Although these “personal characteristics- and 
human agency-centered approaches" can make important contributions to an 
understanding of the actors’ strategies, they fail to consider the role played by 
structural factors. Furthermore, it can be argued that strong presidentialism is 
not something new but rather a traditional characteristic of Latin American 
political regimes. What is indeed a novelty, introduced by the neo-liberal 
adjustment process, is the increased power of technocrats and economists, to 
the detriment of parliamentary and judicial institutions.
The political economy approach presents theoretical and methodological 
problems that have been analyzed by Acuna and Smith. For these authors, “inferring 
politics from economics” as well as “divorcing politics from economics” is bad 
methodology (1994: 23). However, they hold that this relation should not be 
established on the basis of transformations of the capitalist accumulation model, i.e., 
the transition from import substitution industrialization to a liberalized market
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economy (ibidem: 56, fn. 6) since, from the political viewpoint, different state 
institutions, regimes and accords are combined in different ways, with the result that 
diverse social forces, classes, actors, and groups find diverse ways to further their 
interests and to achieve their objectives (ibidem: 19).
Despite the fact that these authors recognize that the state, the political regime 
and the economy can mutually affect each other (Acuna and Smith, 1994: 21), their 
analysis neglects the structural aspects of that relationship to concentrate on “the 
logic of support and opposition”. For them, the impact of economics on politics 
occurs in terms of the formation of coalitions that either prevent or facilitate 
economic restructuring or adjustment. Although it is true that “the same economic 
policies will determine divergent political outcomes in terms of the level of 
sociopolitical conflict and opposition to economic reform,” (ibidem: 20). Acuna and 
Smith do not take into account that these divergences conceal profound changes in 
the relations between social classes, and between social classes and the state. 
Contrary to what these authors hold, the transformation of these relations follow a 
similar pattern throughout Latin America since the free-market economic model has 
structural characteristics which, in articulating the region with the world economy, 
necessarily lead to a similar redefinition of the relations between the state, the 
economy, and society. Therefore, in certain historical conjunctures, politics can be 
inferred from economics and vice versa.
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Contrary to the authors just mentioned, Barbara Geddes recognizes the fact that 
economic liberalization involves the creation of a new regime. As she points out, 
because incumbents have gained control over many of the rents created by state 
intervention in the economy, which in turn plays a central role in attracting political 
support, the biggest and certainly the most articulate and politically influential losers 
from structural adjustment in many countries are government officials, cadres of the 
ruling party and their closest allies. Consequently, regime or government change can 
increase the likelihood of economic liberalization because it breaks the link between 
incumbents and the main beneficiaries of statist policies by installing a new set of 
incumbents (Geddes, 1995: 197). However, it can be argued that the rents and social 
benefits of the interventionist state not only benefit government officials and cadres of 
the ruling party but also organized labor, and middle and weaker sectors. The market- 
oriented reform redefines the relationship between the state, the economy, and civil 
society. It is precisely this redefinition which implies that incumbents change, which in 
turn, determines the need to redefine the regime or the rules of the political and 
economic game. This relationship between state, economic model, and regime will be 
developed in the next chapter to construct a new framework in order to understand 
current Latin American politics.
Two reasons impede Acuna and Smith, and Geddes, like many of the authors 
who adhere to this current of analysis, from placing more emphasis on the structural 
aspects of the economic, political, and social restructuring of Latin America. In the 
first place, there is their underlying rational-choice theoretical framework. For these
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authors, the theoretical framework that studies Latin America on the basis of its 
structural conditions do not permit an understanding of the processes that are 
presently occuring in the region (Acuna and Smith, 1994: 24). On the contrary, they 
maintain that
political choices, strategies and contingencies remain central determinants o f  
social and econom ic processes, and their meaning and consequences perhaps 
gain even greater relevance in a conjuncture o f  deep econom ic crisis and 
transformations (ibidem: 20).
For these authors, the reasons that generate support or opposition to structural
adjustment are rooted in rationality and in the individual interests of the social actors
(ibidem: 53). However, economic restructuring not only generates interests,
preferences and expectations of the individuals and groups that are affected by it, it
also transforms the rules of the game that regulate their social relations. In the second
place, Acuna and Smith, like many analysts of Latin American politics, frequently
fail to distinguish clearly between the economic crisis of the 1980s and the structural
transformations o f the accumulation model (Acuna and Smith, 1994: 18-24),
probably due to the historical sequence and overlapping that existed between the two
phenomena. It is therefore necessary to make the following distinction: the debt
crisis gave rise to short-term measures oriented to achieving economic stabilization
by correcting the negative balance of payments and reducing the fiscal deficit. For
this reason, the structural adjustment process has been defined by most analysts as a
set of conjunctural measures oriented to promoting long-term economic growth,
improving resource allocation, and opening up the national economy to the world
market. However, while the policies to confront the economic crisis do not imply a
substantial change in the relations between the state, society and the economy,
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economic liberalization does imply it to the degree that it constitutes a structural 
transformation o f the accumulation model. Acuna and Smith both accept the fact that 
the transformations induced by economic restructuring are not neutral with respect to 
the class structure and that they can strengthen the power of national and 
international capitalist interests, to the detriment of other sectors of society. 
However, this affirmation is not developed in their study. Nonetheless, a profound 
analysis of the structural transformations of the accumulation model is of great 
importance at the moment of evaluating the democratic development of Latin 
America in political and social terms. For this reason, the economic reforms cannot 
be judged only in terms o f resumed growth and consolidation of democracy as 
maintained by Bresser Pereira, Maravall and Przeworski (1994: 182).
Haggard and Kaufman (1995) also deal with the theoretical framework of 
political economy studies. Their work constitutes a failed attempt to include the 
consideration of structural factors in their analysis of the interplay between politics 
and economics. Their concern is with analyzing the impact of the handling of 
macroeconomic policy on the withdrawal of authoritarian regimes from power and 
the consolidation of democratic regimes. The starting point taken by these authors is 
that the rational choice model used in most studies of the transition to democracy, 
especially in the aforementioned study by O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Przeworski, has 
placed an exaggerated emphasis on the actors’ decisions. Therefore, it is necessary to 
take into consideration the social and economic structures that determine who the 
relevant political actors are and what their preferences are (Haggard and Kaufman:
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1995: 6). These authors begin by analyzing how the transitions from authoritarian 
rule are produced. The conditions under which an authoritarian regime withdraws is 
determined by two factors: a) the presence or absence of economic crisis and success 
or failure in managing economic policy; and b) the degree of cohesion among the 
ruling elite. From this perspective, the rise of economic crises and deficient 
management of economic policy on the one hand, and the fragmentation of 
government coalitions on the other, makes authoritarian regimes unable to establish 
and control the terms of their withdrawals (a prerogative that might otherwise be 
feasible) and, consequently, makes it impossible to influence the political process in 
the democratic regime. In contrast, good economic performance and a cohesive 
ruling elite can better manage, and even avoid, economic crises, which in turn, 
redounds in increasing the regime's capacity to withstand political opposition and to 
determine and control the terms of their withdrawal from power. This enables them 
to protect themselves and to retain their influence in the democratic regime.
However, despite Haggard and Kaufman’s rejection of the preponderant 
emphasis on actors’ strategies and subjective factors to explain democratic 
transitions, they eventually conclude that the determining factors o f changes of 
regime change are not the structural ones, but rather the personal ability of rulers to 
manage the economy and to avoid internal divisions within their governments and 
the coalition that supports them (1995: 12, 37). Haggar and Kaufman are therefore 
open to the same criticism that they make of authors like O’Donnell, Schmitter, 
Przeworski and Acuna and Smith: i.e., they neglect the crucial role that
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socioeconomic structures and international factors play in determining social 
phenomena.
Haggard and Kaufman also analyze the effects of inherited economic 
conditions in new democracies. Their main argument is that the economic legacies of 
the authoritarian regimes and o f the transition period determine the ability of new 
democratic rulers to initiate economic “adjustments” and to manage economic 
policy. For this reason, they distinguish between two types of democratic regimes: a) 
those that inherit favorable economic conditions and whose task is to maintain the 
previous economic model, and b) those that inherit an economic crisis situation and 
must therefore initiate the “economic adjustment” process (1995: 159-163). In the 
latter case, the initiation of economic reforms requires a powerful, centralized 
executive, capable of achieving both autonomy and isolation from pressures arising 
from representative institutions and social sectors negatively affected by such 
reforms. However, quite to the contrary, the consolidation of economic reform and 
democracy actually requires the reduction of such autonomy, and a close relationship 
between the executive and representative institutions since they are crucial in 
structuring distributive outcomes (ibidem: 335-340).
Two critiques can be made of Haggard and Kaufman. First, their concept of 
democracy seems very narrow since they consider it to be primarily an instrument to 
advance the cause of neo-liberal adjustment but not as a means by which to 
contribute to improving the standard of living of society. As they point out,
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new democratic governments that cam e to power in the wake o f  crises had 
incentives to undertake new policy initiatives, but implementation was 
difficult precisely because econom ic problems were more acute and demands 
for short-term econom ic relief more widespread. Incom ing democratic 
governments in the non-crisis cases faced a political and policy setting  
shaped by the fact that authoritarian regimes had already undertaken 
substantial econom ic reforms and built a coalition o f  beneficiaries. In these 
cases the major question w as whether such policies would be sustained under 
conditions o f  more open political com petition (1995: 153).
Second, Haggard and Kaufman do not provide an explanation of why the new
democratic regimes must adopt neo-liberal “economic adjustment,” or why its adoption
coincides with the emergence of new democracies. To do so would have implied
considering structural economic factors from a broader scope rather than focusing only
on the short-term horizon of economic performance, as they in fact did (ibidem: 28,
154). The only relationship they establish between economic factors and social
transformation is that existing between economic deterioration, social mobilization, and
political instability (ibidem: 30-31). This connection can explain a change o f regime but
it cannot explain the change o f economic model. This neglect o f macro-structural factors
is a characteristic that Haggard and Kaufman’s analysis shares with most studies done
using the “transition and consolidation to democracy approach.” Like most authors of
this school, Haggard and Kaufman neglect the fact that the transition to democracy in
Latin America occurred within a new context: i.e., the global processes of
internationalization of the economy and the rise of neo-liberalism as the structural
factors that are reshaping the relationship between the state, politics, the economy, and
civil society.
It is possible that this vacuum is being filled by more recent studies on the 
political economy of Latin America, which show a tendency to reconsider structural
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factors of both an international and a domestic nature. The two books jointly edited
by Smith and Korzeniewicz (1996 and 1997) as well as the volume jointly edited by
Oxhom and Ducatenzeiler (1998) all seem to show this trend. The first two authors -
inspired by Karl Polanyi's holistic view in The Great Transformation - assume a
structural, macro-social, and long-lasting perspective of the economic restructuring
process in Latin America, which surpasses the view centered on the actor and its
agency at the micro-social level in the short term, that Acuna and Smith had posed in
1994. While these authors rejected the relationship between politics and economics
in terms o f the capital accumulation model at that time, three years later Smith and
Korzeniewicz affirmed that
the collision between m obile capital and globalization o f  production on the 
one hand, and national and local actors in Latin Am erica on the other, 
appears to have resulted in a sharp erosion o f  the capacity o f  the national 
state to manage major m acroeconom ic variables... A more nuanced 
understanding o f  the recasting o f  political power, however, calls attention to 
new patterns in the relation between political rule and accumulation. From 
this point o f  v iew , the boundaries o f  political rule and regulation becom e  
redefined, as traditional political institutions at the national level increasingly 
negotiate and coordinate their operations with new agencies o f  political 
regulations functioning at a supranational level (1997: 12).
Oxhom y Ducatenzeiler (1998) start with a double critique o f the 
bibliography on Latin American political economy. In the first place, it tends to 
ignore the organizations of civil society as an explicative variable, and fails to give 
due consideration to the fact that civil society has in fact been profoundly affected 
and weakened by the economic restructuring, especially with respect to the labor 
movement. In the second place, as has already been mentioned in the case of 
Haggard and Kaufman, that bibliography "ignores the increasing tendency within 
Latin America for democratic institutions to become more authoritarian, or confuses
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the institutionalization of authoritarian political practices with democratization" 
(Oxhom and Ducatenzeiler, 1998: 7).
Consequently, Oxhom and Ducatenzeiler hold that insertion into the world 
economy and the adoption of neo-liberal restructuring policies have led in Latin 
America to the establishment of “neo-pluralist” regimes, with highly authoritarian 
features that strengthen the executive and limit the participation of political parties 
and social organizations. The stability of these regimes is obtained by means of the 
fragmentation of grassroots organizations (ibidem: 215), which increases the 
traditional weakness of civil society and affects its ability to pressure for structural 
changes in its favor (ibidem: 233).
In synthesis, according to most studies under review in this chapter, the cause of 
both regime change and economic policy making is ultimately determined by the 
strategic choices of key actors. With the exception o f Smith, Acuna and Gamarra 
(1994), Smith and Korzeniewicz (1997), Agiiero and Stark, and Oxhom and 
Ducatenzeiler (1998), who emphasize international structural factors in determining the 
economic restructuring of the Latin American region, most of the studies fail to 
consider structural elements; the contradictions existing between the requirements of the 
democratization process and those of neo-liberal economic restructuring; the 
implications of the change of economic model for the transformation of the political 
regime; and the decisive role of international factors. Most o f the studies explain the 
rise of neo-liberal restructuring as a result of the action and interests of public or private
sector elites and of the institutional limits within which said action is carried out, or 
based on the influence, interests and demands of other social actors, such as organized 
grass-roots sectors. For this reason, the next chapter seeks to contribute, from a 
structural perspective, to greater understanding of the effects that economic restructuring 
has had on Latin American societies. Emphasis will be placed on the intensification of 
the tendencies toward social fragmentation and disintegration that has resulted from the 
transformation of the model of accumulation of capital.
Chapter 2
Theoretical Frame Work:
Globalization, Economic Liberalization, 
and the Problem of Political and Social 
Integration in Latin America
Contrary to the approaches of the previous chapter that emphasized the 
strategic choices of economic and political actors, this chapter will develop a 
structural perspective. Social phenomena are partly determined by structural factors, 
and scientific research should assign them decisive importance, since a fundamental 
basis for social action and transformation is to be found in the dynamics of 
relationships between individuals and structures and the development of 
contradictions within structures. In this sense, individual action occurs within 
frameworks shaped by structural factors and forces generated by individual and 
collective interactions, and long-term tendencies.
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It is common practice to measure the success or failure o f political, economic and
social reforms by the degree to which they manage to achieve the purpose and
rationality o f their authors. Thus, for example, if the stated objective o f a given reform
was to shrink the size o f the state and it was not reduced, it is tipically considered that
this failure was due to the deficient or insufficient application o f the measure in
question. However, in this dissertation I assume a position that goes beyond this type of
analysis. I consider that, the dynamics o f social processes often surpass actors’
intentions, or go even farther beyond, and social actors in conflict for advancing
differents societal projects imposes themselves mutual constraints which acts as a
structural force. It is the context o f forces and social structures in which action is
inscribed what determines their destiny. Economic and political reforms, such as the
change o f accumulation model, or political constitution, are based on postulates of
rationality that are not necessarily fulfilled in social reality. It is not possible to
anticipate the consequences that a decision will unleash. As Herbert Simon maintains,
in an important sense, all decision is a matter o f  com prom ise. The alternative 
that is finally selected never permits a com plete or perfect achievem ent o f  
objectives, but is m erely the best solution that is available under the 
circum stances. The environmental situation inevitably lim its the alternatives 
that are available, and hence sets a m axim um  to the level o f  attainment o f  
purpose that is possible (1947: 6).
Individuals make decisions that may be rational, but society, understood not as 
the sum of the individuals but as the ensemble o f individuals’ interactions, generates 
forces that wind up limiting the individual's field o f action. From this perspective, in the 
Colombian case, the decisions made by actors involved in the economic liberalization 
policy were constrained by policies concerning the Constitution of 1991, and viceversa.
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At the same time, the structural heterogeneity and fragmentation that characterize 
Colombian society, coupled with globalization processes in which it is inscribed, 
affected the course of both societal projects.
Analyses based on rational choice theory are, basically, equilibrium situations 
carried out in static conditions, from the social point of view (North, 1990: 19). These 
studies assume that choice situations can arbitrarily be extracted from the historic 
dynamics o f society. However, societies are constituted by continuous and contradictory 
currents of historic events, and of the assembly of situational consequences which flow 
from those events. Consequently, actors’ choices are always carried out within the 
current of historic process, determining their options. According to Marx, “men make 
their own history, but not of their own free will in circumstances they have chosen, but 
in circumstances they encounter directly, that exist and are a legacy of the past”(1973: 
408). The problem with rational choice theory is that it abstracts actors from their 
historic process. Without the consideration of the impact of historic forces, the analyses 
of preferences, opportunities, and social action of actors, is inevitably arbitrary. It is 
impossible to study empirical social processes ab initio, since there is always a prior 
history that frames any social dynamic. This historic context should be also the subject 
of analysis. The social process is diachronic. Actors are affected by parallel processes 
which occur in different levels; there are multiple historic processes and times that 
elapse in the macro, intermediate, and micro levels of society. Therefore, analyses of 
the economic and political transformations in America Latina in the 1990s has to take 
into account that historical context in which those process are inscribed.
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Finally, in an increasingly interconnected and globalized world, analyses of 
social phenomena should go beyond the relation between action and structure within 
national societies. It is necessary to take account how the international system and 
the effects it generates affect domestic domains. It is precisely this complex 
framework that enables analysts to make generalizations about Latin American 
politics, since many of the inquiries are very descriptive case studies which lack 
sound theoretical bases. In the present chapter, I will attempt to develop this 
interpretative framework.
After examining some theories o f social action (2.1), I will outline a theoretical 
framework for analazing the economic and political reforms in Colombia in the nineties. 
Examining reforms as the result o f the interaction of exogenous and endogenous factors 
provides a better understanding o f the current political, economic and social situation 
not only o f Colombia but also in Latin America. Globalization and the generalized 
diffusion of the neoliberal accumulation model form the exogenous factors (2.2). 
Endogenous considerations are present to a greater or lesser degree in all Latin 
American countries, including the precarious integration o f their societies and their 
social heterogeneity (2.3.1); state weakness (2.3.2); the conflict between political and 
economic restructurings as a societal projects (2.3.3); the effects of neoliberal 
restructuring on their political regimes (2.3.4); and finally, the contradiction between 
the search for legitimacy and efficiency inherent in by both political and economic 
restructuring (2.3.5). The intersection o f exogenous and endogenous factors has
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aggravated o f the problems of integration that have historically characterized the 
region’s societies.
2.1 Social Action: Between the Structural Context and Individual Rationality
As the previous chapter illustrated, current political science tends to explain social 
phenomena in terms of the intentional and rational actions of actors. The dominance 
of rational choice theory and its inscription within methodological individualism 
accounts for this tendency. This position, take for granted that the central debate in 
the social sciences is between methodologial individualism and methodological 
structuralism, where social action is considered a result of a series of constraints 
imposed by the historic development of society, human interactions, conflict, norms 
and social institutions, technological development, and environmental and 
international factors, among others.
In the last two decades, however, a school of thought has emerged that go 
beyond the agent- structure debate by integrating both positions. Among the most 
representative authors of this school are Anthony Giddens (1984, 1997), Douglass North 
(1990), and Jon Elster (1992).
Giddens’ point of departure is his criticism of structural functionalism and of 
structuralism (1997). He criticizes the first perspective for its reduction of human 
action to a mere interiorization of values, and its use of the concept of structure in purely 
descriptive terms; the second is accused of structural determinism. For Giddens both
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approaches lead to denying the agency o f actors in the constituting society. For this
theorist society is in part a result o f the capabilities of social actors (1994), and in part a
result of the social structures, which enable actors to perform. Drawing on Marx,
Giddens affirms that though social actors generate society, they do not do it under
conditions of their own election (1997: 127-128), but rather this effort is structurally
determined. The structures, nevertheless, should not be understood as mere constraints
on human action, but also as the factors that enable agency. Social structures, defined
by Giddens as a "recursively organized set of rules and resources" (1984: 25) arise from
a succession of repeated actions which through their repetition structure social life. In
such a way, actions generate structures and these, in turn, enable individuals to act.
Giddens refers to this condition of social structures as both originated and result from
human action as the “duality of structure”:
“according to the notion o f  the duality o f  structure, the structural properties o f  
social system s are both medium and outcom e o f  the practice they recursively 
organize. Structure is not ‘external’ to individuals: as memory traces, and as 
instantiated in social practices, it is in a certain sense more ‘internal’ that 
exterior to their activities in a Durkheimian sense. Structure in not to be 
equated with constraint but is always both constraining and enabling” (1984:
25).
North seeks to develop a institutional framework to oppose the idea of the
rational actor upon which the economic theory is based. For North, institutions are
the rules of the social game which
“reduce uncertainty by providing a structure to every day life. They are a 
guide to human interaction, so  that when w e w ish to greet friends on the 
street, drive an autom obile, buy oranges, borrow m oney, form a business, 
bury our dead, or whatever, w e know (or can learn easily) how  to perform 
this tasks” (North, 1990: 3-4).
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Institutions are thus the framework within which individual action and social 
interactions are produced. A theory o f institutions, argues North, requires the 
separation of the analysis of the rules o f the game from that of actors’ strategies 
(ibidem: 5-6), because institutions have their own logic and relative autonomy. At 
the same time, however, North affirms that "institutions are a creation of human 
beings. They evolve and are altered by human beings" (1990: 5). Therefore, there is 
a relationship of mutual determination between human agency and institutional 
constraints. By the integrating individual’s strategic choices with institutional 
constraints, North has taken a step toward the unification of theory and methodology 
in the social sciences. North also transcends the primacy o f individual action with 
his conception of social change, starting from his distinction between formal and 
informal institutions (1990: 73). Historic change is the result of the interplay between 
formal institutions which can be modified by the intentional actions of actors, and the 
resistance opposed by intentional modification by informal norms constituted by the 
culture, which resists all attempts at intentional modification (ibidem: 16).
Elster (1998) also tries to establish a mutual relation between agent and 
structure through his criticism of the reduccionism rationalist and normativist 
approaches. His central concern is the diverse dimensions of social action which is 
guided by instrumental racionality in certain spheres, and by social norms in others. 
As Elster has pointed out, human behavior is a result of the tension between homo 
oeconomicus and homo sociologicus:
The former is supposed to be guided by an instrumental rationality, w hile the
conduct o f  the latter is dictated by social norms. The former is "pulled" by
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perspectives o f  future reward, while the latter is "pushed" from behind by 
quasi-internal forces. The former adapts to changing circumstances ... the 
latter adheres to prescribed conduct even when new and apparently better 
options are available to it (Elster, 1992: 119).
The merit of these three perspectives is that they incorporate agency and 
structure in their analysis of how social institutions are produced. Nonetheless, each 
of three theorists assume that the social actors converge around a single institutional 
framework, ignoring that they are, in fact, in permanent conflict whit regard to 
institucional arrangements. While some actors seek to maintain the statu quo, others 
seek to reform or to transform social institutions. This conflictual relationship 
imposes mutual constraints which act as structural determinants of both collective 
and individual actions. In certain moments structural constraints are even more 
determinant. Junctures in which social structures are sharply redefined, such as 
globalization, regime change, or a new model of accumulation, can alter the rules of 
the game that govern social behavior.
2.2. Exogenous Factors: Globalization and Neoliberalism
Political, social and economic problems have traditionally been analyzed from two 
different perspectives: the nation-state and the international system. This is the legacy 
of the Westphalian order which consists basically of: a) the principle of state 
sovereignty, understood as the supreme and exclusive power of the state over the 
population and the territory, and b) the search for nation-state autonomy in a world 
characterized by rivalry among states. However, in recent decades a broad spectrum of 
phenomena are causing globalization, which is altering the so-called Westphalian order. 
By globalization is meant a broad and complex process that links technological.
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political, economic, cultural and institutional dimensions, by means of which the 
distances have been made “so much shorter, the movement of ideas, pictures, currencies 
[goods] and information so much faster, and thus the interdependence of peoples and 
events so much greater” (Rosenau, 1990: 12). Among the principal causes of 
globalization is the development of micro-electronics and its application to practically 
all spheres of human activity, but especially to production and communications. It has 
generated the progressive interdependence of different national societies, the spatial 
reorganization of production, the international integration of trade and financial markets, 
and a profound transformation of the international system. Globalization, however, 
extends beyond the economic realm and promotes changes in political and cultural 
concepts and practices as well, and reduces the time and space dimensions of social 
relations (Mittelman,1996:3). From this perspective, one can say that globalization is 
characterized by emerging patterns of universal interconnectedness and an increased 
consciousness of the world as a unitary whole.
In particular, the application of micro-electronic technology to industry and 
telecommunications has led to the exhaustion of traditional models of production and 
management such as Taylorism and Fordism. This is expressed, among others things, in 
the replacement of production of finished goods under one large roof of a single factory, 
by the production of component parts which may be produced anywhere on the planet 
and assembled directly in the final markets (Cox, 1987; Lipietz, 1988). From the 
geographic perspective, these new production systems generate processes of
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flexibilization, decentralization, internationalization and interdependence among 
national societies which multiply and decentralize the decision-making centers.
This process is also affecting the nation-state's capacity to regulate economy and
society for two reasons. First, the interdependence among states is a consequence of the
inability of single and independent states, individually considered, to control and
regulate phenomena whose origins and effects transcend national borders (Keohane and
Nye, 1989). Second, the increased flexibility of industrial production and the
internationalization of the economy collides with centralism, normative and institutional
complexity, and large public expenditures which are characteristic o f such a modality of
state action. One important consequence of such a change is that the political and
economic arrangements among politics, capital and labor, which gave rise to the welfare
state after World War II, have broken down due to the reduction of social policies, the
tendency toward the “atomization” of productive units which hinders the organization of
workers in national labor unions, and the new scheme for relations between capital and
labor which operates on a world scale. As Vacs points out,
taken to its logical conclusion, transnationalization and interdependence 
w ould culminate in the creation o f  an integrated global political econom y in 
w hich the role o f  states is severely limited by their growing incapacity to 
control crucial variables that affect econom ic, social and political 
developm ents within and across national boundaries (1994: 73).
Robert W. Cox affirms that globalization became ideology when it came to be
considered a finality or an inevitable culmination of the strong market tendencies at
work (1996: 23). Nevertheless, the ideological character of globalization goes beyond
its inevitability. Globalization is embodied in neoliberalism as the new concept of the
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relationship between state, economy, and society. If  the international system until the 
1980s may be characterized as the era o f geopolitics in which anti-communist ideology 
acted as the cohesive factor within the Western nation-states system, in the 1990s the 
new international scenario may be characterized as the era o f geoeconomics in it anti­
communism is replaced by neoliberalism as the cohesive factor, for it represents the 
structural adjustment o f national economies and societies which corresponds to the new 
tendencies o f liberalization, flexibility o f productive processes, deregulation of 
economies and integration o f local and regional markets6. However, in spite of its 
apparent technocratic neutrality, neoliberalism, with its emphasis on values o f freedom 
and individualism, is in fact the new ideology of the redefinition of the relationship 
between the state, the economy and civil society. Neoliberalism, as ideology, implies a 
tendency to replace the logic of politics for the logic o f the market as the principal 
criterion for action in society. In other words, for neoliberals, decisions through public 
institutions are less democratic than decisions through the market. In the words of one 
o f the most representative ideologues of neoliberalism,
the characteristic feature of action through political channels is that it tends to 
require or enforce substantial conformity. The great advantage of the market, 
on the other hand, is that it permits wide diversity. It is, in political terms, a 
system of proportional representation (Friedman, 1982: 15).
6 I am drawing here from Richard Falk (1995) who characterizes the current restructuring o f the world 
order as a transition from “geopolitics” to “geogovemance”, understanding the former as relations among 
nation-states seeking “balance o f power, self-defence, spheres o f  influence, and alliances”, and the latter 
as a more integrated world in economic, political and cultural terms which weakens sovereign states (pp. 
1, 2 ,9). But it is important to recall that the ideological confrontation between the eastern and western 
hemispheres was fundamental in the constitution o f  a world politics, and in the function o f agglutinating 
states around one o f the two poles o f world power. Furthermore, given that globalization is basically a 
globalization of capital and that liberalization of the market and the ideology that accompanies it are its 
clearest expression, I have decided to change the term “geogovemance” for that “geoeconomics.”
52
For neoliberals, the market reduces the need for political intervention. An important 
characteristic o f political decisions is that they require deliberation, consensus and 
submission. The market does not. Thus, for neoliberals the market is more democratic 
than any political regime.
Notwithstanding this, political regulation o f the economy is far from 
disappearing; the economy has become more regulated than it has ever been before. 
What is happening is that the regulation is undergoing a process o f displacement from 
the nation-state level to the supra-state or global level. This phenomenon has been 
considered by scholars as a form of “global governance” understood as the emergence of 
common principles, norms and values to regulate and coordinate political and social 
relations on a global scale (Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992; Commission on Global 
Governance, 1995), which constitute global power structures and enhance the scope of 
political authority and domination. The concept and practice o f “global governance” 
have been fundamental in the constitution o f international regimes that demand 
worldwide observance o f principles such as the free market, democracy, and human 
rights. This is translated into political and economic conditioning that links the granting 
of loans or development aid to the adoption o f structural reforms in the Third World. 
For this reason, one o f the institutional expressions of globalization and global 
governance of the economy is the strengthening o f the role of multilateral financial and 
trade organizations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), 
and the World Trade Organization (WTO). For example, in the past twenty years, the 
IMF has experienced a process of strengthening, in which it moved from performing
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a relatively low-profile role as coordinator o f the international monetary and exchange 
system, which arose from the Bretton Woods agreements in 1945, to playing the role of 
a sort o f supra-state central bank, some of whose functions are supervision of the global 
capital market and the demand for adjusting national economies to the principles of 
globalization and the free market (James, 1996; Scholte, 2000). As Cox has pointed out, 
“international finance is the preeminent agency o f conformity to world-hegemonic order 
and the principal regulator of the political and productive organization o f hegemonic 
world economy (1987: 267).
Another expression of globalization is the constitution o f regional blocs of 
economic integration such as the European Community, Asean, Nafta, Mercosur, and 
the Andean Community, which are a sort o f supra-national space in favor of which the 
nation-state is ceding functions in economic matters. In other words, the state is 
restructuring itself through its participation in the creation of supra-territoriality, i.e., the 
creation of larger spaces and institutions needed to advance the globalization process. 
This restructuring implies the broadening o f the geographical reference o f the state’s 
regulatory capacity. The state is thus undergoing a process of “partial denationalizing 
of national territory and a partial shift of some components o f state sovereignty to other 
institutions, from supranational entities to the global capital market” (Sassen, 1996: xii).
Simultaneously with the aforementioned process, there has been a process of 
“rebirth” o f civil society which is also undergoing a process of breaking national 
boundaries and redefining its role. Its protagonism in the international arena stems not
54
only from individual and group actions but also from the fact that while the nation-state 
is still significant as a reference point for the action of groups and individuals, it is no 
longer the only referent for social action. Their existence has increasingly referred to 
global processes and institutions. They are in the middle of a competition among 
different power and decision-centers for their loyalty and support. As Rosenau points 
out,
individuals have becom e, both as group members and as citizens, a mayor 
battleground on which states, governments, sub-national groups, international 
organizations, regim es, and transnational associations com pete for their 
support and loyalties, thereby posing for them choices that can not be easily  
ignored and that serve as both a measure o f  global change and a challenge for 
global stability (Rosenau, 1990: 213).
However, the rebirth of civil society is a paradoxical process. In spite of the
globalization of individual and group frameworks for their actions, and the fact, noted by
Rosenau, that the awareness of their insertion in the world and their analytic skills have
increased considerably (1990: 13, 64), their influence in the national and international
agenda and decision-making seems to be more and more reduced. This is due to the fact
that while individuals and groups are locally based, the center of power and decisions
are moved away from local life due to the process of internationalization. Only a few
non-governmental organizations and social movements like Amnesty International and
Green Peace, may have the capacity to act transnationally. Most movements and
individuals are circumscribed to the limits o f local life, thus confirming the irony
pointed out by Rosenau that “the abilities of individuals to connect to world politics and
cope with its complexity have reached new heights while their sense of control over the
complexity has fallen to new lows” (1990: 335). Nonetheless, in the past two years
"transnational" social protest movements have begun to arise which, conscious of the
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fact that the decisions o f the supranational institutions increasingly affect their living 
conditions, have begun to question globalization.7 Nevertheless, these movements are 
still very incipient and mainly link groups and individuals from the developed world. 
The civil societies o f the Third World in general, and of Latin America in particular, are 
still far from being able to effectively influence the global centers of decision-making.
That is the framework in which Latin America must act. The above-mentioned 
globalization process acts as a constraining force and precludes the possibility of 
autonomous development. Globalization can explain why some scholars consider it 
“surprising” that one of the findings o f their research “is the degree to which interest 
groups fail to account for the initiation... o f [market-oriented] policy reform” (Bates and 
Krueger, 1993: 455). This new array of global conditions means that the economic 
growth and social development o f the region’s countries depend on their competitive 
insertion in the world market. As Morley points out, the region is “embedded in a 
worldwide trading and financial system, from whose rigid rules there was no easy 
escape” (1995: 5). Besides, in the age of globalization it is not enough to simply export; 
it is also necessary to increase the technological content o f the exported goods and 
services.
7 1 refer to the heterogeeneous ensemble of personalities, political and social movements, and NGOs, o f  
diverse regions o f the world, that have raised the banners o f antiglobalization, to demand everything from 
control o f multinationals and global protection o f the environment, to equitable worldwide distribution of 
wealth, including the disappearance or democratization o f international financial agencies and condoning 
of the foreign debt o f Third World countries. Said groups have directed their protests, often violently, 
against the summit meeting o f the World Trade Organization in Seattle, in December 1999; the Thirtieth 
World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland in January 2000; the joint semi-annual assembly o f the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in Washington, DC in April 2000; the Third Summit o f 
the Americas in Quebec, Canada in April 2001; and the meeting o f the G-8 in Genoa, Italy in July 2001.
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This situation has led since the 1980s to an exhaustion o f the import substitution
industrialization model (ISI) which was adopted by Latin American countries in the
second postwar period. The type o f protected industrialization adopted by Latin
America, and the international division of labor that predominated until the 1970s,
prevented the region from developing structural conditions for improving its
productivity by means o f technological development, in order to ensure competitiveness,
as of the 1980s, in an increasingly technified and globalized world economy. This
situation has expressed itself in a weak interelationship between growth and work
productivity. According to the Employment Program for Latin America and the
Caribbean, PREALC,
in the 1950-1980 period, Latin American industry expanded at a greater pace 
than the average o f  the OECD and EEC countries; nonetheless, the rate o f  
increase in work productivity -about 2.9% - was less than that achieved by  
those countries: 4.0%  for the OECD y 4.4%  for the EEC. The productivity 
breach is even greater i f  one compares it w ith outstanding experiences, such 
as the cases o f  Italy (5.4% ), France (5.6% ) or Japan (8.1% )”. (PREALC,
1990: 7).
Therefore, according to the WB and the IMF, which are imposing globalization and 
Neoliberalism in the region, the ISI produced, among other things, a loss of international 
competitiveness of national industries due to the excessive protectionism it implies. 
Besides, according to those institutions, this strategy entailed “a serious misallocation of 
resources, especially because of the central role played by the public sector as an engine 
of ‘growth’ ” (Fanelli and Frankel, 1994: 102). For those reasons the WB and the IMF 
are imposing programs o f restructuring of the public sector in Latin America, which 
implies a change in the traditional emphasis o f public policy-making in order to achieve 
a competitive insertion o f the region’s countries in the world market. Such restructuring
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consists principally o f : a) reducing the state’s size by reducing public expenditures and 
privatizing public entreprises; b) decentralizing the state’s activity by translating the 
responsibility of providing public services to local government; c) liberating prices and 
interest rates from state control, and, in general, deregulating economic activities; d) 
introducing regressive taxation; e) reducing tariffs and barriers to foreign trade and 
flexibilizing the exchange rate; f) flexibilizing the labor market and atomizing labor 
unions and social movements. This policy affects and reduces labor's negotiating power 
because, otherwise, it could prevent achievement of the goal of reducing public 
spending.
2.3. Endogenous Factors
2.3.1. Society: Cooperation, Conflict, and the Problem of Integration
In modem social theory, society has been understood exclusively as conflict (Marx,
1987; Coser, 1964; Dahrendorf, 1973) or as cooperation (Axelrod, 1984; Fukuyama,
1995). However, the purposes of this dissertation demand a concept that will combine
both of these dimensions. Therefore, society can be defined as a set of social
interactions resulting from the permanent tension between cooperation and conflict.
According to Rawls, social cooperation exists since it
makes possible a better life for all than any would have i f  each were to live 
solely  by his own efforts. There is a conflict o f  interests since persons are 
not indifferent as to how the greater benefits produced by their collaboration 
are distributed, for in order to pursue their ends they each prefer a larger to a 
lesser share (1971: 4).
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The constitution of the social order has, thus, to do with opposing positions with 
respect to how the basic structure of society is constructed, i.e., the way in which the 
principal social institutions are linked in order to permit the allocation of freedoms, 
goods and social opportunities. From this point of view, politics can be defined as that 
collective and conflictive action oriented to the construction, maintenance or 
transformation of a social order. Said confrontation requires society to reach an 
agreement on the principles of justice that should regulate said construction. It is the 
conflict, in a context of growing individual and social needs and scarce resources, that 
obliges the members of society to reach a consensus on the priority in the satisfaction of 
needs and the distribution of said resources. Therefore, distribution is not only a 
question of economics but one of politics as well. The re-distributive policies that are 
carried out in society, are carried out not only through the markets but also through 
institutions that, in theory, differ substantially from them. It is not possible to 
understand the nature and the diverse types of economic distribution without 
understanding, at the same time, the functioning of political institutions and examining 
the axiological principle on which said distribution is based.
Jurgen Habermas' theory of communicative action can also provide conceptual 
tools for dealing with the problem of the dual constitution of society and its crises. This 
author considers society to be simultaneously “system” and “life world”, which makes it 
possible to distinguish between systemic integration and social integration. The “life 
world” is the concept that makes it possible to observe society from the viewpoint of the 
constitution of social relations on the basis of recognition of mutual claims of validity
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of the life plans of the actors that intervene in a situation, based on dialogue and 
argumentation (Habermas, 1987: 167 ft). It is on the basis of the life world dynamics 
that culture and society are generated and the personality of individuals is formed. 
These elements, which are closely linked in primitive and traditional societies, undergo a 
process of increasing differentiation in modem and contemporary societies. In 
synthesis, social integration is produced in the life world and in the ways in which social 
action is integrated by means of a normatively guaranteed consensus and achieved by 
means of communication. Society as a system, is constituted by the relations among the 
different subsystems that compose it (such as the family, the institutions of secondary 
socialization, the economy, and the State) and the needs for coordination among them 
from a center of power or “self-government.” (Ibidem: 161 ff). This need for 
coordination or “systemic integration” is the result of a historical process o f progressive 
institutional differentiation of society. The factor of systemic integration in traditional 
societies was the dynastic family, and it is the market and the State in modem and 
contemporary societies. In synthesis, systemic integration is produced through the 
exercise of an external control over social actions that are not coordinated inter- 
subjectively.
After having developed said concepts, Habermas points out that “the 
fundamental problem of social theory lies in finding the way to satisfactorily connect the 
two conceptual strategies involving the ideas of system and life world” (Ibidem: 151), 
since a concept of crisis appropriate for the social sciences has to be capable of 
establishing the connection between social and systemic integration (Habermas, 1989:
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19). This connection can occur in two different ways. In the first place, the progressive 
complexification and diversification o f modem societies has led to a primacy of 
technical rationality and bureaucratic-organizative aspects to the detriment of 
communicative rationality, which has been “colonized” by the former. The result is a 
crisis of legitimacy in which technocracy displaces democracy as a form of coordination 
and adoption of social decisions. For the purposes of this dissertation, I consider that 
one of the manifestations o f this type of crisis is seen in the way the neoliberal 
development model was adopted in Latin America in general, and in Colombia in 
particular. Its technical imperatives required that its adoption be done behind the back of 
the different social organizations and political institutions of negotiation and articulation 
of interests. This can be interpreted as a divorce between mechanisms for the generation 
of consensus and legitimacy and mechanisms for the elaboration and implementation of 
macro-economic policies. Consequently, by excluding communicative reason and social 
participation from the sphere of macro-economic decisions, which is precisely where the 
firm foundations can be laid for a society that is not only democratic but just, a path is 
being opened in Latin America to a type of instrumental and technocratic rationale that 
is displacing political legitimacy. But, furthermore, the neoliberal model has contributed 
to deepening the social inequalities in the region, thus exacerbating the problem of the 
lack of social integration. In fact, the Gini coefficient in the region rose from 0.54 in 
1982 to 0.58 in 1990 (Londono and Szekely, 1997); and despite the moderate 
resumption of economic growth in the region in the mid-1990s, the number of poor 
people increased to 210 million, 50 million more than in the critical years of the 1980s 
(Korzeniewicz and Smith, 2000; 15). As Boron points out, an
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enduring legacy o f  neoliberalism is a society w hose social integration has 
been debilitated by the upsetting impacts o f  unfettered market dynamics; this 
weakening has crystallized the tremendous cleavages and inequities that 
characterize our 'really existing capitalism' ( . . . )  A 'society' o f  this type is a 
mere juxtaposition o f  'social universes' and Latin American societies are 
quickly approaching this. C lasses and social groupings may be almost 
com pletely disconnected and (...) scarcely adequate for the sustenance o f  a 
democratic order (1998: 57-58).
In the second place, from the viewpoint of systemic integration, the State has the
responsibility of articulating the economic, political and sociocultural system. However,
the development of contemporary societies tends toward progressive autonomization and
specialization of the different social systems, especially the economic system that seems
to be gaining ground with globalization in relation to the function of coordination and
social regulation. Given this tendency to autonomous development of the different
systems that make up society,
one can scarcely explain how the political system should be able to integrate 
society as a w hole, even though it is specialized for regulatory activities that 
are meant not only to rectify disturbances in functional system s but also to 
achieve an ‘environm ent-friendly’ coordination among system s drifting apart 
(Habermas, 1996: 335-336).
This incapacity of the State to ensure inter-systemic cohesion appears not only as a crisis
of legitimacy but of the rationality of society as a whole as well. The crisis of integration
also occurs when profound political, economic and social changes, disarticulate the
relationships that constitute the societal pattern in such a way that the inter-systemic
coordination of society, and the constitution of intersubjectivity and meaning among the
actors, is made either difficult or impossible.
Finally, the sociocultural system contributes a "legacy of knowledge" to the 
integration of society and a set of values and symbols so that the needs of understanding
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and identity of individuals and groups are covered and ties of solidarity and motivations 
for acting in conformity with social norms are produced, and it becomes possible “to 
tune individual lives in with the collective forms of life” (Habermas, 1987; 201). 
Disturbances of the social integration process translate into loss of meaning and identity 
in the sphere of culture; and into anomie in the sphere of society (Ibidem: 203). These 
reflections can prove illuminating for an understanding of societies like those of Latin 
America that have presented tendencies toward social fragmentation since the nineteenth 
century due to historical problems in the constitution of their social fabric, and to the 
lack of what Gino Germani denominated “the minimum central prescriptive nucleus 
sufficient for integration.” (Cordera, 1996:22).
In conclusion, every society presents a tendency to a certain degree of 
disintegration, so that it is never possible to consider it absolutely integrated. Therefore, 
social integration is a relative concept that has analytical purposes. There will be 
epochs in which the tendency toward social disintegration will be greater or will affect 
significant institutional spheres, and others in which said tendency will remain within 
restricted limits. Accepting that it is a relative concept, an integrated society can be 
defined as one that presents the following characteristics: a) A State with sufficient 
capacity to regulate social relations and produce the inter-systemic coordination of 
society. Politics is thus the form the social conflict assumes and the role of the State is 
to try to maintain the uneasy balance between cooperation and conflict, providing 
society with the minimum degree of cohesion required for it to continue to exist. From 
this perspective, it is possible to speak of the political integration of society, b) A culture
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consisting of a set o f values, ideas, symbols and “images o f the world”, that permit 
communicaction, intersubjectivity and the attribution o f meaning to social life, c) On the 
basis of said communication and intersubjectivity, a normative structure is produced that 
is the result o f a consensus among its members. This consensus is the source of 
legitimacy and o f the binding force o f the norms. The attitudes and expectations o f the 
members o f society correspond to the normative structure because they have internalized 
or socialized it. From this perspective, it is possible to speak o f social integration, d) The 
different elements o f state regulation, culture and the normative structure are articulated 
and there is sufficient compatibility among them to ensure social coordination and the 
peaceful solution o f social conflicts and tensions. Said articulation can be denominated 
the societal pattern, defined as “a set of relations integrated into the state and the statist 
historical cycle, and particularly the network of political relations that organizes the style 
of economic development and the cultural self-understanding o f the era and o f its social 
potentialities for change” (Calderon and Dos Santos, 1995: 35).
The concepts of society and social integration have traditionally referred, 
explicitly or implicitly, to human groups or communities, considered from the cultural 
viewpoint as nations, settled in spatially delimited territories, and given political 
cohesion through the Nation-State8. Considering this, it is possible to affirm that 
globalization redefines society and sharpens the tendencies to its disintegration, since it 
implies a progressive expansion of the forms o f social relation and organization, and the
8 Although this is the main meaning that has been given to the term society, I am aware that there are 
“nation-societies" that struggle to become “nation-states”, as in the case o f  the Palestinian people, or that 
have no interest in doing so, as in the case o f the Gypsy people. However, both cases considered an 
"exception to the rule".
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expansion o f the geographic spaces in which they take place. As Giddens states, it is a 
question o f “the intensification of the social relations throughout the world by which 
distant places are interconnected, in such a way that local events are configured by 
events that occur at a distance of many kilometers or vice versa” (1993. 68). All this 
implies, in turn, a crisis o f politics, because if  this is the form that the cohesion of 
modem societies assumes, upon expanding the geographical and cultural “coordinates” 
of society, the possibilities of coordination and regulation o f social relations from a 
spatially delimited political center, are seen to be seriously impaired.
2.3.2. The Weakness of the State
As has already been said, society is not only a cooperation network, as Axelrod supposes
(1984), but a network o f social conflicts and tensions as well, that need to be mediated by a
relatively autonomous power, in order to ensure the continued existence and reproduction
of the society itself. From this perspective, the role of the State is to maintain the uneasy
balance between cooperation and conflict, so that society achieves the minimum degree of
cohesion needed for its continuity. As Norbert Lechner states,
politics is a conflict o f  particularities, and the State is a form o f  generality.
Said distinction does not im ply separation or absorption. W e cannot think o f  
politics without referring to a form that synthesizes society , nor can w e think 
o f  the State without referring to a div ided  society (1986, p. 30).
Therefore, the State can be defined as the institution which, by means of a monopoly of 
the use of legitimate force and o f the production o f regulations (Weber, 1968), integrates
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both the society and the national territory, mediates social conflicts, and ensures the 
integration and systemic coordination of society.
Many definitions o f the state reduce it to its material expression, i.e., to the state 
apparatus, to a set of organizations and institutions such as the three branches of 
government and administrative bureaucracy. However, the state is a specific form 
assumed by social relations in modem societies; that form of relationship that divides 
society in both the public and the private sphere. This division, by placing the public 
sphere above the private sphere, makes possible the cohesin of society. Said social 
relation crystalizes in specific institutions and organizations that, by means of a 
monopoly on the legitimate use of force and production of regulations, (Weber, 1968), 
integrates society and national territory, mediates social conflicts and ensures the 
integration and systemic coordination of society. This fact generates a political culture that, 
in general terms, is shared by all members of a cohesioned society (Elias, 1987).
To define the State in this way, i.e., as the cohesive factor in society, does not no 
necessarily imply ignoring the role of the state in the constitution of social domination, and 
more specifically in class domination. And it is precisely this domination, made possible, 
among other things, by the splitting of society into the public and private sphere, that could 
be considered a specific form assumed by social cohesion. In this respect, it is illustrative 
to make a brief reference to the Marxist debate about the State. At the risk of simplifying 
a complex debate, the multiple Marxist concepts of the state9 can be reduced to two
9 A good synthesis o f these concepts is found in Gold, Clarence and Wright (1975).
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major tendencies: a) that which conceives of the state as an instrument of class 
domination, a reflection of the contradictions originating in the economic structure of 
society, where classes are pre-constituted as social subjects (Marx, 1973; Lenin, 1978; 
and Miliband, 1970; among others); b) that which considers the State to be an extra- 
economic instance that makes it possible to constitute the economic and political 
conditions, including among the constitution of classes as social subjects, necessary for 
the production and reproduction of capital (Poulantzas, 1969; and Offe, 1993; among 
others). From the former perspective, politics, understood as the State, appears as a 
mere reflection or epiphenomenon, as an “illusory community”, as a product of 
alienation, of a “false consciousness,” that prevents class domination from being 
perceived as such. From the latter perspective, the State is characterized by its “relative 
autonomy” with respect to economic relations and as the necessarily political moment of 
the constitution of class domination. The nature of capitalist production and circulation, 
and that of the social classes is affected by structural tendencies that impede their 
reproduction, such as the tendency toward the fragmentation of the dominant class, and 
toward the unity of the dominated class (Poulantzas, 1979: 152-194), or the tendency 
toward the “de-mercantilization” of social relations, especially, of the labor force (Offe, 
1993: 35-64). Thus the need for State intervention to counteract said tendencies.
To these theoretical concepts of the State can be added the classic liberal and the 
Hegelian models. For the former, the State arises from the consideration of a pre-social 
situation, the state of nature, a situation of anarchy and lack of personal security, which 
justifies the collective configuration of a regulatory power, the legitimacy of which
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originates in a value judgment, according to which individuals accept the authority of
the State because it is the most rational institution possible for avoiding a social
condition of non-regulated conflict, in which individual liberty, property, and
conservation would be impossible (Hobbes, 1987). From an anti-liberal perspective like
that of Hegel, the State appears as “the moment of ethicity”. That is to say, the State is
the institution that returns the individual's collective dimension, social nature, broken by
the rise of civil society, i.e., the market economy, and liberal individualism. In this
respect Hegel states:
if  the State is confused with Civil Society and its determination is placed on 
the security and protection o f  property and personal liberty, it is done in the 
in terest o f  individuals as such, the ultimate end in which they are unified; and 
in that case, to be a member o f  the State falls within individual caprice. But 
the State has a very different relation with the individual; the individual as 
such has objectivity, truth and ethics only as a member o f  the State, since the 
State is objective spirit (H egel, 1955: 208, § 258).
This brief account of different conceptions of the State, permits us to conclude that since
from Hobbes to Hegel to Poulantzas, from the right to the left, the State has been
considered an important factor in the constitution and cohesion of society. Something
different is the value judgment that each theoretical current makes regarding this
function of the State, and from which political strategies tending to its preservation or
suppression can be derived.
Now, the State in the Third World in general and in Latin America in particular, 
it does not have sufficient autonomy to constitute a generic form of society, so as to 
provide the minimum degree of cohesion and mediate its conflicts, which aggravates the 
political integration crisis, the expressions of which are violence and anomie. Said
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debility refers to the incapacity of the State to structure the social totality, monopolize the
use o f violence, constitute social subjects, regulate their relations and mediate their
conflicts. With reason Habermas says that
the Third World is composed nowadays o f  territories where the state 
infrastructure and the monopoly o f  violence have been so weakly formed 
(Somalia) or have crumbled so much (Yugoslavia), where social tensions are so 
strong and the thresholds o f  tolerance in the political culture so low that indirect 
powers o f  a mafia type [as in Colombia, adds the author o f  this dissertation] or
o f  a fundamentalist nature shake the internal order. These societies are
threatened by national, ethnic or religious processes o f  decomposition” (1999:
168).
Precisely because of this situation, an extensive bibliography has appeared in the 
last two decades, stemming mainly but not exclusively from the field of international 
relations, and dedicated to analyzing the phenomenon of the weakness of the State in the 
Third World.10 Joel S. Migdal, for example, has paradoxically characterized Third World 
countries as “strong societies”, characterized as they are by the persistence of non- 
capitalistic forms of relation and social control, that have impeded the formation o f a 
centralized state capable of achieving “the successful subordination of people’s own 
inclinations of social behavior or behavior sought by other social organizations in favor of 
the behavior prescribed by state rules” (1988: 22). The result is a situation of social 
fragmentation that impedes the rise of “strong states” with sufficient capacity to integrate 
society and to centralize its regulatory function. Migdal argues that social fragmentation 
and the primacy of local political bosses in turn impede the development of a rational 
bureaucracy and facilitate the control of local public institutions by personal interests, 
which leads to the displacement of general State policies by partial interests of society.
10 A good synthesis o f this bibliography can be found in Mason (2001).
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Barry Buzan (1991) considers the State to be constituted by the relation among 
three elements: a) state institutions, composed by law, government, and public 
administration; b) the idea o f the State itself; and c) the physical base, composed of the 
population, understood as national community, the territory and natural resources. 
According to Buzan, the strength or weakness of states, depends on the type and degree 
of cohesion among these elements (Ibidem: 65), which vary from State to State and from 
region to region. In the countries of the Third World, state institutions lack the 
necessary capacity to establish legitimate authority and to provide safety and public 
services for the population. In relation to the idea of the State, Buzan defines it as “what 
binds the people into a sociopolitical and territorial entity” (Ibidem:70), the main sources 
o f which are found in the nation and the organizing ideologies. However, in Third World 
countries, the unity of the national community is often affected by ethnic confrontations 
and the integrity of the territory threatened by secessionist movements or by territorial 
conflicts with neighboring countries. In synthesis, according to Buzan, weak states are 
characterized by the incapacity of state institutions to provide safety and welfare for the 
population, the lack of an identity and national unity; the scarce legitimacy of political 
authority, and the lack of consensus with respect to the basic norms that regulate the 
social process (1991: 97-110).
With certain exceptions, concern for the problem of the weakness of the state and 
civil society in Latin America has been absent from comparative political studies. 
Nevertheless, in recent studies, this topic has begun to encounter a certain space for 
reflection. In this respect, Boron points out,
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the problems o f  governance within new democracies and w eak states are 
compounded in Latin America by the deep, long, and wide ‘fault lines’ 
running through the very fabric o f  their civil societies. A s w e have seen, 
democratic states have to face a w hole series o f  problems that in them selves 
raise serious concerns regarding the possibilities o f  effective democratic 
governance. The situation grows worse when these governments have to 
deal with dual and fragmented civil societies— and with large m asses o f  
marginal people unable to be incorporated by the capitalist econom y” (1998:
59).
The Latin American State is one whose formative process combined traditional 
and modem forms and institutions of social relation. This makes it possible to analyze 
and understand the failures of many of the policies developed by the States of the region, 
especially those o f “Cepal” or of “developmental" inspiration”, the purpose of which 
was to strengthen their interventionist or regulatory capacity to constitute integrated, 
democratic, rational, and capitalistic societies. From this perspective, it is also possible 
to understand patrimonialist and clintelist nature of the Latin American states, which has 
led not only to the lack of autonomy with respect to civil society, but also to its true 
privatization. Thus, contrary to what many hold today, an urgent task that Latin 
American societies should undertake, is not so much that of privatizing their states, as 
one of constituting their public character. In the face of this situation, the neoliberal 
positions, that maintain that the social and economic problems of the region are due to 
“a large, pachyidermous state”, must be taken with reservations. It is not a question of 
whether the State should be large or small. The discussion in the region should not 
revolve around the size of the state but rather the type of state, i.e., a (relatively) 
autonomous, effective, legitimate State, with the capacity to achieve social cohesion, 
social and economic development, equity, and democratization of society. However, the 
margin of maneuver within which to construct such a state in Latin America is limited, if
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one takes into account the fact that the forces arising from the globalization process 
tend, as already mentioned, to transform the nature, scope, and functions o f the state, and 
to debilitate its capacity to achieve the cohesion of society. Thus the crisis of integration 
of Latin American societies has tended to worsen with the economic restructuring 
programs underway since the 1980s.
2.3.3. Social Democracy and Market Economy:
Two Social Projects in Conflict
In the past decade Latin America has faced a crisis of political and social integration
caused by the impossibility of reaching a consensus on the basic principles of social
order, among other things. In this respect, two different societal projects confront each
other: one which has arisen from the democratization processes the region has
experienced since the 1980s expressed in a series of constitutional reforms, and another,
based on the neoliberal model of opening and internationalizing the economy. There are
multiple clashes between these two projects, regarding both conceptualization and
implementation that will inevitably lead to crises soon or later.
As a consequence of the democratization processes, many Latin American 
countries radically reformed their political constitutions: Ecuador did so in 1978, Chile 
and Brazil in 1989, Colombia in 1991, Paraguay in 1992, Peru and Bolivia in 1993, 
Argentina, Guatemala and Nicaragua in 1994, and Venezuela in 1999. Although 
Mexico did not have a radical constitutional reform, it did introduce some notable 
reforms in its constitution. These constitutional reforms share elements in common, 
such as the recognition of new social rights; the expansion of political participation and
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the introduction o f mechanisms o f direct democracy, strengthening of the congress and 
the systems of checks and balances among the branches of government, reforms of the 
administration of justice and the central banks, etc. (Gargarella, 1997).
The inclusion of new economic and social rights and the expansion of political 
participation have been the most significant elements of said reforms. The Brazilian 
Constitution includes among social and economic rights the establishment o f a detailed 
series of labor rights and guarantees, among which figure unemployment insurance, 
workers' right to participate in the firm's profits, in determining the workday, etc. The 
Constitution of Argentina, in addition to expressly establishing a series of economic and 
social rights, incorporates into its text a series of international treaties signed by this 
country, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the American Declaration 
of the Rights and Duties o f Man, and the Convention on the Rights of Children, among 
others. But according to analysts, Colombia is the country that represents the greatest 
advance in recognition of social rights (Dugas, 1993: 28). The Colombian Constitution 
of 1991 not only establishes the traditional or "first generation" civil and political rights, 
but also considerably increases the number of "second generation" or economic, social, 
and cultural rights. Among these are the right to protection of the family, to social 
security, to health services, to decent housing; to education and culture; the rights of 
women, children, adolescents, the elderly, the handicapped, and workers. It also 
recognizes collective or "third generation" rights, including the right to a healthy 
environment, to public space and to quality in services the state offers to the community. 
Finally, the new constitution established powerful judicial tools to enforce said rights,
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such as the right to judicial tutelage and to popular actions, that have had profound 
repercussions on the social development of Colombia.
In relation to the system of checks and balances, it is necessary to say that a 
phenomenon characteristic of Latin American political regimes is their accentuated 
presidentialism (Linz and Valenzuela, 1994), due not only to a strong centralism 
inherited from the era of Spanish colonization, but also to the legacy of various decades 
of authoritarian governments. Therefore, the Constitutional Reforms of recent years 
were oriented to re-establishing the balance between the executive and the legislative 
branches of government, reducing the powers of the former and strengthening the 
political control powers of the latter. With the exception of the constitutional reforms of 
Ecuador y Peru, where the executive branch was strengthened, various South American 
countries such as Colombia, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, Argentina and Chile introduced 
measures that tend to re-establish the balance of powers. In the last country in mention, 
for example, the president lost many of faculties granted in Pinochet's Constitution. 
With the constitutional reform of 1989 the Chilean president lost the power to dissolve 
the parliament, to send whoever opposed the regime into exil, and to restrict liberties and 
basic civil rights. In fact, even the institutions designed by the dictator to maintain the 
power and influence of the armed forces after the transition to the democratic regime 
lost part of their initial force. Likewise, the Constitutional Reform of 1992 in Paraguay 
reduced the powers attributed to the executive during the dictatorship of General 
Stroessner. In Colombia, the constitutional reform of 1991, among other things, 
strengthened the political control function of Congress by introducing the impeachment
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and granting the legislature certain powers o f control regarding states of exception, as 
well as in matters such as the economy. En Argentina, the Constitution of 1994, reduced 
the presidential term of office from six to four years.
In recent years, some analysts have begun to speak of the “crisis of 
representativeness” of Latin American parliaments and political parties, due partly to the 
transformations of civil society and the rise of new social actors and movements and 
partly to the clientelist nature of the political systems of the region. A study done by 
Iberobarometro in 1993 and 1994 and analyzed by the Roper Center for Public Opinion 
Research of the University of Connecticut, concluded that in most Latin American 
countries “more than 50% of the population distrusts the congress (with figures close to 
80% in Colombia); that 8 in 10 Argentines, Colombians, and Peruvians, and 7 out of 
every 10 Mexicans distrust their political parties” (Gargarella, 1997: 986). For this 
reason, many of the constitutional reforms in the region introduced a series of 
dispositions tending to broaden political participation among the population by means of 
the introduction of mechanisms of direct democracy, the elimination of clientelism and 
corruption, the improvement of electoral and the representativeness of the congress, and 
the rationalization and legitimization of the legislative function (Ibidem: 983, 986-987).
Another important constitutional reform topic in Latin America has been 
improvement of the administration of justice, to ensure its independence and increment 
its efficacy. The lack of these two characteristics has become an obstacle to full 
development of democracy in Latin America, since the State is impeded from
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guaranteeing citizens adequate exercise of their constitutional rights (Fruhling, 1997). 
The independence of judicial power had been lost due to the interference of military 
dictatorships or, in cases like Colombia and Venezuela, due to bipartisan political pacts 
that, among other things, pre-established a parity-based distribution of judicial posts 
among the two traditional political parties. For this reason, various countries of the 
region (among them, Colombia, Peru, Paraguay, Bolivia, Argentina and Mexico) 
constitutionally established an institution called the Superior Council of the Judicature 
which constitutes “an intermediate body between judicial power and political power, the 
main purpose of which is to restrict the executive discretionary power in the selection of 
new judges” (Gargarella, 1997: 973). In relation to the effectiveness o f justice, 
constitutional reforms in the region introduced the accusatory system through the 
creation of prosecutors' offices. This has been complemented through the development 
of a series of programs proposed and financed by international agencies like the World 
Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the Organization of American States, 
as well as the adoption of a series of measures to improve access to justice, to facilitate 
its application and reduce the degrees of impunity (Fruhling, 1997: 242).
Finally, another important dimension of the recent constitutional reforms in Latin 
America has been the creation of independent central banks, i.e., subject neither to the 
authority of the government nor to the preferences of the voters. Between 1990 and 1995 
more than thirty countries in diverse continents carried out constitutional or legal 
reforms to increase the independence of said entities (Maxfield, 1999). Brazil inititiated 
the process in Latin America in 1980; Chile followed in 1989, Colombia in 1991,
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Argentina and Venezuela in 1992, and Mexico in 1993. According to Maxfield (1997), 
this worldwide tendency is due more to the links between the domestic and the 
international economy than to strictly internal factors, to the extent that increasing flows 
of international capital have an impact on the public finances and the political and 
economic stability of these countries which requires centralized control over the basic 
instruments of macroeconomic policy.
Based on the assumption that institutions are crystallizations o f the relations of
force among social actors, it can be said that the reforms have had contradictory
dynamics to the extent that they represent different interests and societal projects, such
as that of social democracy on the one hand and that of neoliberalism on the other. For
example, reforms aimed at strengthening the legislative branch and the mechanisms of
checks and balances clash in many Latin Americans countries with those concerned with
the need to isolate the executive from social and political demands and pressures, in
order to implement economic restructuring policies. In the Colombian case, this
confrontation, among many others, has occurred between the Constitutional Court -
which has incarnated the aspirations of social democracy - and the Banco de la
Republica (Colombia’s central bank), which epitomizes the tendencies toward an
autonomous economic system, and isolation of the technocracy from social pressures
and control over macroeconomic policy. As Maxfield, quoting John Freedman, asserts,
the current trend toward CBI [central bank independence] ‘is antithetical to 
popular sovereignty’ because independent central banks and the owners o f  
m obile capital they essentially ‘represent’ are usurping national power to 
‘decide the distribution o f  power and w ealth.’ ”(1999: 290).
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As will be shown below for the Colombian case, the confrontation between the 
institutions mentioned above, has been one o f the most significant expressions of those 
occurring between the two types of societal projects of contending with each other in 
Latin America.
Another point of confrontation is presented in relation to the constitutional 
recognition of economic, social and cultural rights of the population. The effective 
exercise of these rights does not depend on their simply being mentioned in a 
constitutional charter, but on the establishment of a social order based on distributive 
justice, which is opposed by a neoliberal order based on commutative or market-based 
justice. Thus it seems that the history of the relations between the state, society, and the 
economy, develop in a pendular movement, in which progressive epochs, of greater 
displays of public activity in search of a distributive justice, alternates with conservative 
periods characterized by inhibition of activity of the State, which becomes a mere 
guardian of order and arbiter of economic activity, so that individuals seek retributive 
justice for themselves, through the market. In the period between the post-war and the 
early 1970s, the Keynesian model which prevailed in the industrialized countries of the 
west, as has already been mentioned, assumed an increase in public function and in the 
regulation of the economic process on the part of the State. In contrast, since the mid- 
1970s, said paradigm entered into a process of crisis, provoked, according to some 
analysts, by the “excesses” committed by the intervention of the welfare State, the mare 
magnum of state regulations and bureaucratization inherent to public activity. These 
factors combined to generate the effect of loss of global efficience of the economy.
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For this reason, another paradigm - the neoliberal one - has arisen recent years. In 
the economic sphere it postulates reducing state action o f by dismounting the 
institutional and productive apparatuses o f the public sector and confiding in the signals 
of the market to orient private activity and achieve the optimum allocation o f resources. 
Neoliberals thus leave the solution to problems of development and distribution of 
income and wealth to the free will o f the market place. In the political sphere, they pose 
the need to put limits to the so-called “excesses” of democracy, to the degree in which 
political participation and democratic demands have generated an “overload” for 
governments, which have led to an "unbalanced" expansion o f public activities to the 
detriment o f private initiative, to a disaggregation o f interests, and to the loss of 
governmental authority (Crozier, Huntington and Watanuki, 1975).
From this perspective, politics is circumscribed to the field of public 
management, in which the legitimacy o f the State is understood, once again, strictly in 
terms of effectiveness. But it is not enough for state action to be merely effective. For it 
to be legitimate, it must also be just - in terms of equity. From this it follows, as Van 
Parijs (1992) maintains, that what makes a society just, is, to a great degree, a matter of 
distribution: if  politics is understood, among other things, as a struggle over the 
distribution of social resources, the market should give way to deliberation, since what it 
deals with is the collective and conflictive construction o f order. The main problem that 
said construction has to face, although not the only one, is that of the material 
reproduction o f society and the participation o f the diverse actors in the social product;
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“therefore the problem is just that political decision on the economic process. It is 
precisely that deliberate creation of the development of society that should be the object 
of a theory of democracy." (Lechner, 1982: 41-42)
To this notion of politics as deliberation, the neoliberals oppose the idea of the 
market as a factor of social integration, to the extent that society is considered the whole 
set of acts of exchange, which actually leaves the idea of politics void of content. In 
fact, in the opinion of the neoliberals, it is not the democratic decision-making process, 
but the market that guarantees good government. They propose, therefore, to increase 
the efficience of the system and to substitute politics with economics, or at least to 
reduce the field of action of the former. In this way, efficience arises from the need to 
reduce the number of decisions of a collective nature regarding the allocation of 
resources in society, so that they can instead be made according to the objective and 
rational principles that are released through the full force of the laws of the market.
The appeal to the virtues of the market as a factor of social cohesion, and the 
exaltation of economic freedom in opposition to political regulation of the economy, 
both basic characteristics of neoliberalism that can hardly be conjugated with the idea of 
a more equitable society, have resurrected the topic of justice as a nodal point of 
contemporary philosophy and political science. Despite a certain pragmatic trend in 
economics and political science, the most fundamental concern of neoliberals is not 
efficience, but freedom. In this respect, it is illustrative to quote Milton Friedman, who 
affirms that
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what we have spoken o f  from the beginning is freedom. Although a certain 
number o f  my propositions had the immediate effect o f  improving our 
economic welfare, this is not, to tell the truth, more than a secondary 
objective in relation to the preservation o f  individual liberty (quoted by Van 
Parijs, 1992: 187).
Thus, in the present discussion regarding redefinition of the concept of the 
political, a broad range of positions, from the egalitarianism of Rawls (1971) to the 
anarcho-individualism of Nozick are confronted (1990). The latter, adheres to 
libertarianism which affirms the supremacy of particular interests of individuals that owe 
nothing to society, since they are considered separately existing realities (Ibidem: 45), 
dismissing the fact that what defines society is the interaction among its members. In his 
attempt to determine how much space individual rights concede to the State, Nozick 
reached the conclusion that anything more than a minimal State, i.e., anything that goes 
beyond the simple functions of protection, is an illegitimate State (Ibidem: 287). On the 
basis of these affirmations and a concept of retributive justice, Nozick rejects outright 
the political nature of the distribution of social resources and thoroughly disqualifies 
collective decision-making regarding the material reproduction of society. For Nozick, 
in society
there is no central distribution, no person or group authorized to control all 
resources, to jointly decide how  they should be distributed. What each one 
obtains is obtained from others, who give it in exchange for som ething else  
or as a gift. In a free society diverse persons control different resources and 
new ownership o f  new assets arise from the voluntary actions and exchanges 
among persons (Ibidem: 153).
Consequently, Nozick does not accept the distributive fiscal policy typical o f the welfare
state, since for him all taxation is equivalent to a system of forced labor. All distribution
that does not adjust to the principle of "to each as he/she chooses and from each as
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chosen" (Ibidem: 163), threatens the freedom of individuals and affects the efficience of 
the exchange of goods.
Against Nozick and the Neoliberals, it can be argued that the public sphere is 
not just the ambit of mercantile exchanges, nor is it reduced to the production of security 
and technical decisions. It is also the space of confrontation of diverse social interests, of 
state mediation of conflicts arising there and, therefore, of the construction of consensus. 
The market, per se, does not produce nor does it sustain a social order and, on the 
contrary, it presumes a policy of ordering.
From the other current, Rawls, in his search for a more egalitarian liberalism,
expresses his concern for social and economic inequalities. He maintains that the main
objective of justice is to constitute the basic structure of society, with which distributive
justice becomes one of the most important objects of political reflection, since it is
the first virtue o f  social institutions, as truth is o f  system s o f  thought. A  
theory, how ever elegant and econom ical, must be rejected or revised if  it is 
untrue; likew ise, laws and institutions, no matter how efficient and w ell- 
arranged, must be reformed or abolished i f  they are unjust (1971: 3).
On the basis of a complex conceptual and methodological apparatus, framed 
within the contractualist tradition, which is not of interest to us here, Rawls elaborates a 
notion of justice based on two principles: the first affirms a freedom of equal citizenship 
for all, and predominates over the second, which should inspire the distribution of the 
social product. This poses the equality of opportunities and only permits economic and 
social inequalities to the extent that they are based on institutions established in such a 
way as to achieve the maximization welfare of the least favored
82
From this perspective, contrary to that o f Nozick, the political sphere is 
converted into the space where distinct concepts of man and society "intertwine" to 
produce a consensus regarding the principles o f justice on the basis o f which the basic 
structure o f society is constituted or reformed (Rawls, 1993). In this way, citizen 
participation in the definition o f order generates a political concept of justice centered on 
the problem o f the distribution of goods, which constitutes the only possibility that the 
social organization can signify a rational advantage or good for each of its members.
The above references to the positions o f Rawls and Nozick are intended to serve as the 
basis for showing the present conflict that the introduction o f neoliberal models produce 
in matters o f equity. On the one hand, the degree o f social development in the region 
leaves much to be desired and on the other hand, the neoliberals maintain that normative 
intervention by the State generates inefficiencies and inhibits the exercise o f individual 
liberties. Nonetheless, the construction o f a legitimate and democratic State in Latin 
America requires the introduction of policies aimed at the redistribution o f income, for 
which the neoliberal adjustments leave little margin for maneuver. Paradoxically, 
together with the implantation of neoliberal models, or because of it, a concern for 
equity has awakened in the region. The ECLAC, for example, has placed at the 
consideration of its member countries a proposal for the development o f the region in 
the 1990s, which, given the painful experiences of the previous decade, attempts to 
conjugate “the transformation o f the productive structures o f the region within a 
framework of progressive social equity ” (Cepal, 1990: 12). The starting point of said
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proposal is recognition of the fact that the social cost of the neoliberal adjustments 
dramatically affected the most vulnerable strata of the population and, therefore, the 
achievement o f solid political, economic and social development of Latin America 
demands fulfillment of minimum requirements of equity (Boron, 1998; Cepal, 1994). 
For the Colombian case, the concern for equity appears incorporated in the political 
Constitution of 1991 (articiles 1 and 334, among others) as one of the principal objetives 
of public action. Nonetheless, a neoliberal spirit also impregnates large part of the 
document (articles 333 and 336, among others) as a result of the confrontation between 
the social democracy and free market models.
2.3.4. The Neoliberal Model and its Effects on the Political Regime
The adoption of the neoliberal model of accumulation in Latin America has also implied 
a recomposition of the relations between social classes. To analyze this phenomenon 
requires considering this model as something more than a series o f macroeconomic 
policy measures, to consider it as a societal project. By a societal project is meant the 
concept that the social sectors that aspire to lead the social transformation process have 
of the relations between the state, civil society and the economy.
This redefinition of the relations between the different social classes, and 
between them, the State and the economy, implies, in turn, a modification of the 
political regime. Most comparative political scientists, consider the regime, i.e., as the
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rules o f the political game, to be separate and distinct from the rules of the economic 
game. However, it is possible to consider the regime to be an integral set of rules that 
regulate the relations between the state, society, and the economy. The economy and 
politics are both social institutions, sets of rules of the game, as North defines them 
(1990: 3-4), that shape social interaction, provide a structure for daily life and, therefore, 
define and limit the range of actions and choices open to individuals. Profound changes 
in the economy or in politics may induce mutual transformations that profoundly alter 
social relations and therefore require new rules to regulate them. Changes in the 
accumulation model transform the political regime and generate new rules o f the game 
that produce societal transformations and redefine the social actors, their relationships, 
and their fields of action and choice.
Traditionally, the political regime has been defined, in strict terms, as the set of 
rules and institutions that regulate the type and number of political actors (generally 
political parties), the forms of access to political power (generally competitive 
elections), the relations among the branches of government (system of checks and 
balances), and the process of binding public decision-making (Munck, 1996: 3-4). This 
definition excludes elements such as non-partisan actors, social classes, economic 
interests, and the ideologies o f the actors. Furthermore, it does not pay sufficient 
attention to the “rules of the game”, i.e., the negotiations or alliances between the actors 
and the conditions that facilitate or impede them. Munck excludes, explicitly, from the 
concept of regime this type of considerations and rejects alternative definitions, like that 
of Michael Mann, that considers the regime as having originated in “an alliance of the
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actors o f ideological, economic and military power, coordinated by the rulers o f the 
state” (Mann, 1993: 18-19). Definitions like the above are reductionist, maintains 
Munck, because they conceive of the regime “in terms of its actors and deal with the 
institutional rules as epiphenomena.” (1996: 20).
The concept of regime used in thisw dissertation is closer to that of Mann, since I 
consider the rules to originate in an alliance not only among political actors but with 
social and economic actors as well. Therefore, I define the political regime as the set of 
rules that regulate the relations between social classes and their organizational 
expressions and among these and the political parties and the State. The principal 
function of the political regime is to act as a junction between the State and the 
economic model, in order to constitute an organizing principle of society, i.e., to act as a 
base for undertaking alliances between different social sectors in order to provide 
orientation for the social process. The idea of the accumulation model as societal project 
and as the set of rules that regulates the relations between social classes and political 
actors, produces consequences for the concept of “autonomy of the State.” As 
traditionally conceived (Poulantzas, 1969; Skocpol, 1985), said autonomy has been 
understood as the capacity of the State to distance itself with respect to the partial 
interests of civil society. On the contrary, the existence of a societal project requires that 
state action be the result of a combination of the internal strength of state institutions and 
their articulation with key sectors of civil society that aspire to lead the process of social 
transformation (Evans, 1995). In this sense, the political regime is the link of union
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between the State and the economic development model, and makes it possible either to 
undertake the latter as a societal project or to impede its implementation.
To elaborate said conception of the political regime as an organizing principle 
of society, it is necessary to draw from Antonio Gramsci's concept of hegemony. From 
his perspective, the ruling class not only exercises domination but also “moral and 
intellectual leadership” in society (1971: 57), i.e., it is a question of exercising 
domination not only by means of force but also by consensus. The contributions of Max 
Weber (1968) also help to structure the concept of political regime proposed here, to 
the degree that, for said author, the processes of capitalist accumulation require a series 
of cultural conditions relating to the existemce of an ethic of the ruling class, without 
which no development is possible. Said leadership and consensus should be obtained 
through commitments and reforms in which the interests of different social groups 
should be taken into account.
The political regime and the model of accumulation are mutually conditioned. 
For this reason, the type of economic model is not neutral with respect to democracy and 
respect to the type and the participation of political and economic actors. The model 
itself possesses characteristics which generate inclusionary or exclusionary processes. 
The ISI was an inclusionary model since it required suitable working and middle classes 
not only with technical skills but also with increasing purchasing capacity. For this 
reason the institutional expression of such a model was the inclusivionary welfare state 
that acted through a series of distributive policies like: a) public health system, b) the
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unemployment insurance system, c) the provision o f financial aid to low-income 
families with dependent children, and d) government promotion o f trade union 
organization, among other things. It might be said that these and other related measures 
constituted a “social contract” among capital, the State, workers and other social 
movements, over wages, working conditions, social benefits and political participation. 
To the contrary, the neoliberal model is exclusionary, since it makes it more difficult to 
devise and enact a distributive policy. Those tendencies undermine the possibility for 
the action of workers and other organized social actors. Their participation in the 
economic process and in the distribution of its benefits progressively loses legitimacy.
The change of economic model invalidates the old agreements between the elites 
and the social classes that sustain and make possible the functioning of the above model of 
industrialization by substitution of imports, and imposes the need to generate new 
agreements to fit the new correlation of social forces. Nonetheless, the neoliberal model 
limits or prevents the possibility of achieving these new agreements among the different 
social actors or establishing the leadership of the economic and political elites. This 
contradictory dynamics between the lack of functionality of the old agreements and the 
structual impossibility o f achieving new ones, aggravates the society's tendency towards 
disintegration. This is due to two reasons. In the first place, to the division among the 
economic elites due to the opening and internationalization of the economy. The elites 
are divided into those who have incorporated technological advances and have 
connected to the world's productive and financial circuits, and those less competitive 
ones that act on the basis of the national market. While the former advocate free trade
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and the internationalization of the economy, the latter advocate protectionism or gradual 
liberalization o f the economy. In the second place, it is to the exclusion of subordinate 
social sectors because, among other reasons, of the reduction of public social spending 
and state subsidies and the generation of unemployment. Both dimensions of the 
economic restructuring process limit the possibilities o f the elites to form alliances 
among themselves and with other social sectors, in order to democratically construct 
new rules o f the game to regulate the relations among the economic, social, and political 
actors.
2.3.5. Legitimacy Versus Efficiency
The simultaneous processes of democratization and change of the accumulation model
in Latin America engenders a contradiction between legitimacy and economic
efficiency. Indeed, legitimacy and efficiency are the most important factors of state
activity (O’Connor, 1973; Offe, 1993) and they determine its capacity to integrate
society and distribute its resources. The contradiction lies in the fact that the state must
try simultaneously to fulfill
the conditions in which profitable capital accumulation is possible [and] to 
maintain or create the conditions for social harmony. A  capitalist state that 
openly uses its coercive forces to help one class accumulate capital at the 
expense o f  the other classes loses its legitimacy and hence undermines the 
basis o f  its loyalty and support. But a state that ignores the necessity o f  
assisting the process o f  capital accumulation risks drying up the source o f  its 
own power, the econom y’s surplus production capacity and the taxes drawn 
for this surplus (Ibidem: 6).
Legitimacy and efficiency determine also the twofold nature of the state’s expenditures,
which may be divided into social capital and social expenses: the former is constituted
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for expenditures required for profitable private accumulation while the latter is
constituted for projects and services
which are required to maintain social harmony to fulfill the state’s 
‘ legitim ization’ function. {. . .) Because o f  the dual and contradictory 
character o f  the capitalist state, nearly every state agency is involved in the 
accumulation and legitimization functions, and nearly every state expenditure 
has this twofold character (Ibidem: 7).
Adapting O’Connor’s premises to the Latin American case, the contradiction 
between legitimacy and efficiency stems from a democratization process and a new 
constitutional order which claims “more state” as a condition to overcome the legitimacy 
crisis, and an accumulation model which requires “less state” in order to allow the free 
allocation of society’s resources by the market. While neoliberal governments privatize 
public enterprises and reduce the public expenditures, the new constitutions increased 
the number of public institutions and erected fairness and redistribution as the 
cornerstones of the new political and economic order. However, the final balance 
affected this last objective owing to the greater importance attributed to the policy of 
recovering the legitimate monopoly on force by the state. Additionally, an alternative 
diagnosis of the efficiency of the Latin American state lies in the fact that, no matter 
what its size, its inefficiency originates in the politicians' tendency to take possession of 
public resources and offices for their own benefit, owing to the clientelist and 
patrimonialist character of the political regime. Rather than be privatized, the Latin 
American state should be become “public”.
The contradiction between legitimacy and efficiency is also expressed in the 
tension between fiscal policy and social policy, which has the following dynamics: the
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neoliheral adjustments pursue the efficiency of the state for achieving macroeconomic
equilibrium, specifically for reducing inflation and the fiscal deficit. The search for
those goals implies, among other things, the decrease of public expenditures, the
introduction of regressive taxation, and the reduction of the real wage. With these
policies the distributive function of the state is severely affected which also affects its
capacity to conciliate the interests of different social actors. This situation engenders a
struggle over distribution and a increasing social polarization of the population. The
state, with diminished resources, has less capacity to respond to pressure which leads to
the loss of the state’s legitimacy and the need to resort to repression and
authoritarianism. Thus, the abandonment o f the interventionist concept in Latin America
has occurred at the expense of civil rights and democratic warranties. For this reason,
current political-econom ic trends have heightened the importance o f  the 
socioeconom ic components o f  the equation -market structures- over the 
political ones-dem ocratic procedures. This raises the possibility o f  
conflictive situations where the preservation o f  market structures is secured 
at the expense o f  democratic procedures 
(V acs, 1994: 68).
In synthesis, I have developed a structural perspective in this chapter. I have 
maintained that rational choice theory assumes that choice situations can be extracted 
from the historical dynamics of society. Consequently, actors’ choices are always 
implemented within the context o f historic processes which determine their options. 
Therefore, analyses of economic and political transformations in America Latina in the 
1990s have to take into account the historical context in which those processes are 
embedded.
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I also have maintained that although there is a mutual interaction between agent 
and structure at certain junctures the dynamics of social processes surpass actors’ 
intentions, and that social actors seeking to advance differents societal projects imposes 
upon themselves mutual constraints which act as a structural force. From this 
perspective, I showed that in Latin America the decisions made by actors involved in the 
economic liberalization policy were constrained by decisions concerning 
democratization policies, and vice versa. At the same time, the structural heterogeneity 
and fragmentation that characterize Latin American societies, coupled with globalization 
processes in which it is inscribed, affected the course of both societal projects.
I have argued that the structural context of political and economic reforms is 
shaped by the interaction of exogenous and endogenous factors. Globalization and the 
generalized diffusion of the neoliberal accumulation model were analyzed as exogenous 
factors. As endogenous factors, the precarious integration of the Latin American 
societies was analyzed, along with their social heterogeneity, state weakness, the conflict 
between political and economic restructurings as a societal projects, the effects of 
neoliberal restructuring on their political regimes and finally, the contradiction between 
the search for legitimacy and efficiency inherent in both political and economic 
restructuring. The interaction of exogenous and endogenous factors has aggravated the 
problems of integration that have historically characterized the region’s societies.
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In the following chapters I will apply such a structural framework to the 
Colombian case for analyzing the contradictory dynamics o f  political and economic 
reforms in the 1990s.
Chapter 3
State, Society, and Political Regime in Colombia
Colombia, like most Latin American countries, is characterized by a weak state and a 
fragmented civil society. These historical traits have become even more pronounced 
during the 1990s as a consequence of political and economic transformations in the 
country. On the one hand, the political system experienced a traumatic process of 
constitutional reform designed both to strengthen the state and increase its legitimacy, as 
well as to overcome the exclusionary nature of the political regime. On the other hand, 
the national economy also made the transition from an import substitution model of 
industrialization to a neoliberal model of economic opening and internationalization of 
the economy. The aim o f this process was to increase economic efficiency by reducing 
the size of the state and its regulatory function. Regarding this restructuring process, it 
is worth asking whether the adoption of the neoliberal has deepened the fragmentation of
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the Colombian society and whether reducing the scope of its intervention works against 
the objectives of strengthening and legitimizing the state.
This two-track restructuring is based upon a contradictory relationship. While 
“political opening,” as a result of the adoption of a new Constitution, has produced 
favorable conditions for fostering policies of democratization and social integration, 
“economic opening” has counteracted that possibility. This economic process is 
exclusionary in social terms, owing to the privatization of state enterprises; bankruptcy 
of private enterprises that cannot compete in the international arena; unemployment; 
and, the reduction of public social expenditures, among other things. Furthermore, 
these two structural political and economic reform processes, constitute, in turn, two 
societal projects promoted by diverse actors and interests. These two societal projects 
have confronted each other in Colombia since the early nineties, and neither of the two 
has achieved legitimacy and the political agreements needed to impose themselves and 
to promote diverse social interests.
The economic and political restructuring has been accompanied by the severe 
crisis of legitimacy and hegemony the Colombian political system has suffered in the 
last three decades, as manifested by high levels of violence, a lack of trust in public and 
political institutions, and the lack of a ruling class with a societal project comprehensive 
enough to integrate the national territory and different social interests. This situation 
stems from three factors: the weakness of the state (3.1), a political regime that
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amalgamates premodemity and modernity, which confronts domestic and external forces 
towards its full modernizations (3.2), and the fragmentation o f the Colombian elite (3.3).
3.1. The Weakness of the Colombian State
Colombia's current political crisis is a consequence, among other things, of the 
weakness of the state, which can be traced to its historical inability to integrate territory, 
establish a legitimate monopoly of force and production of regulations. If the state is, as 
defined in the theoretical framework presented above, the main cohesive factor of 
society, it can be said that the Colombian state has failed both to monopolize the use of 
force and to integrate the nation's society and territory, thus reducing its possibilities for 
mediating and channeling social conflicts and tensions. Said conflicts are therefore 
resolved at the margins of public institutions, a situation which gives rise to para- 
institutional expressions of power such as paramilitary groups, drug-trafficking mafias, 
and guerrilla movements.
As has been established in the theoretical framework, the state is a social 
relationship that divides society into a public and a private sphere. Said division is what 
makes it possible to establish and exercise domination in society. In turn, a system of 
domination presupposes a material basis (territory and economy), an institutional base 
(state apparatus), and a symbolic base (national culture). This triple base forms a 
structure capable of building and reproducing the network of modem social 
relationships.
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The equivalent of the symbolic element, the concept of the nation, in classic and 
traditional societies was the ethnic group. Nevertheless, the modem concept o f the 
nation links ethnic elements to the idea o f a political community whose unity is based on 
the integrating function of an internal market as well as on basic social solidarity. The 
modem concept of the nation also supposes the existence of a ruling class that needs to 
organize its preponderant role in society on a universal plane, i.e., it has to give its 
domination a general form, which implies articulating its own interests with those of 
other subordinated social sectors, which is what Gramsci (1971) denominates 
hegemony.
Historically, the formation of the state has been a gradual process of construction 
or acquisition of the above-mentioned attributes, in order to exercise domination over 
society and the territory in which it is setttled. These attributes generate the state's 
capacity to integrate regions and populations and to create and reproduce certain patterns 
of social relations.
This process of state formation has not been free from violence. Nevertheless, it 
is necessary to distinguish between two types of violence: that which is exercised in the 
process of constituting the state, and that which arises from precarious constitution of 
the state or from the absence of the same in different regions of the national territory. In 
relation to the former, authors like Tilly (1992) and Elias (1998) have pointed out that 
the process of integrating territories and societies necessarily passes through a periods of
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exercising rough coercion and violence. Elias holds that the processes o f formation of 
the state and construction o f the nation show that
every effort towards greater interdependence, towards closer integration o f  
previously independent or less reciprocally dependent human groups, 
undergoes a series o f  specific conflicts and tensions o f  integration, o f  
balances, o f  power struggles that are not accidental but structural 
concomitants o f  these efforts to achieve greater functional interdependence o f  
the ‘parts’ within the whole (Elias, 1998: 106-107).
The integration achieved by the State (which is basically the triumph of a strong power
over its rivals and the imposition of its own legality as the victor's legality) absorbs
violence or the power to use violence to solve social conflicts, that was diffuse in the
society, and creates an institutionalized, legitimized, centralized and legally regulated
power. Thus there arose a public space that serves as a form of mediation and resolution
of social conflicts and tensions. Failure to firmly constitute this integration, or to
legitimate it, leaves power in the private sphere, which means that members of society
may resort to the use of force and violence for the solution of conflicts, to the detriment
of basic social cohesion.
In general terms, this has been the process of constitution of the state as an “ideal 
type”, based on the European experience of historic formation of the nation-state (Tilly, 
1992). Although the formation of the state in Latin America in general, and in Colombia 
in particular, has followed a similar pattern, the process has been conditioned by three 
factors. In the first place, the legacy of a colonial past marked by Spanish influence. 
From the cultural point of view, this legacy is expressed in the survival of particularism, 
localism, nepotism and generally anti-capitalistic values and codes of behavior (Oslak, 
1981), i.e., a legacy associated with the survival of a traditional political and social
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order. The successive processes of capitalist modernization that developed after 
independence and until well into the twentieth century became hybridized with these 
traditional institutions. In the second place, the process of settlement that originated in 
the colony, characterized by the development of enclave economies which made it 
possible to link each population to the metropolis through commerce but also resulted in 
isolation and the lack of a communications infrastructure among them. Thus, when the 
links to the metropolis were interrupted after independence, territorial fragmentation 
became even more acute and further hindered the formation of a national market. The 
weakness of the Colombian state is partially due to its limited territorial integration that, 
even today, characterizes various regions of the country. Thirdly, the lack o f articulation 
among the different sectors of the ruling class, i.e., their inability to constitute a 
hegemony. This aspect will be dealt with in section 3.2.1
The regional, political, and social fragmentation of the ruling clase has impeded 
the structuring of an effective system of power and has been one of the causes of its 
weak centralization. But this fragmentation has especially contributed to the lack of 
leadership and capacity of the elites to “envision” an integrated society, territory, and 
economy, i.e., to construct a real nation-state. This situation is manifest, among other 
things, in the elite's incapacity to elaborate a policy of broadening the internal market, by 
means of colonization processes that integrate marginal territories and populations that, 
unfortunately, constitute more than half the country. Those marginal territories, 
colonization zones of the agricultural frontier, are concentrated in the region of 
Orinoquia in the eastern part of the country, with an extension of 310,000 km2, and in
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the region of Amazonia, in the southeast, with an extension of 315,000 km2. These 
regions are characterized by low agricultural productivity, lack of infrastructure in terms 
of roads and basic services, no integration into national or regional markets, and a 
precarious presence of the state. The towns of these regions have a population of less 
than 10,000 inhabitants each and less than one-third reside in the municipal seat. Of the 
population of these regions, 75% live in poverty and 40% of the same live in conditions 
of misery. The two regions add up to a total extension of 625,000 km2, i.e., 54.7% of the 
nation's 1.141.748 km2 surface area. If other minor zones of internal colonization, 
situated in the central and northern regions of the country, are added, it is no 
exaggeration to say that almost 60% of Colombian territory is composed of zones that 
are either not integrated or precariously integrated into the economic, political and social 
development of the country (Instituto Geografico Agustin Coddazzi, 1996; Echandia 
Castilla, 1999).
As one author has pointed out, “Colombia is a country of permanent 
colonization” (Bolivar, 1999:34), but in the twentieth century this has been more the 
result of spontaneous uprooting of populations from the different regions, for political or 
economic reasons, than the product of any deliberate territorial and socioeconomic 
development policy on the part of the state and the ruling class. It is precisely this 
circumstance and the failure to carry out an agrarian reform, which has been postponed 
ever since 1936 because of the lack of political will among the elites, that have 
generated "empty spaces" in Colombia. These prove to be fertile ground for armed 
violence, since within them
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there exists a population ready to resort to armed opposition, produced by a 
flood o f  heterogeneous colonization in which very different regional and 
ethnic groups converge (...) that constitute very diverse subcultures. 
Furthermore, the presence o f  the state is precarious and almost entirely 
limited to repressive control o f  conflicts due to the fact that the traditional 
bipartisan system never managed to monopolize the expression o f  political 
and social struggles in these areas as it did elsewhere. On the contrary, these 
regions have been the scenario o f  a tradition o f  protest dating back to the 
beginning o f  the 20th century that has led the population to identify with 
groups that confront both the State and the traditional bipartisan system. 
(Gonzalez, Fernan, 1997:93).
The lack of effective institutional presence of the state in the different regions of 
the country contradicts the vision of the Colombian state as a monolithic entity, the 
product “of a globalizing and totalizing national history, whose validity collapses when 
one takes into account the particularity of a regional life” (Uribe de Hincapie and 
Alvarez, 1987: 13). As an indicator of such a lack of state presence, it can be mentioned 
that 86% of total public expenditures in 1995 was spent by the central government and 
only 14% by departmental and local governments. Of the total amount spent by the 
central government, more than 38% was invested in Bogota and only 5.8% in Orinoquia 
and Amazonia (Fundacion Social, 1998, p. 155), which are colonization areas that are 
totally marginalized from socioeconomic development efforts and plagued by social 
conflict and by a high degree of guerrilla, paramilitary and drug-trafficking activities. In 
addition, one might note that 39% of the Colombian population inhabits 808 
municipalities which represent 77% of the total number of Colombian municipalities, 
and are in turn classified from a socioeconomic development point of view, as 
precarious, fragile or incipient (Ibidem, p. 395).
The incapacity of the present ruling class to carry out a policy of national 
integration contrasts with the successful processes of territorial integration and social
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cohesion developed during the second half o f the 19th and beginning of the 20th century, 
as a product o f a vision of the elite. I refer to the Antioquefio colonization that was 
fundamental in the constitution of the culture and the economy of the coffee-growing 
region which, until just recently, was the motor force of the Colombian economy since it 
permitted the accumulation of capital needed for the industrialization of the country. In 
the mid-19th century, the present coffee-growing region was an uncultivated jungle area 
in the southwestern portion of the country. Although its colonization was not free of 
violence and unexpected events, the decided support of the Antioquia’s commercial and 
political elite, facilitated a significant agricultural, commercial and demographic 
development of the coffee-growing region (Brew, 1977; Palacios, 1980b). In the second 
half of the nineteenth century, the merchants of Medellin (the state of Antioquia’s 
capital) acquired large extensions of land in the southwestern part of the state, fomented 
immigration, and donated lands to those who were willing to work on the construction of 
roads to connect this region with the capital of the department, to work in agriculture 
and mining, or to found settlements (Brew, 1977: 176-177).
The leadership of the elite and the importance that coffee acquired as an export 
product made this one of the most highly integrated regions of the country from the 
economic, political, and social points of view. This integration was expressed in a series 
of organizations and institutions, such as the coffee-growers committees that 
coordinated and promoted coffee-growing activity at the local, departmental and 
national levels through the powerful Federation National de Cafeteros. This 
integration established ties of solidarity, symbols and ways of life that produced the
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“coffee culture," which has played a key role in creating a sense of a Colombian 
nationality (the national pride associated with the idea that Colombia produces the best 
coffee in the world, the internationally projected image of the Colombian peasant in the 
figure of “Juan Valdes”). However, it is necessary to say that this integration has begun 
to erode recently because of the crisis of the coffee economy induced by the opening of 
the economy and the global economic conditions. These developments no longer favor 
worldwide pacts and producers' cartels regarding the commercialization of primary 
products, which had been crucial to the success of Colombian coffee-growing activity. 
That crisis has eroded the quality of life of coffee-growing peasants and coffee-growers 
institutions' chances of maintaining this model of integration. This situation has 
expelled peasants towards the current areas of spontaneous colonization, where social 
cohesion is either lax or non-existent and plantations of coca and poppy abound in a 
generally illegal economy.
If the state is defined as a social relationship and as a set of institutions and 
mechanisms that make it possible, one could say that to a certain extent the Federation 
de Cafeteros and its coffee-society project has been a state. In fact, there are authors 
who consider it to be a para-state (Escobar, 1995). Although there are those who adduce 
that precisely because of this the Federation de Cafeteros has helped to impede the 
formation of a true state in Colombia, the purpose of these reflections is to illustrate how 
the current ruling class has failed to construct a nation-state in the current colonization 
zones, due to its lack of long-term vision and its inability to integrate society and 
territory.
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The Colombian bipartisan regime has also contributed to the weakness o f the 
state. In this respect, Fem&n Gonzalez (1997) maintains that the weakness of the 
Colombian state is due to the early rise o f traditional political parties at the end of the 
first half o f the 19,h century", a very difficult initial period in the process o f forming the 
Colombian state. Parties, the Conservative and Liberal, acted as a factor o f social 
integration at that time and promoted the formation of social identity on the basis of 
patronage and personal loyalties, thus preventing the establishment of a direct 
relationship between state and citizens. The weakness of the state became even more 
visible during the second half of the twentieth century, as a result of the crisis of parties 
and the erosion of their central role in Colombia's political and social life after the end of 
the National Front12 (1958-1974).
Paul Oquist (1978) maintained that throughout the nineteenth century the 
Colombian state was very weak and social integration was achieved through strong non- 
capitalistic social structures and non-state forms of social control. This situation 
changed during the first four decades of the twentieth century when, according to 
Oquist, the Colombian state achieved a considerable degree of strength and ability to 
integrate and regulate society. However, during the 1940s and 1950s, the political 
struggle between Liberals and Conservatives for control o f exclusive access to state 
power, along with profound changes in the structure of classes and emergence of social
11 The Liberal and Conservatives parties were founded in Colombia in 1848 y 1849 respectively
12 The National Front was an agreement made in 1957 between the Liberal and Conservative parties to 
bring an end to a long period of extremely violent confrontations (1946-1957) for the control o f the state 
apparatus. The agreement provided for the two parties' alternation in power and equal distribution o f  
government jobs between them over a period of sixteen years. See Hartlyn , 1988; Leal, 1986).
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conflicts, generated a situation o f violence which undermined the previous strengthening 
o f the state to the point o f partial collapse, especially in regions with the most acute 
social contradictions.
Contrary to Oquist, Bejarano and Segura (1996) consider that the state underwent 
selective strengthening during the National Front period due to increased public 
spending in three sectors of the executive branch. The average percentage o f total public 
spending from 1957 to 1974 was 28.6% in the social sector, 25.9% in justice and 
security, 20.3% in infrastructure, and 20.88% in public administration (Ibidem: 14). 
According to those authors, the process consolidated the executive branch and public 
administration at the expense of the legislative branch, whose functions and controls 
were clearly diminished vis a vis the former. Nonetheless, this selective strengthening 
does not seem so clear, as these same authors recognize, if various aspects are taken into 
account. In the first place, the growth o f social spending (education, health, housing, 
and agriculture), contrasts with the marginality and extreme poverty o f large sectors of 
the Colombian population during the period considered, as pointed out by various 
analysts (Urrutia, 1984). At the same time, that increase coincided with increased social 
protests during the National Front, which rose from 46 in 1958 to a total of 295 in 1974, 
with a notorious rise to 539 in 1971 (Archila, 1997:16). This would suggest that the 
increased spending was due more to the pressure exerted by these social struggles than 
to a deliberate policy oriented to strengthen the state and social integration, or that social 
spending was diverted to other sectors, inefficiently allocated or that it “did not grow at
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the rhythm o f the social needs o f a country that was growing and becoming transformed 
at dizzying speed” (Bejarano and Segura, 1997: 16). In the second place, increased 
public spending in the areas of justice and security does not seem to have been as clear 
as the authors hold, since public spending in those sectors declined from 28% in 1958 to 
20.57% in 1974. The administration of justice was the “Cinderella” o f the state for a 
long time, a fact that has contributed significantly to the deterioration of public order 
ever since the National Front period. This situation is reflected in an increased rate of 
impunity that rose from 84% en 1975 to 95% in 1992 (Montenegro, Posada y Piraquive, 
2000: 99). Investment in justice only began to increase in the early nineties when 
aggravated violence and profound deterioration of public order made it imperative to do 
so. In the third place, public spending on infrastructure does not seem to sustain the idea 
of selective strengthening of the state. That spending also diminished throughout the 
period studies by Bejarano and Segura, since it fell from 28.3% in 1958 to 13.12% in 
1974. This situation is grave if  one considers the fact that Colombia is a country with 
serious deficiencies regarding the integration of its territory and its national market, 
precisely because of the weakness o f the state.
Although there is no sound empirical evidence for Bejarano and Segura's 
argument and despite the fact that they do not consider other important dimensions of 
the concept of the state such as the cultural, political, economic, and territorial ones, one 
can accept for the sake of the discussion that a certain increase in public spending and 
rationalization of public administration implies a partial strengthening of the state.
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Indeed, during the 1960s and 1970s the National Front governments revitalized the 
policies of modernization and rationalization of state and public administration which 
had been interrupted during the violent period of the 1940s and 1950s. However, this 
process was undermined by a series o f other factors such as the exacerbation of 
clientelism and patrimonial ism as a consequence of the exclusionary power-sharing 
arrangement between the Liberal and Conservative parties, the rise and entrenchment of 
drug-trafficking, the strengthening of guerrilla groups and organized crime, the growth 
of informality and illegal forms of capital accumulation, and increasing colonization of 
agricultural and economic frontier zones without due planning, orientation and 
integation into the national market and institutions. Therefore, the relative advances 
achieved in terms of the state’s capacity to regulate society, and to mobilize and allocate 
resources practically collapsed during the 1980s and 1990s.
In addition to the Colombian state's inability to integrate the territory, another 
important aspect of its weakness is its inability to administer justice and provide security 
for its citizens. The judicial system's capacity to resolve conflicts among citizens is 
very limited. According to the Colombian Department of Planning the rate of impunity 
in 1994 was 97%, while a criminal court judge produces only 15 sentences per year, i.e. 
little more than one a month (Montenegro, 1994: 38). That year there was a backlog of 
2,000,000 cases in criminal matters and 1,800,000 cases in civil and economic matters 
without solution (ibidem). For the same year, there were 196 police for every 100,000 
inhabitants in Colombia, while smaller countries like Uruguay and Peru had 767 and 350 
respectively (Ibidem: 41). Social conflicts thus tend to be solved at the margin of public
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institutions by the guerrilla, paramilitaries, drug trafficking mafias and other forms o f 
private justice and defense.
Economic studies have appeared recently on the situation o f justice and violence 
in Colombia, that reject the weakness of the state as an explanatory variable, considering 
it a vague concept that does not withstand “either a serious empirical analysis or a 
minimimum contrast with reality” (Montenegro, Posada and Piraquive, 2000: 85 and 
93). Instead, they consider the causes of violence in Colombia to be associated with the 
rise and strengthening o f drug-trafficking and organized crime, the expansion of the 
illegal economy, and the existence o f areas o f colonization with abundant economic 
resources such as oil, bananas, gold, and emeralds. All o f this made possible and 
increased criminality, which, in turn, led to the collapse of criminal justice (Gaitan, 
1995; Rubio, 1999; Montenergo, et. al., 2000). Although these authors are correct in 
pointing to the above-mentioned factors as causes of violence, the strictly quantitative 
view of the phenomenon, typical of the economic bias, leads them to underestimate the 
institutional, political and cultural dimensions. They do not consider the fact that the 
administration of justice is a function of the state that has traditionally been neglected in 
Colombia, and that the economic and social exclusion, the lack of territorial integration 
and development of the internal market (fundamental elements of the state), propitiate 
processes of spontaneous and disordered colonization, with uprooted populations, in 
which the exploitation of natural resources foments and strengthens criminality.
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By and large, the development o f para-institutionality is a result of the weakness 
o f the state that is facilitated by geographic complexity o f territory; scarce or non­
existent communication, transportation, education and health infrastructure, and the 
limited presence of administrative, police and judicial authorities. The gap left by the 
state is filled by clientelism, drug-trafficking mafias, guerrilla movements, and groups 
dedicated to private justice and defense. The last of these constitute an interesting 
symbiosis of social relations: powerful regional interests in search of the security the 
state fails to provide as protection against delinquency or guerrilla excesses, ally 
themselves with some sectors of the military and drug-traffickers to fight a common 
enemy. It is the guerrilla itself and its supposed sympathizers or supporters which are 
defined ambiguously to encompass intellectuals, teachers and professors, human rights 
defenders, and civic leaders. Such a strategic alliance has engendered a spiral of war, 
terror, massacres and social uprooting, and a “culture” of intolerance, violence and 
exclusion. This “culture” pervades the ways in which the population o f a weak state and 
a fragmented civil society solves its conflicts.
Since the 1980s all those factors have created a situation o f social anomie 
characterized by violence and the systematic violation of almost all norms of social 
coexistence. As I have argued (Oijuela, 1990), the catalyst of this crisis has been drug- 
trafficking, which has exacerbated all its dimensions. The weakness of the state and the 
absence of public authorities and development policies in much o f Colombian territory 
have spurred the expansion of the drug-trafficking cartels. Supported by unlawful 
forms of capital accumulation, they challenge the precariou s institutional order and
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through corruption and violence they seek political, economic, and social insertion into 
Colombian society. In their struggle against legality they contribute to the 
decomposition of the state and society.
The incapacity of the elites to integrate the national territory and to assume
leadership in society, the state's inability to administer justice, the increasing weight of
the economy and illegal activities in Colombian society and culture, the anomie and
deterioration of the social fabric, have given certain authors grounds on which to
characterize Colombian culture as a “mafia culture” (Garay, 1999). This culture has
displaced the culture of work and productive investment, which has led to the “de-
industrializacion” of the country. According to Gomez Buendia, one of the
characteristics of Colombian society is the weakness of public rationality, which is
topped by private rationality, understood as
individual creativity, diversity, imagination, ingenuity, the inexhaustible 
tenacity o f  Colombians; but also their difficulty in organizing them selves to 
undertake collective projects so as to resolve the most essential public 
problems, (beginning with peaceful coexistence and respect for the country's 
institutions -  first and foremost, the law -) (1999: 19).
3.2. Political Regime as an Amalgam of Premodernity and M odernity 
and its Limits in a Global World
According to Weber, historically the development of the modem state began at the 
moment in which the prince expropriated the bearers of administrative, fiscal and war 
mechanisms and concentrated all power in himself (1997: 1059-1060). If, as Weber 
says, a characteristic of political modernity is the separation of state officials from the 
resources with which they administer society, then we can say that in the Third World in
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general, and in Colombia in particular, that separation and, therefore, modernity, has 
only been produced partially and, in any case, not fully produced. This can lead as to 
affirm that patrimonialism and clientelism are typical o f  Third World regimes.
Furthermore, as mentioned above in the theoretical framework, the legacy of “the 
colonial and traditional past in Third World societies reinforced non-capitalistic forms of 
social control and socio-political relations, impeding the formation of a centralized state 
able to achieve “successful subordination of the people's own inclinations of social 
behavior. . .  in favor of behavior prescribed . . .  by rules” (Migdal, 1988: 22). The result 
is a social fragmentation that impedes the emergence of “strong states” with sufficient 
capability to integrate society and centralize its regulatory function. This social 
fragmentation and the political primacy of local and regional strongmen prevent, in turn, 
the development of a rational bureaucracy and facilitate the control of local institutions 
by personal interests, which leads to the displacement of general state policies by partial 
interests. From this perspective, it can be said that Colombia’s armed conflict has to do, 
in large part, with the state’s incapacity to predominate over local interests in order to 
address historical problems related to the redistribution of land an the integration of 
territory. These ideas from Migdal must be complemented with those of Gamarra 
(1994), who has referred to the contemporary Latin American regime as a hybrid given 
that it combines, on the one hand, democracy and authoritarianism, and on the other 
hand, neo-liberal technocracy and “patronage” in the decision-making process.
Drawing on Weber, Migdal, and Gamarra, one can say that the modernization of 
Colombian society can be viewed as an unfinished process if one takes into account that
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both the legacy o f social and territorial fragmentation of the colonial past (Palacios, 
1986; Pecaut, 1987), the process o f industrialization that occurred during the first half of 
the twentieth century, and the National Front pact from 1958 to 1974, generated a social 
and political hybrid of modernity and premodemity. Indeed, the old and bloody struggle 
over hegemony from the 1940s to 1950s, between the conservative agrarian-based 
faction of the elite, and the liberal pro-modernization faction, was solved by means o f a 
mutually beneficial covenant that appeased both sides. Although priority was given to 
the modernization and industrialization of Colombian society, the traditional sector was 
able to maintain some privileges based on a partial continuity of traditional society. 
That situation helps to explain the persistent failure of attempts at agrarian reform, why 
the large rural landowners have paid low taxes, and why many of the political 
relationships in Colombia have a clientelistic character. Politically, the pact included the 
alternation of Liberal and Conservative Parties in government, and equal distribution of 
positions in the legislative, executive, and judicial branches (Leal, 1984). The 
arrangement has consequently been labeled as a “consociational regime” (Hartlyn, 
1988). Although the National Front marked an end to the political violence of the 1940s 
and 1950s, and for some years promoted stability of the political regime, it established 
the basis for yet another crisis whose principal effects were: a) exclusion of new social 
and political forces which arose due to the process of modernization and 
industrialization, b) exacerbation of clientelism, c) blurring of ideological and 
programmatic boundaries between the two parties, d) incapacity to implement social 
reforms, e) lack of representation, and d) rupture between political and economic elites.
Clientelism is the premodem legacy of an agrarian and traditional society that 
has served as a cohesive force for socio-political integration for a large portion o f the 
Colombian population, especially the rural one. Indeed, the lack of both a broad and 
effective infrastructural and social policy and of a state presence in a large portion of the 
national territory is the essence of clientelism. Clientelism is a personalized and 
hierarchical system of socio-political relations, and a sort of private social security 
system, in which regional and local politicians (electoral barons, in the Colombian 
jargon) substitute for the state action. They satisfy the particular needs of their clients 
by means of the private use of state resources and funds, and controlling access to public 
services, in exchange for their clients’ political loyalty. This undermines the state’s 
effectiveness in providing Colombians with adequate public services in matters that 
encompass everything from water and sewerage to the administration of justice.
The exacerbation of clientelism and patrimonialism has reduced the relative 
autonomy of the state in Colombia and negatively affected its legitimacy for two 
reasons. First, the private use of public resources impedes state efforts to direct such 
resources towards state priorities or the common good. Second, political relations based 
on personal loyalties impede the state’s capacity to act as a general cohesive factor of 
society that, in turn, limits its possibilities for leading the modernization process. 
Therefore, the Colombian political crisis engenders, among other reasons, the 
delegitimation of the state due to the lack of generalization of the benefits derived from 
its action.
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According to some authors, clientelism has proved functional for the different 
social classes, the political system, and the economy in general, since it has provided 
stability and integration for Colombian society (Leal and Davila, 1991: 97). However, 
one must to accept this affirmation with some reservations, since the political stability 
has been very fragile and social integration has been partial at best. However, 
clientelism, patrimonialism, and hybridation that have characterized the Colombian 
political regime until now have begun to find their limits and have ceased to be 
functional to Colombian society.
One of the limitations confronted by the Colombian hybrid political regime is the 
current national and international concern for corruption. This has been defined, from a 
moral and juridical perspective, as the undue and illegal appropriation of public money 
or goods for private ends. However, for the purposes of my analysis, I will approach the 
issue of corruption from a Weberian sociological perspective. From this point of view, 
corruption is one o f the expressions of clientelism and patrimonialism that, in turn, are 
expressions of a premodern political culture. According to Weber, patrimonialism is a 
traditional form of domination, in which political control is exercised by means of a 
bureaucratic apparatus integrated by the sovereign’s friends or favorites. When such 
domination is exercised in polities it is called patrimonial state, and its form is similar to 
the domination established in the domestic community (Weber, 1997: 184-187). The 
types of retribution of the "patrimonial servants" are called by Weber "prebends", which 
consist of the sovereign’s personal patrimony assignments in money, goods, granting of 
land or of incomes, rights or tributes. Weber calls "prebendary" the existence of a public
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administration maintained in such a way (ibidem: 187-189). This form of patrimonial 
exercise o f authority implies a political relationship based primarily on personal loyalty, 
which represents a strong obstacle for the rise of economic and political modem 
rationality (ibidem: 191). This, as mentioned above, impedes the complete separation of 
the private and public spheres, and the appearance of the rational legality. As Weber 
points out, "the patrimonial state assures that the sphere of favors granted by the 
sovereign can be converted in to a mechanism for the formation of fortunes, and clears 
the path (. . .) to the enrichment of the sovereign himself, of his favorites, courteous 
officials, governors, mandarins, taxgatherers, state attomies, sellers of all kinds of 
graces, large merchants and capitalists. . ." (Ibidem: 837).
According to this Weberian characterization, it can be said that in Latina 
America, patrimonialist political domination manifests itself in two institutions: 
clientelism and prebendarianism. From this perspective, corruption is not a moral 
deviation of behavior but a form of prebendary relationship, which characterizes Latin 
America’s political regimes. Corruption thus be understood as a remnant of 
patrimonialism hybridized with the modern bureaucratic rationality. Patrimonial regimes 
constantly generate clientelist and prebendary relations, reproducing a traditional 
political culture. In such regimes those practices are not only apparent in pre-electoral 
periods (although they intensify in such periods) but also constitute the fundamental and 
core praxis that generates stable bonds of domination which, in turn, reproduce practical 
clientelist and prebendary relations. Practices of this kind include: the delivery of 
money in exchange for votes or recommendations to obtain official posts ; favoritism in
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granting public contracts; monopolies offered to friends of the state; tolerance o f the 
infractions of the law, incompatible accumulations of officials posts, etc. All of these 
cases refer to political practices that blur the crucial distinction between the public and 
private spheres.
The new limits confronted by the Colombian hybrid political regime are thus
manifested in greater national and international concern regarding corruption and they
are being replaced by the new public institutions that arose from the new political
Constitution of 1991, which will be analyzed below, and by the globalization process.
Both these phenomena are forcing full modernization of social relations, in the sense of
the establishment of more rationalized and transparent relations between the state and
civil society, in order to make the economy more effective. But it is not simply a
question of seeking greater transparency and effectiveness in the allocation of social
resources at the national level, but also of seeking greater security for capital at the
international level, threatened by the insecurity of the regulative framework of Third
World societies and the fragility of the new electronic technologies of transmission of
information at the global level. In this respect, Wang and Rosenau point out that
as growing numbers o f  companies from northern industrialized countries 
expand their operations into developing countries, where the monitoring and 
regulative framework tends to be less developed, they are subject to greater 
temptations to engage in practices not allowed at home. The digitalization o f  
international finance and the proliferation o f  strategic business alliances 
accompanying globalization are other reasons why corruption may be 
increasing: it is technically much easier than ever before to launder and 
dispose o f  the gains harvested through corrupt practices (2001: 30).
Furthermore, the international political changes have contributed to generating a new
anti-corruption environment, since with the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the
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Soviet Union and crisis o f communism, the great economic powers are no longer willing 
to support and tolerate corrupt, undemocratic governments or those that do not respect 
human rights.
Thus, corruption has become a topic on the new international agenda. The new
sensitivity in the face of this phenomenon and the need to design new policies to combat
it have been warned by various international analysts. In this respect, Glym, Kobrin,
and Naim say the following:
in less than a half-decade, the worldwide backlash against corruption has 
swept like a firestorm across the global political landscape. Governments 
have fallen. Longtime ruling parties have been hounded from office. 
Presidents, prime ministers, parliamentarians, and once mighty corporate 
chieftains have been grilled by prosecutors and herded into the docket. Italy,
France, Japan, South Korea, India, M exico, Colombia, Brazil, South Africa: 
no region, and hardly any country, has been immune (quoted by W ang and 
Rosenau, 2001:27).
The new global anti-corruption attitude has also been expressed in countless
international conferences and institutions. Among them, it is worth mentioning the
International Anti-corruption Conference, IACC, which has been meeting every two
years since 1983. In its ninth meeting, held in 1999 in Durban, Surafrica, the IACC
considered that corruption is “one of the most debilitating legacies of the twentieth
century” (Ibidem). International multilateral organizations like the United Nations, the
World Bank, the International have also redoubled their efforts in the struggle against
corruption. In 1999 James Wolfesohn, president of the World Bank, emphasized the
importance of the policy of combating the phenomenon in the following way:
w hile building an effective government framework is difficult, it w ill become 
im possible if  there is corruption which is the single most corrosive aspect o f  
developm ent and must be fought systematically at all levels. Particularly it 
must start with a vigorous commitment from the leadership to fight
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corruption on all levels, with initiative both to prevent it from happening and 
a system for finding and punishing wrongdoers where corruption exists. The 
lead must come from the top and efforts must be persistent and unyielding 
(W ang and Rosenau, 2001: 28).
But perhaps the maximum expression of the new global order against corruption 
has been the rise of “Transparency International”, founded in 1993 as a non­
governmental organization, specialized in anti- corruption matters. Transparency 
International states that its mission is “to curb corruption by mobilizing a global 
coalition to promote and strengthen international and national integrity systems” 
(Galtung and Pope,1999: 260; emphasis added). This NGO is constituted by a general 
secretariat, located in Berlin, and a large number of national chapters, which have 
increased from 50 in 1995 to 100 in 2000 (Ibidem). In 1996, the Latin American 
chapters constituted a regional chapter to strengthen cooperation in the struggle against 
corruption.
In Colombia, it can also be said that the sensitivity of civil society in the face of 
corruption has increased. A survey done in the year 2000 by the Confederation of 
Chambers of Commerce and the Fundacion Corona on the perception of Colombian 
entrepreneurs regarding the phenomenon, showed that the majority believes that 
corruption has increased. Of those who have contracts with the state, 95% recognize 
that they have accepted paying a percentage of the total amount of the contract to 
functionaries of the state entity that should ganted it; and 37.8% affirm that they know 
the amount of the bribe that they must pay in advance, 44.2% affirm the bribe is 
solicited by the public official (Confecamaras, Fundacion Corona y Cipe, 2000: 21 and 
29). According to the business sector the more corrupt state entities are the Congress,
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the Social Security System, the Public Finance System, and the Public Sector Unions. 
The entrepreneurs think the Colombian Government should consider the fight againts 
corruption as one of its more important priorities (ibidem: 44).
The Colombian General Comptroller's Office was strengthened by the 1991 
Constitution. In consequence, in the last years its investigations have increased 
notoriously, from less than 1000 in 1990, to 1229 in 1998, and 1751 in 1999. Moreover, 
in the last decade in Colombia there has been a proliferation of civil society’s 
organizations known as veedurias ciudadanas, a kind of citizens’s comptrollerships 
whose function is to oversee politicians and public employees’ behavior, as well as the 
correct allocation of state funds and the execution of public works. These organizations 
have created a network in order to coordinate their actions.
In synthesis, at the beginning of the 1990s, “global coalition” arose against 
corruption as an expression of global governance.” This fact, along with the political 
changes occurring in Colombia during the same period, have contributed to the 
generation a domestic public conciousness against corruption and the development of 
national and international strategies for fighting it. In turn, the above processes have 
created a pressure toward rationalizing and increasing transparency in the allocation of 
state resources that constitute a force against the continuity of clientelism and the hybrid 
nature of the Colombian political regime.
3.3 The Fragmentation of the Colombian Elite
The clientelistic socio-political relations, that are one of the characteristics of the 
Colombian political regime, are articulated with another of its characteristics that, as has 
already been mentioned, is the ruling class' inability to integrate its different sectors. 
This has been one of the traits of the Colombian elite from the era o f independence to 
the present day (Palacios, 1980a).
During the nineteenth century, this incapacity of the ruling class to organize its 
interests on the general plane of society, appears as disarticulation among the 
landowners, and between them and the commercial sector. During the first half of the 
twentieth century, this disarticulation appeared as a confrontation among the rural 
landholding elite, and the industrial urban elite, which became clearer after 1930, when 
the liberal governments assumed power and laid the political and institutional bases for 
the process and the formation of a working class (Pecaut, 1987). At the end of the 
twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first, this fragmentation is manifested 
in over-representation of the rural sector in the Congress13, in disarticulation between the 
political elite and the economic elite14, and in fragmentation of the latter between the 
sector that produces mainly for the internal market, and that which, by taking advantage
13 T h is  o v e r-rep rese n ta tio n  persis ts d esp ite  the  fac t th a t th e  la tes t census, don e  in 1993, sh o w ed  su bstan tia l 
ch an g es in the  co m p o sitio n  o f  the C o lo m b ian  p o pu la tion , inc lu d in g  th e  fact th a t 74%  o f  th e  p opu la tion  
lives in u rban  areas, w h ile  2 6 %  lives in ru ra l areas. N ev erth e less , th a t cen su s  h as no t been  ap p ro v ed  by 
C on g ress, ad d u c in g  sup p o sed  techn ica l defec ts in its execu tion , since  rep resen ta tio n  o f  the  reg ions in 
th is in stitu tion , and  the po litica l in terests linked to rural areas, w ould  be  affected .
14 D esp ite  th is  h is to ric  situa tion  o f  fragm en ta tion  o f  the  ru lin g  class, th e re  have been  th ree  fa iled  attem pts 
in C o lo m b ia  to  link  and  h arm on ize  the d ifferen t sec to rs o f  tha t c lass  and  to  dev e lo p  th e  na tio n -sta te  on 
th is basis. T hese  w ere  the gov ern m en ts  o f  R afael N u n ez  (1 884-1886), A lfonso  L o p ez  P u m are jo  (1934  - 
1938), C a rlo s L leras R estrep o  (1966-1970).
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of economic "opening", has managed to become articularted into the global economy. 
This last aspect will be analyzed in Chapter 5.
This rupture between political and economic elites has led to an institutional 
fragmentation of the state: the political elites express themselves and act through the 
Congress and other non-technical institutions, while the economic elites pursue their 
interests through institutions responsible for economic policy, such as the Central Bank, 
the National Planning Department and the Finance Ministry. This fragmentation 
becomes apparent in three ways: First, the primacy of economists over lawyers and
politicians in public policy making. Second, concern over the excessive clientelist 
influence on economic policy which led to administrative reforms aimed at insulating 
state institutions responsible for economic policy; and, third, the new role that the 
Consejo Gremial Nacional (a federation of the principal business organizations) has 
played in Colombia’s political life in recent years.
In relation to the first aspect, until the fifties politicians and lawyers exercised a 
privileged management of state institutions and economic policy. Political activity and 
membership in political parties were also mechanisms of prestige and social mobility at 
that time. However, adopting Palacio’s hypothesis, it seems plausible to affirm that 
since 1948 "militance in political parties was no longer a channel of social mobility, 
especially for professionals, who began to seek public office through distinct 
mechanisms" (2001: 115).
120
In the 1960s, the process of industrialization and “semi-modernization” was 
consolidated in the country, and the economic functions of the state increased and 
became more complex. This coincided with the development of economics as a science 
and a university career. Economists began to replace lawyers and politicians, who 
remained as representatives of the traditional social relations and political culture 
(Palacios, 2001: 115). The number of schools or departments of economics in 
Colombian universities increased from 3 in 1952, to 9 in 1960, to 35 in the 1980s, and to 
48 in the 1990s. Consequently, the number of graduates in economics grew from 60 in 
1960 to 1449 in 1980, and descended to 812 in 1997 (Palacios, 2001: 111). It can be 
said that, as of the 1960s, the economists began to replace to humanists and lawyers as 
the primary "organic intellectuals" of Colombian society. As Gramsci points out, "each 
social group, upon emerging from the original base of an essential function in the 
productive sphere, creates at the same time, organically, one or more layers of 
intellectuals that give that group homogeneity and consciousness of its own function in 
the economic field: the capitalist businessman creates with himself the economist, the 
scientist of the political economy. In addition, the businessman is also an intellectual" 
(Gramsci, 1981: 187)
In Colombia, the tecnocratic economists, have formed a closed social circle 
based upon its commmon social class identity, its academic formation in few 
universities, especially Los Andes University (Bogota), a elite University; its 
professional fulfillment in the same institutions in the public and private sectors, 
especially, the Ministerio de Hacienda, the Departamento Nacional de Planeacion, the
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Banco de la Republica, and the Asociacion Nacional de Instituciones Financieras, ANIF; 
in research centers such as CEDE and FEDESARROLLO, and in international 
multilateral organizations such as ECLA, Inter American Development Bank, and the 
World Bank, Between 1958 and 2000, 62 people have occupied ministerial posts, 
director of the Departmento Nacional de Planeacion, and director or codirector of the 
Banco de la Republica, and the great majority of them have been economists. Of these 
62 officials, 32 are Los Andes University alumni (Palacios, 2001: 128). O f the all 
Colombian economists, 164 have carried out doctoral studies at foreign universities, 
especially in the United States; and 80% are Los Andes University graduates (ibidem: 
121). Additionally, 70% of the scholarships offered by the Banco de la Republica to 
conduct doctoral studies outside the country have been offered to Los Andes University 
alumni (ibidem: 122). In consequence, the economics school of this University has 
been the alma mater of the main decision makers of Colombian economic development 
policies during the last four decades. According to Palacios, in the context of 
Colombian economics schools, Los Andes University "has better complied with the two 
requirements consistent with the values of the practical ideal: it has been more apolitical 
and tecnically oriented in all aspects, and more open to internationalization” (Palacios, 
2001: 118)
In regards to the Consejo Gremial, this organization has filled the political gap 
left by the traditional parties since they abandoned the function of channeling, debating, 
and proposing solutions to general interest issues. The Consejo Gremial has replaced 
political parties on issues such as conflict and peace, erosion of the social fabric, and
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citizen security. It is illustrative in this respect to quote Cesar Gonzalez, former
president of the Consejo Gremial:
business institutions should perform a cultural role in the formation o f  public 
opinion and strengthening o f  citizenship. It should be this w ay because o f  the 
weakness our society exhibits in performing a real public action aimed at 
solving our fundamental problems. The concept o f  “public action” refers not 
only to the administration and control o f  state power and instruments but also  
to civil society’s ability to obtain general interest goals. Peace, cultural 
modernity, an identity worthy o f  Colombia in the international community, 
and sustainable econom ic growth are our fundamental interests” (Gonzalez,
Cesar, 1997: 75-76).
As will be shown below, this fragmentation of elites and state institutions has affected 
the regime’s effectiveness, i.e., its capacity to lead society, especially in the context of 
the changing economic model. The situation is reinforced by the neoliberal nature of 
such a model, whose exclusionary character limits the possibility for elites to make 
alliances with other social sectors.
In synthesis, I have argued in this chapter that Colombia has suffered a crisis of 
legitimacy and hegemony, which originated in the interaction of four factors: a) the 
weakness o f the state; b) the hybrid character of the political regime, resulting from the 
combination of premodern and modern political cultures; c) the limits imposed by new 
political and economic conditions at the national and international levels upon the 
continuation of such a hibridization; and d) the fragmentation of the political and 
economic elite. This crisis becomes more acute due to the confrontation between two 
conflicting societal projects that have struggled for recognition since the early 1990s: 
that which arises from the 1991 Constitution, and that which arises from the neoliberal
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economic model. The development o f these ideas is the objective o f the next three 
chapters.
Chapter 4 
Colombian Societal Project I: The 1991 Political Constitution
As shown in the theoretical framework, many of the countries of Latin American 
suffered a series of constitutional reforms during the eighties and nineties that, as 
Gargarella has affirmed (1997), share common elements. These constitutional reforms 
were the result of three factors. First, the need to institutionalize the transition to the 
democratic regime, in the second place; second, the concern among different political 
and social forces over the institutional deterioration and social inequality, and third, the 
pressure of international economic agencies and of technocratic national elites to 
institutionalize the neoliberal economic restructuring. Colombia has become inscribed 
within this general tendency in Latin America. However, it is necessary to point out that 
the adoption of a new constitution in Colombia was also determined by the need to find 
a solution to a long and profound political crisis.
4.1. The Crisis Leading to the Constitutional Assembly
In the previous chapter we analyzed the weakness of the Colombian state, its incapacity 
to integrate the territory and the society, the fragmentation of the ruling class, and its
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incapacity to constitute a hegemony. To have a complete picture of the Colombian crisis
in decade of the nineties, three more elements must be added to the situation described
above. In the first place, the long crisis of the political regime that had been developing
since the seventies, based on the negative effects of the bipartisanship agreement of the
National Front. These effects are the exacerbation of clientelism, the fading o f the
parties’ ideology and programs, their inability to carry out the necessary social reforms
in a Country which had suffered an accelerated modernization , and the fragmentation of
the parties to the point that in practice each member of the party organizes its own
political movement for personal ends, as a result of which the representation of the
general interests of society becomes impossible. But perhaps the most perverse effect of
the National Front was the exclusion of the new social forces that arose as the product of
industrialization, urbanization and the relative modernization of the country that
occurred in the second half of the twentieth century. This more diversified and complex
Colombian society faced a
blockade, quite diversified in its methods, o f  almost all the em erging forms 
o f  political participation. Everything that did not pass through the bipartisan 
filter received a systematic treatment, whether subtle or barefaced, o f  
annulment” (Leal, 1987: 77).
This exclusion was the cause of the rise o f guerrilla movements like April 19th
Movement, M l9. Future members of this group, united in a dissident nationalist
political party named ANAPO saw their hopes of coming to power legitimately
frustrated in 197015, which obliged them to radicalize and to confront the regime
illegally. However, in 1990, this guerrilla movement became reincorporated into life in
l5D ue to the fact th a t the g o v e rn m en t o f  th a t tim e m an ip u la ted  the elec to ra l resu lts to  p rev en t the  popu list 
po litical m o v em en t A lia n za  N a c io n a l P opular, A N A P O , from  assum ing  pow er. I f  th a t had  o ccu rred , the 
b ipartisan  po litical reg im e w ould  have  co m e to its end.
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civil society to participate in the Constitutional Assembly, obtaining a high number of 
votes.
In the second place, the deterioration of public order, due to the increase in 
common delinquency, the violence of guerrilla and paramilitary groups and, above all, 
since the mid-eighties, of drug-trafficking mafias that declared war on the weak 
Colombian state in order to prevent their extradition to the United States.
Finally, the tendency of the Colombian economic structure to generate severe 
inequalities in the income distribution and high levels of poverty, is reinforced by the 
political regime’s scarce receptivity to any reform of the social structure. This is 
manifested in social instability, as a result of the aggravation of the class conflicts and 
the increase in social protests.
Thus, adoption of the 1991 Constitution was an attempt to overcome the crisis of 
the political regime and its legal expression, the old Constitution of 1886. But to 
understand the political meaning of this Assembly, it is necessary to review the failed 
attempts at reform that preceded it, which illustrate the rigidity of the power structure in 
Colombia and the incapacity of the political regime to respond to the necessities of 
democratization and social reform of an increasingly differentiated and complex society.
The idea of convoking a constitutional assembly as a solution to the crisis of the 
regime, dates back to the Liberal government of Lopez Michelsen (1974-1978), who
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proposed to reform the administration of justice and to restructure the political-territorial 
division of the country (Cepeda, 1987), given that the political, administrative and fiscal 
centralism started to show signs of exhaustion at that time and to generate a series of 
protests called paros civicos on the part of the different municipalities and regions 
throughout the country. These protests were due to the precarious level of 
socioeconomic and infrastructural development of the municipalities. The progressive 
increase in the number of paros civicos is illustrative in this respect: between 1958 and 
1966 there were 16 paros civicos, between 1971 and 1981 there were 138, and between 
1982 and 1989 there were 218 (Orjuela, 1992). However, the idea o f undertaking this 
reform was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of Justice, due to the fact 
that the constitution in force at that time did not permit amendments to be made outside 
of the Congress, as president Lopez had proposed.
During the Liberal government of Turbay Ayala (1978-1982), the increase in the 
guerrilla activities of the M19 coincided with the popular protests of the subordinate 
social sectors, that were a constant phenomenon throughout the period o f the National 
Front (Archila, 1997). For this reason, the ruling class diagnosed the crisis as the result 
o f problems of public order. Consequently, the policies of Turbay Ayala were directed to 
preventing and criminalizing the popular protest by means o f the so-called “security 
statute” (Reyes, et. al., 1978). At the same time, he revived the previous government’s 
idea of carrying out a constitutional reform of the administration of justice, through the 
creation of a general Prosecutor office that would be in charge of the functions of
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investigation and accusation in criminal matters. Nevertheless, this reform was also 
declared unconstitutional, for the same reason mentioned above.
During the presidential period of Conservative Belisario Betancur (1982-1986), 
the social protests continued to increase, especially those of the peasants, students, and 
workers (Archila, 2000). However, Betancur diagnosed the crisis in a different way. He 
considered that the crisis and its main expression, violence, had objective and subjective 
causes. The former had to do with the lack of presence of the state in vast areas of the 
national territory and their lack of integration into the national market. In order to face 
up to this cause, Betancur developed a national integration plan, that consisted basically 
of public investment in physical and social infrastructure in said regions. The subjective 
causes, were due to the perception among new generations of Colombians that had 
grown up in the shadow of the National Front that they had no space in which to 
participate in the political, economic and social life of the country. To confront this 
situation, the Betancur government developed two policies: a peace process to seek the 
reinsertion of guerrilla groups into civil life, and a “political opening” or process of 
democratization of the political regime (Bejarano, 1990). This process included 
measures like the popular election of mayors, so that the demobilized guerrilla groups 
would find spaces for political participation (Orjuela, 1992).
The guerrilla groups with the exception of the Revolutionary armed forces of 
Colombia, FARC, received the peace negociations with skepticism. This group entered 
negotiations with the government and to test the regime’s determination regarding
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democratization, decided to create a legal political movement, the Patriotic Union. 
Nonetheless, the peace negotiations failed due, among other reasons, to the systematic 
extermination of the members of that political group, including several presidential 
candidates, at the hands of paramilitaries and anonymous forces of the extreme right, to 
the point that in the past two decades around 3,000 members of these movements have 
been assassinated. This situation was the result, in part, of the ambiguous position of the 
FARC regarding legal political action, that led them to “combine all forms of struggle.” 
It also derived from the lack of a real will to democratization and tolerance on the part of 
the Colombian political regime.
In general terms, it can be said that the Betancur government had a clear vision 
of the need to integrate Colombia politically, territorially and economically, and to 
oxygenate and democratize the political regime. Nonetheless, the structural factors of 
the Colombian political and social crisis, and the lack of vision of the ruling class, meant 
an obstacle for Betancur’s political project. In the end, Betancur was abandoned by the 
Conservative party, his own party, who called him “communist”, and by a large part of 
the Liberal party. Furthermore, the intransigence of the M l9 guerrilla group, was the 
straw that broke the camel’s back. This group’s 1985 assault on the Supreme Court of 
Justice, with its violent ending in which many of the Justices died, weakened the 
government even more.
In practice, the popular election of mayors was the only reform instituted by the 
Betancur government that was relatively successful. By establishing a bond of
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accountability between the mayor and the local community, it has contributed to 
democratize the political regime to some degree and to relegitimate the state. 
Nevertheless, this reform has also contributed to strengthening clientelism and 
corruption. Only a few municipalities have elected mayors who are “outsiders” or civic 
leaders who have tried to positively transform political and social life at the local level.
The Liberal government of Virgilio Barco (1986-1990), sought to revitalize and 
relegitimate the bipartisan regime by means of a scheme to end the connivance between 
liberalism and conservatism, through the institutionalization of a scheme of relations of 
“government party and opposition party.” However, given the profound socioeconomic 
transformations that have taken place in Colombia during the second half of the 
twentieth century, which have resulted in a more diversified and complex society, 
solutions to the crisis based on the continuity of bipartisanship are doomed to failure or 
to contribute to aggravate the crisis itself. Due to the conviction that the bipartisan 
scheme had been exhausted, the Barco government opted for two different strategies. 
The first consisted of newly exploring the possibility of a political agreement regarding 
the reinsertion of guerrilla groups, which was only possible with the M l9; and the 
second, of reforming the political constitution, in response to the clamor of certain key 
sectors in the formation public opinion in the country.
To carry out the the constitutional reform, Barco proposed convoking the citizens 
to a plebiscite, in order to derogate a norm of the Constitution of 1886, introduced by the 
National Front pact, that prohibited reforming the constitution by means of direct
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participation of the primary constituent power, i.e., the people. If the plebiscite was 
approved, the government would proceede to call elections for a constitutional assembly 
with popular participation. However, this initiative failed due to the strong opposition of 
the Conservative party and of various sectors of the ruling class. Given this opposition, 
president Barco was obliged to make an agreement with the Conservative party, 
desisting from the plebiscite and committing himself to carry out the reform through the 
Congress. But the Congress' decision to include a norm that favored drug-traffickers in 
the reform by prohibiting the extradition of Colombians, caused the constitutional 
reform to abort.
The late eighties linked all the factors of the political crisis in such a way as to 
produce a situation of anomie and increased violence, the catalyst of which was the 
violence exercised by the drug-traffickers. The victims of the hard and bloody war that 
they unleashed against Colombia's weak state and society included judges, the police, 
important public officials, common citizens and, between 1989 and 1980, three 
presidential candidates. It was then that a group of university students, interpreting the 
feeling of Colombian society, led a movement that diverse social sectors later joined, to 
reform the political regime and Colombia's public institutions. This led, during the 
Liberal government of Cesar Gaviria (1990-1994), to the election of a Constitutional 
Assembly in December of 1990.
There was broad representation in this Assembly which included not only the 
traditional political parties, but also those on the left, some guerrilla groups that
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demobilized during the Barco and Gaviria governments' peace processes to participate in 
it16, entrepreneurs, and diverse sectors o f Colombian society. If, as defined in the 
theoretical framework o f this dissertation, the political regime is not simply the sum of 
institutions and norms that regulate the relations between the political parties and the 
state, but also the relations between the social classes and between them and the state, 
then the Constitutional Assembly was an attempt to broaden the Colombian political 
regime, to make room for the social sectors that have never been included in it.
4.2.The Societal Project o f the Constitution of 1991:
Legitimacy, Democracy and Equity
The main objective o f the Constitutional Assemably o f 1991 was to resolve Colombia's 
political crisis. To achieve this purpose, the Assembly introduded a series o f reforms in 
six major areas: a) the quest for peace, b) the expansion of democracy and of the 
economic, political and social rights o f citizens, c) the strengthening and relegitimation 
of the state and the political regime, and d) the modification o f the economic regime to 
introduce elements of equity.
The Constitution o f 1991 can be considered a societal project that sought to 
integrate and democratize Colombian society. The quest for social integration 
manifested, among other things, in the fact that the political and social forces that 
promoted that project were very heterogeneous since they covered everything from 
traditional bipartisanship and drug-trafficking elements to university students and
16 The M l9, the Popular Liberation Army (EPL), the Socialist Renovation Current (CRS), the armed 
indigenous movement “Quintin Lame”, and the Revolucionary Workers Party (PRT).
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progressive intellectuals, as well as indigenous groups, social movements, non­
governmental organizations and various radical left-wing political groups that wanted to 
explore a peaceful and democratic path to change.
The idea that the new Constitution was considered by its main promoters to be a 
societal project is noted in the a posteriori disenchantted reflection o f an analyst who, 
referring to participative democracy, introduced by the new constitution, affirmed:
the expectations, perhaps utopian and messianic that we had about what could 
be achieved through them and ask ourselves whether on this horizon of the 
invention of a new country, we can change -  without being fully conscious of 
the fact - the citizen who really exists, or at least tries to do so, in a context of 
multiple tensions and inequalities, for the elusive image of an imaginary 
citizen in the face of whom the former is pathetically deficient, definitely 
precarious and lacking in civic virtues. (. . .) It is necessary to recognize that 
the dramatically intensified war in the past ten years has significantly 
contributed to closing the spaces for participation; that the increased poverty 
in the cities and the displacement in rural zones has turned the different 
fundamental rights established in the constitution of 1991 into simply virtual 
and rhetorical realities (Uribe, 2001: 143).
4.2.1. The Q uest for Peace
At the beginning o f the nineties in Colombia, leaving aside common crime, which is 
comparatively one o f the highest in the world, there were two great focal points of 
violence: the guerrilla groups and the drug-trafficking cartels.
In relation to guerrilla violence, it is necessary to say that the idea o f reforming 
the Constitution by means of a constitutional assembly elected by popular vote 
generated a process o f demobilization o f armed groups, due to the expectation o f 
participating in it and o f being actors in important transformations in the country's
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political, economic and social structure. This characteristic differentiated the peace 
processes o f the nineties with respect to previous ones. While the processes o f the 
eighties were, in the strict sense, processes o f insertion o f armed groups in the social 
order, which remained intact, the peace processes o f the nineties have been the 
opportunity for these groups to abandon the armed struggle on the condition that they 
participate, in an active way, in the transformation o f society for institutional ways. That 
is to say, the peace processes, since the nineties, have increasingly been the scenario in 
which to reconstruct or to refound the state and civil society in Colombia.
Throughout the eighties, the armed conflict had been aggravated due to the 
strengthening o f the military capacity of the different armed actors, due to the abundant 
financial resources available to them, flowing from the illegal narco-trafficking business, 
extorsion, and kidnapping. At the end o f the eighties, it became increasingly clear that a 
peace proposal based on the surrender o f the armed groups or on their unconditional 
reinsertion into the existing order, was not possible. The demand of the armed groups 
increasingly aimed at a reform o f the political regime and the economic and social 
structure o f the country.
For this reason, the possibility o f adopting a new political constitution was 
presented in 1991 by the Gaviria government (1990-1994) as a peace pact with certain 
guerrilla groups. The negotiation process with the National Liberation Army (EPL), 
culminated in the signing o f an agreement in March 1991, to participate in the 
Constituent Assembly. The same thing occurred with the Revolutionary W orkers' Party
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(PRT), and the insurgent Manuel Quintin Lame Indigenous Movement. The M l9 
movement that had demobilized since the end of the previous government, also 
participated in the Constitutional Assembly, with an electoral success that was 
unprecedented for any guerrilla group, which enabled them to exercise importamt 
leadership in the Assembly's deliberations. The strongest guerrilla groups as well as the 
ones with the greatest destabilizing capacity, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), did not want to participate 
in the constitutional process.
With most of the guerrilla groups demobilized and participating in the 
Constitutional Assembly, the Gaviria government considered this situation as a good 
argument for delegitimating the non-demobilized guerrilla groups. On the one hand, 
Gaviria considered that after the reforms the new constitution would establish, there 
would no longer be reasons for credible guerrilla actions. One the other hand, the FARC 
and the ELN, strengthened financially and militarily, did not have sufficient political 
vision and assumed an ambiguous position regarding the constitutional process. 
Nonetheless, the government made several attempts to approach these groups to 
negotiate peace. But with both radicalized positions, the negotiation process ended in a 
strong armed confrontation. The government undertook a military offensive against the 
guerrilla the same day that elections were held to elect the representatives to the 
Constitutional Assembly. This led the FARC to radicalize even more its offensive and 
militaristic position that it continues to hold to this day. With this, the possibilities of a 
new constitution as an instrument for achieving peace in the country were limited.
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With respect to the relationship between the Constitutional Assembly as a 
scenario o f peace and drug-trafficking violence, it must be said that throughout the 
eighties drug- traffickers became “narcoterrorists”, due to the articulation of various 
factors. In the first place, the antinarcotics policy o f the U.S. Government, who defined 
the problem of drug-trafficking as a national security issue, gives priority to a repressive 
strategy to deal with the problem. This translated into pressures on the Colombian 
government to deal repressively with the drug-traffickers and to ensure their extradition 
to the United States. However, this position of the U.S. government ignored the weak 
nature of the Colombian state, so that the political pressures to confront drug-trafficking 
with repression only contributed to further increasing its weakness (Tickner, 2001). The 
drug-traffickers on the other hand confronted the Colombian state with a multiple 
strategy: assassination of important political and social figures of the country, the use of 
terror against civil society, the infiltration of illicit money in political campaigns and in 
institutions of popular representation, and open war on the state, under the slogan “ we 
prefer a tomb in Colombia to a jail cell in the United States.” In the second place, the 
linking of the drug-trafficking mafias to paramilitary groups permitted the strengthening 
of the military capacity of these group, since they had the money to acquire arms and 
training. This relationship between drug-traffickers and paramilitaries has been one of 
the main factors in the violation of human rights and the weakening of authority and 
justice in Colombia.
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The drug-traffickers' strategy of combining terrorist actions with political actions
makes it possible to think that they sought legitimacy and acceptance among social
sectors that thought the state was incapable of ending leftist subversion. Therefore, one
can sustain the thesis that, as of the late eighties, the drug-traffickers were an important
part o f a politico-military project of the extreme right. This is confirmed by the rise of
the Movement for National Restoration (MORENA) in August of 1989. According to
general Miguel Maza Marquez, the director of the Administrative Departament of
Segurity (DAS) at that time, that political movement was
the culm inating point o f  a sym biosis between drug-traffickers, self-defense  
groups, and the groups o f  paid assassins trained by agricultural entrepreneurs 
fed up with constant harassment by the guerrilla (. . .) In the context o f  this 
accelerated metamorphosis, one perceives the influence o f  the drug cartels 
and the laxity o f  certain private agencies that, confused by the volum e 
punishable facts attributed to those who have risen up in arms, have finally  
decided to subtly align them selves with the opposite block, without paying  
attention to the fact that their procedures and barbarism are equally  
condemnable (El Tiempo, August 24, 1989, p. IOC).
Some government measures were finally able to contain the advance of this extrem
right political project; but it is possible to conclude, with president Barco, that at the end
of the eighties the war against drug trafficking should be understood not only as a
struggle of the law against organized crime, but as an effort to permit “the survival of
democratic institutions and public liberties” (Barco, 1989: 137-138).
However, the weak Colombian state was in no condition to confront an enemy 
strengthened by such an enormous amount o f illicit financial resources. For this reason, 
the drug cartels subjected the country to one of the worst waves of terrorism in its entire 
history. There was no other way out than to change the strategy and try to negotiate
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with the drug cartels. In any case, the policy against that phenomenon was ambiguous 
throughout the eighties and oscillated between repression and dialogue (Orjuela, 1990). 
The change to a clear negotiation against drug-trafficking occured during the Gaviria 
government (1990-1994). This distinguished between drug-trafficking and drug- 
trafficking related violence. The former, was considered a transnational phenomenon the 
treatment of which surpassed the limits of national politics and required international 
cooperation. The latter was considered to be a national problem and, therefore, the 
Colombian government had sufficient autonomy to manage it. The Gaviria government 
thus developed a policy of bringing the drug cartels to justice, in exchange for not 
extraditing them to the United States. This implied making the negotiations of previous 
years with the cartels explicit and public, not so as to legitimate it, but rather to find a 
basis on which to elaborate more realistic policies for dealing with it.
The Constitutional Assembly was the scenario in which to legalize this policy. 
As mentioned above, the violence associated with drug-trafficking was the straw that 
broke the camel's back, and led the Assembly to seek a solution to the Colombian 
political crisis. During the deliberations the bombs and the indiscriminate assaults 
against civil society ceased; but the drug-traffickers kidnapped well known journalists in 
order to exert pressure on the Constitutional Assembly. Despite the reticence of some of 
its members, it approved an article that prohibited the extradition of Colombians. One 
of the delegates to the assmbly summed up Colombian society's posititon on the matter 
in a single phrase:
as the lovers o f  peace that w e are, w e have the intimate conviction that we
w ill never achieve it w hile and arbitrary and unconstitutional decree o f  a state
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o f  seige continues to allow  the extradition o f  Colombians (Gaceta 
Constitucional, N o. 39: 10).
The constitutional prohibition of extradition served to return tranquility to Colombian
society and made possible the surrender of Pablo Escobar, head of the Medellin cartel.
However, this prohibition was derogated during the Samper government (1994-1998),
partly due to the pressures of the U.S. government, and partly to president Samper's need
to legitimate himself before the national and international community, given the
accusations of having received money from drug cartels in his electoral campaign.
4.2.2. The Introduction of a Social Democracy
Given the restricted nature of Colombian democracy, Constitutional Assembly of 1991 
proposed making the political system more inclusive and representive. In this sense, the 
first article of the new Constitution establishes the character of the Colombian state as 
democratic, participatory and pluralistic. The second article establishes that one of the 
essential purposes of the state is to “facilitate the participation of all in the decisions that 
affect them in economic, political, administrative and cultural life of the nation”. In 
addition to the vote, it also established a series of mechanisms for direct political 
participation such as the plebiscite, the referendum, popular consultation, the open town 
council meeting, the legislative initiative of citizens, and the recall or revocation of 
mandate of political representatives by the citizens.
The rights to social participation include traditional right to free association, but 
it also includes new rights such as community participation in health services and 
education, in decisions that can affect the environment, worker participation in
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management of enterprises, and participation of ethnic, social, economic, cultural and 
ecological sectors in the National Planning Council, etc. In fact, the Constitution of 
1991 establishes that the professional, labor union, social and sports associations should 
be democratic, and assign the state the role of “fostering democratic practices for 
learning the principles and values of citizen participation” (article 41).
Furthermore, it established the popular election of governors (that of mayors had 
already been established in 1986); the local administrative boards for popular 
representation o f the diverse zones of the municipalities; the indigenous communities' 
right to govern themselves through their own authorities, in accordance with their 
culture and traditions; and the popular election of judges of the peace to deal with minor 
conflicts among citizens. In synthesis, it can be said that, at least formally, the new 
Constitution broadly established direct participation of citizens, to the point that one of 
the members of the Constitutional Assembly pointed out that “the ideology of 
democratic participation became the cement of the whole structure of the new Political 
Charter” (Fals Borda, 1991: 53).
The Constitutional Assembly considered the old constitution to be very poor in 
matters of human rights and that, in addition to the exclusionary nature of the bipartisan 
regime, social exclusion and the violation of human rights were two of the main factors 
of the Colombian political crisis. For this reason, it was decided to place the emphasis 
on the recognition of three generations of human rights, i.e., individual political rights 
and civil liberties; socioeconomic and cultural rights; and collective rights like the right
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to a healthy environment. The first are the traditional and universally known ones such 
as the right to life, habeas corpus, and freedom of conscience. Among the second, the 
Constitution of 1991 established the right to social security and health, decent housing, 
education, the rights of minorities and disadvantaged or discriminated persons such as 
children, women, the elderly and the handicapped. Among the third are the right to 
public space, to quality public goods and services , and the right to enjoy a healthy 
environment. The emphasis on socioeconomic inclusion is noted from the very first 
article of the Constitution of 1991, which defines Colombian state as a “social state of 
law”.
The Constitution of 1991 also established a series of judicial mechanism and
institutions for the exercise and effectiveness of these rights, such as the Constitutional
Court, the Defender of the People, the injunctive action named tutela, and popular
actions. These mechanisms, as will be seen further on, have been considered by the
community to be really effective for demanding their rights with respect to the state and
public administration, which have often been characterized by arbitrary treatment and
ineffectiveness. According to the Colombian Commission of Jurists, with very few
exceptions, Colombian judges did not know and did not apply norms regarding these
three generations of human rights,
whereas, under the protection o f  the Constitution o f  1991, constitutional 
justice has been vigorous in the protection o f  the rights o f  persons and 
minorities, as well as in its intention to control the abuses by the authorities 
and the powerful (Uprinuny, 1991: 99).
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The constitutional recognition of these three generations of human rights means 
the concretion of the quest for greater social justice on the part of progressive political 
and social forces. In this respect, one of the Justices of the new Constitutional Court, 
which has led the crusade for the recognition of these rights and social justice, points out 
that
the Constitution, in synthesis, proposes tw o strategies o f  justice. The first, 
respect for the person, regardless o f  their differences. The second, respect for 
the person, taking their historic particularities into account, to maintain the 
difference, to suppress it or to discount disadvantages and inequities, 
according to each case (. . . )  The Constitution has begun to recognize subjects 
w ho require special protection (minors, women, the elderly, the handicapped, 
hom osexuals, prisoners, indigenous people, and indigents, etc.) The accent o f  
the [new constituional] regime protection o f  social rights, indicates that their 
interests were not usually duly articulated by the democratic political process, 
which certainly cannot be maintained indefinitely (Cifuentes, 2000: 268- 
269).
For this reason, the constitutional mechanisms that have really been effective in the 
recognition and guarantee of these rights in recent years have generated the biggest 
legal, political and economic controversies that Colombia has experienced in the second 
half of the twentieth century. That debate will be analyzed further on.
4.2.3 Strengthening and Relegitimation of the State and the Political Regime
As has been pointed out in the theoretical framework, the state is an essential element in 
the production of the social order, in producing the cohesion of society and the 
integration of the territory through the regulation, the coordination of the different 
social subsystems, and the legitimate use of force. Furthermore, the third chapter showed 
how the Colombian state has suffered such deterioration in recent decades that it is in no 
condition to produce a social order. This situation has translated into violence and
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anomie, in the incapacity o f the public authorities to guarantee even the most elementary 
rights of citizens, and in the degradation with which Colombian society assumes the 
diversity, the disagreement, and the demand for their rights.
For this reason, in the last three decades, a series of reforms have been 
introduced, without much success, in the administration of justice in aspects such as the 
computerization of information and decongestion of court dockets, organization of the 
judicial career, technical and professional development of criminal investigation 
agencies, and the physical modification and decongestion of prisons, among other 
things. (Escallon, 1998). But it was the Constitutional Assembly of 1991 that adopted a 
somewhat more profound reform of the judicial branch through the creation of new 
institutions such as the Superior Council of the Judicature, the General Prosecutor’s 
Office, and the adoption of the accusatory system in the criminal justice, and the 
creation of constitutional justice with the Constitutional Court as its highest tribunal.
The administration of the judicial branch was assigned to the Superior Council of 
the Judicature. This function corresponded to the Ministry of Justice in the past, and its 
performance was very inefficient. It is necessary to emphasize that in addition to 
elaborating and executing the budget of the judicial branch, the Superior Council of the 
Judicature must supervise the performance of the judicial offices.
With the adoption of the accusatory system, the judges are relieved of the 
function of investigating crimes, which now becomes a function of the General
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Prosecutor's Office, whose actions are governed more by the technical criteria of 
criminal investigation than by the procedural formalism of the function o f judgment. In 
this respect, one analyst pointed out that the investigation o f crimes had erroneously 
been attributed to the judges in Colombia, which was incompatible with the nature of 
their function, since they are not trained to investigate the facts, but to analyze them in 
law (Giraldo, 1993). With this technical separation of functions, the Constitutional 
Assembly hoped to achieve a significant increase in the effectiveness o f criminal justice 
and a notable reduction o f impunity.
It is significant to point out the fact that there had been an attempt to introduce
the idea o f a General Prosecutor’s office and the accusatory system into Colombia in
1979, but the authoritarian bias of the government at that time prevented its virtues of
effectiveness from being known to the public. At that time, various associations of
judges and lawyers, non-governmental organizations, and academics, considered that
judicial reform to be the repressive instrument of the regime and called the Colombian
state a police state. In this respect, it was said that:
there are, thus, sufficient sym ptom s to think that the concentration o f  
investigative functions under a General Prosecutor w hose designation w ill 
correspond practically to the executive, w as not due to reasons unrelated to 
the unstable balance o f  the social struggles characteristic o f  recent years and 
tries to project the broadening o f  police function o f  the executive into the 
judicial field. For this purpose, there w ill now  be an institution w hich, like 
the general prosecutor’s o ffice  g ives the state sufficient flexib ility  to 
crim inally repress, under the protective appearance o f  a normal judicial 
process, anyone w ho the conditions o f  reproduction o f  the capitalist system  
point to as undesirable or unbearable" (Rojas, 1980: 157-158).
Two decades later, in the face of the achievements of the General Prosecutor’s Office, it
is becoming clear to the different social forces, even those on the left, just how great a
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degree of deterioration the basic order in Colombia has reached. Although the 
established order ultimately constitutes society asymmetrically and permits the exercise 
of class domination, it is also what makes it possible, as O'Donnell says, for “the 
multiple social relations [to be carried out] on the basis of [a minimum of] stable 
expectations’’ (1992: 10).
Finally, in relation to the topic of the reform of justice, it is necessary to point out 
that part o f the violence that Colombian society suffers is generated in economic and 
social disputes among its citizens, due to the impossibility of dealing institutionally with 
disagreements and conflicts, because of the congestion of civil, commercial and family- 
law cases in the courts. Therefore, effectiveness of the administration of justice in civil 
matters has also been sought through the direct participation of citizens in the solution of 
conflicts by institutionalizing the process and creating non-judicial mechanisms for the 
resolution of conflicts, such as conciliation, arbitration tribunals, and justices of the 
peace elected by the community. The purpose is to see that the judges will only have to 
deal with conflicts to which the community has not found a solution. This is because, 
according to one expert, the congestion in the courts is due in part to the progressive 
process of judicialization that consists of taking every type of conflict arising between 
citizens to the judges to decide, regardless of the transcendence or the degree of 
commotion it causes in the community (Giraldo, 1993). Thus, the legitimacy of the state 
requires the solution of its lack of effectiveness in the administration of justice, which in 
turn requires the participation of the community in the solution of their conflicts, within 
institutional frameworks.
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Another important aspect of the search for legitimacy of the state, has been the 
creation o f the Constitucional Court, which has been assigned the task of constitutional 
control o f the law, which previously corresponded to the Supreme Court o f Justice. But 
the most important function o f the Constitutional Court has been that o f being the 
supreme human rights tribunal. This is exercised through the revies o f judicial decisions 
related to the injuctive action, which is the instrument by means o f which citizens can 
make use o f their fundamental rights before any authority that refuses to recognize them.
Due to its decisions, the Constitutional Court has been the institution that has 
become the symbol o f the quest for social justice, and has therefore played a 
fundamental role in the re-legitimation of the state. From the beginning, the Court has 
been very clear in pointing out the normative and political importance o f the new 
definition of the state as a “social state o f law”. In a 1992 decision, this entity affirmed 
that the social state is not a mere rhetorical formula but one that implies a great 
responsibility o f judges in the recognition of constitutional and social rights o f citizens 
(Uprimmy, 2001).
This function of recognition of fundamental rights, not only in the political field 
but in the social and econmic fiels as well, has caused the Constitutional Court to be 
accused of politicizing and usurping the legislative and executive functions of designing 
economic policy, given the decisions that have been taken in the field of hounsing 
finance and the right to health and education, among other things. These accusations
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and the conflicts between the Constitutional Court and the functionaries in charge of 
handling economic policy will be analyzed in the last chapter o f this dissertation. For 
the moment, one must say that it is not a question of the political character the 
Constitutional Court, but rather that the issues on which it has decided have acquired a 
notable political character, given the Colombian context of profound social inequality. 
The political character o f these judicial decisions are also derived from the new place 
that the 1991 Constitution attributed to the Court in the political system, that puts it in 
direct relation with the social and economic conflicts that have not been resolved in the 
instances o f political decision, due to deficiencies in political representation, to a lack of 
political will of the ruling class and to the weakness of civil society. The Constitutional 
Court was created to “ensure that the democratic ‘opening’ initiated by the constitutional 
movement would be maintained” (Cepeda Manuel Jose, 2000: 519). This democratic 
spirit had a text: the new Constitution, but not, as Cepeda says, a context, or, rather, it 
lacked another context, because “on the social plane, the need to put an end to 
arbitrariness was as great as the conceptual vacuum [that the Court] had to fill (Ibidem: 
553). In general terms, one can say that the Constitutional Court has been the state 
institution that symbolizes the spirit of democratization and equity that animated the 
constellation of progressive forces that promoted the constitutional movement. From this 
viewpoint, the Court has tried to keep open the institutional and legal possibilities for 
social reform and effective political participation of minorities and the socially least 
advantaged.
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In relation to re-legitimizing the regime, it is necessary to start by saying that the 
Constitutional Assembly revoked it in a polemic decision, the mandate o f the Congress 
at that time. It was a decision with more o f a symbolic character than a real one, but it 
demonstrated the desires o f the new social and political forces represented in the 
Assembly to make a "tabula rasa” out of the "ancien regime", and create a new 
political regime in Colombia. For this, the Constitutional Assembly established a series 
o f mechanisms and institutions to broaden the political representation of the minorities 
and forces other than the traditional bipartisanship, to reduce clientelism and corruption, 
and to increase citizens’ control over the activity of the state, especially in relation to the 
allocation and use o f public resources.
Political participation was broadened at the municipal level with the creation of 
the local administrative boards and with popular election of mayors at the departmental 
or state level. At the national level, participation was broadened through the creation of 
national circumscription for election the senate, in order to favor political minorities. 
Although in the first congressional elections following approval of the new Constitution, 
held in October 1991, the traditional political class obtained a majority of the votes once 
again, despite the fact that its mandate had been revoked by the Constitutional 
Assembly, the new norm showed its virtues since 18% of the seats in the senate 
corresponded to new political forces different from the traditional bipartisanship 
(Restrepo, 1993: 233). Nevertheless, the bipartisanship again regained lost ground in the 
1994 elections, which shows the enormous weight of the rusty structure o f the old
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Colombian political regime even after the introduction o f these reforms. However, a gap 
was openned up which third forces could take advantage of.
For the representation o f ethnic minorities, a special seat was created in the 
Senate for the indigenous communities, and one in the lower house for the black 
communities. Furthermore, in recognizing the indigenous territories as politico- 
administrative entities of the state, their dialects as official languages in that territories, 
and the right o f indigenous people to govern themselves through their own authorities, 
according to their own customs and traditions, Colombia is inscribed in the worldwide 
tendency toward recognition of multiculturalism, that poses to contemporary political 
orders the challenge o f constructing political unity on the basis o f recognition of ethnic 
and cultural diversity (Taylor, 1994; Kymlicka and Wayne, 2000).
In relation to the system of checks and balances, the Constitutional Assembly 
was concerned with reestablishing the equilibrium between the executive and the 
legislative, which had been altered since 1968 in favor of the former. For this reason, 
the new Constitution granted the legislative branch faculties and mechanisms for 
exercising greater political control over the executive, such as the motion of censure of 
ministers, the congressional power to modify certain executive decrees, prohibition of 
codes issued by the executive, and the return to the legislative branch of certain powers 
in economic matters.
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In order to “purifiy” Congress and political activity and to “eradicate” practices 
such as clientelism and corruption, the Constitution introduced a series o f limitations 
and prohibitions, such as revocation of the mandate o f mayors and governors, and the 
loss o f office for members o f Congress, which is produced by violation o f the severe 
criteria o f disqualifications and incompatibilities established for those who wish to hold 
a seat in Congress, For instance, since the new Constitution was approved in October 
1991, the Council o f State has received 298 petitions for loss of investiture, o f which 35 
have been decided positively (Colprensa, December 11, 2001). The loss of investiture 
means political death since whoever is dispossessed of a seat in Congress can never 
again hold any elected public office of popular representation.
Furthermore, the so-called auxilios parlamentarios, i.e. financial “aids” given by 
the government to congressmen, were eliminated, at least on paper. Those “aids” are the 
funds the government included in the national budget in favor of members of the 
Congress, in exchange for their approval o f the bills it submits to Congress. However, 
this practice continues to be used by the executive, who has considered it to be the only 
way to carry out its policies o f economic restructuring. This situation illustrates the 
hybrid character of Latin American political regimes in which the old clientelist political 
practices are combined with the technocratic needs of economic restructuring, as 
pointed out by Gamarra (1994).
In relation to the political parties, the new Constitution established the right o f all 
citizens to found parties and movements, state financing of political campaigns, and
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equality o f access to public communications media, which favors political minorities 
and tries to compensate them with respect to the weight o f bipartisanship. Finally, the 
new constitution strengthened the state's agencies of control such as the Offices o f the 
Procurator and the Comptroller, and created the Office o f the Defense o f the People to 
ensure that human and other rights are respected.
In synthesis, the Constitutional Assembly attempted to solve Colombia's long 
political crisis through strengthening, relegitimation, and democratization o f the state 
and the political regime. The international context and the new global actors have also 
contributed to this task. The pressure of the U.S. State Department and of the American 
NGO, Human Rights Watch, for Colombia's Government, Armed Forces, and 
subversive groups to respect human rights has contributed to the process of re- 
institutionalizing the state and society in Colombia (US Department of State, 2000; 
Tickner, 2001). Likewise, the United Nations, with its Delegate Office for Human 
Rights in Colombia, has contributed as a global force, to create a more democratic 
society in the country. The new agencies o f global governance such as the World Bank 
operate in the same sense and its demands for state reform and, while emphasizing 
privatization and economic restructuring o f the state, also ask for its democratization and 
institutional improvement. However, this combination o f exogenous and endogenous 
factors is far from fluid and is full of tensions and contradictions.
4.2.4. The Quest for Equity
In very general terms, it can be said that the concept of the economy written into the 
Constitution o f 1991, can serve as the foundation for both a policy o f state intervention
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in the economy and a free market policy and intemacionalization of the economy. This 
ambiguity is the result o f the convergence in the Constitutional Assembly o f forces that 
represent the two economic ideologies and the role played in the Assembly by the 
government of Cesar Gaviria (1990-1994), whose economic role and development plan 
were clearly neoliberal (Presidency of the Republic, National Planning Departament, 
1991). From this point of view, in 1991 two different societal projects confronted each 
other: one led by the progressive and leftist social forces that wanted an economy 
sensitive to the social needs of the great majority of the Colombian population, and 
another led by the Gaviria government and its technocratic economic group, that tried to 
carry out its neoliberal restructuring project both within the Constitutional Assembly and 
outside of it, in the institutions in charge of managing the economic policy.
Nonetheless, the predominant trait of the new Constitution in economic matters, 
and from which it has derived its meaning in the ten years that have passed since its 
approval, has been the emphasis on equity and the great number of socioeconomic rights 
established in it. The concern for equity appears, among others, in article 1, which 
defines the Colombian state as a social state of law, and in article 334, which establishes 
that the state is in charge of directing the economy and that it should seek the equitable 
distribution of opportunities and the benefits of development, full employment of human 
resources, and ensure that all persons, particularly those with the lowest income, have 
effective access to basic goods and services.
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The new Constitution also established that the state would promote the access of 
all Colombians to rural and urban property, foment the participation o f workers in the 
companies they work for, and encourage associative and solidary forms of management 
of property. It also established the social function o f private property and enterprises 
(article 333), and leaves open the possibility that they be expropriated when they do not 
fulfill this function, even by an administrative process with no judicial process for 
expropriation (article 58). This decision was highly criticized for its effects on the 
economic liberalization model, since it is argued that it could frighten foreign investment 
away.
In relation to the planning of economic and social development, the Constitution 
establishes the possibility of ample participation of the entrepreneurial, social, cultural, 
political ecological sectors in the National Planning Council.
But the Constitution also contains norms of neoliberal inspiration such as those 
that establish the independence o f the Central Bank and, therefore, of monetary, credit 
and international exchange rate policy, with which it recognized the global tendency in 
these matters (Maxfield, 1997 and 1999). Economic freedom is guaranteed in article 
333, which establishes that the state “will impede the obstruction or restriction of 
economic freedom and will avoid or control any abuses by persons or enterprises of their 
dominant position in the national market”. The privatizing neoliberal spirit is manifest 
in the articles that establish that the private sector could participate in offering public 
services, and that the government could sell or liquidate state enterprises or grant private
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firms the right to fulfill their functions when the former do not do so efficiently” (article 
336).
Given this ambiguity, in which interventionist welfare-state norms are blended 
with neoliberal norms, the Constitutional Court has taken charge, through its decisions, 
o f emphasizing the social and equitable nature o f the new political charter. This is one 
o f the reasons why it can be considered the garantor of the progressive spirit of the new 
constitution and the creator of a viable context for applying its norms.
But the proliferation of socioeconomic rights is undoubtedly the principal 
characteristic of the Constitution of 1991 in economic matters. This is due to the fact 
that, traditionally, the social policy of the state was always the last priority and was 
never translated into significant financial resources to make it viable. At the first 
inflationary or fiscal obstacle, the social policy was abandoned. The Constitution tried 
to modify this situation by establishing that social spending would no longer be a residue 
of the economic policy but rather the main obligation of the state. As has already been 
shown, many norms show a clear intention to intervene in the functioning of the 
economy and to orient public spending to guarantee its citizens, especially the poorest 
sector, effective enjoyment of socioeconomic human rights. Thus, for example, one of 
the most controversial norms for the partisans of a neoliberal economic policy are 
articles 356 and 357, which establish a series of constitutionally obligatory transfers of 
resources from the national budget to the departments and municipalities to attend the 
basic needs of education and health of its poorest citizens.
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At present, these transfers represent about 45% of the current revenue of the 
central government. This situation has generated three points of confrontation between 
the model of social liberalism, established by the constitution, and the neoliberal model 
proposed by the government. In the first place, the promoters of the neoliberal model 
argue that the transfers of resources have generated rigidity in the assignment of public 
spending, which clashes with neoliberal ideas of flexibilizing the allocation of resources 
and also produces “fiscal laziness” in local governments and communities with respect 
to generating their own resources (Departamento Nacional de Planeacion,1981; 
Presidencia de la Republica-Departamento Nacional de Planeacion, 1992). In the second 
place, liberalization of the economy has implied the dismounting of tariffs on foreign 
commerce, which were one of the main sources of fiscal resources for the state for many 
years. Therefore, there is a need to seek new sources of fiscal income to finance the 
above-mentioned social spending obligations established by the new constitution which 
add up approximately to 400 billion pesos and represent 2% of the GDP (Sarmiento 
Palacios, 1992). Nevertheless, it is not easy to obtain new fiscal resources for covering 
the new public expenditures mandated by the 1991 Constitution due, among other 
reasons, to the structural limitations imposed by the neoliberal economic model, which 
implies reducing the fiscal deficit and, as far as possible, avoiding increases in taxes. 
There is, therefore, a conflict between the demands of the new constitution and the 
postulates of the new economic model. Thirdly, it is argued that the resources transferred 
from the cemtral government to the departments and municipalities are wasted or 
improperly allocated, due to clientelist practices and corruption. Although there is much 
truth to this argument, the remedy to these problems cannot be the reduction of resources
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for the social policy of the state. Furthermore, this situation clearly shows the cultural 
conflict generated between the features o f political pre-modernity introduced by the 
regime and the demands for full modernization imposed by the new constitution, the 
neoliberal model and the global context. In the fourth place, the agreement on fiscal 
adjustment signed by the Pastrana government (1998-2002) and the International 
Monetary Fund in 2000 demands, among other things, the reduction and rationalization 
of the above-mentioned transfers to the regions. With this, it is not only the 
confrontation between the two societal projects that becomes more evident, but the 
influence of exogenous factors on domestic policies as well.
4.3 The Balance o f the New Constitution: A Societal Project without 
Consensus
As shown above, the Constitution of 1991 is a project that seeks to re-establish the 
Colombian state and society and overcome the political and social crisis through the 
quest for peace and reduction of violence, the broadening of democracy and human 
rights, the strengthening and relegitimation of the state and the political regime, and the 
search for equity. However, after ten years of attempts to strengthen this constitutional 
project, the political crisis has not only not been solved, it has indeed worsened.
In fact, the armed conflict has intensified, despite the fact that the Constitution 
was conceived as a pact of peace among Colombians. Nevertheless, the agreement was 
not possible due to the fact that the significant actors in the armed conflict, such as the 
guerrilla groups FARC and ELN, the military, and the paramilitary, did not participate in 
it. Furthermore, the armed conflict is due in part to the lack of agrarian reform and 
modernization and technical development of agricultural production. However, neither
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the peasants nor the large landholders participated in the Constitutional Assembly either. 
And although the Constitution established the social function of property, until now it 
has not been possible to carry out an agrarian reform, due to the limitations imposed by 
the power structure in Colombia, where vested interests linked to large rural landholders 
still wield significant weight.
Despite the General Prosecutor's successes in combatting organized crime, the 
administration of justice, not only in criminal matters, but in civil, labor and family 
matters as well, continues to be very deficient (Giraldo, 1996). Criminality and impunity 
still run very high. Violations of human rights persist, although some progress was made 
in terms of their recognition and judicial protection.
In relation to the opening of the political regime and its democratization, it can be 
said that the Constitution laid the foundations for making the transition from 
bipartisanship to a multi-party system, but the new political forces are still too weak and 
fragmented to dispute the place of the traditional political parties. Nevertheless, 
significant spaces were opened up for ethnic and political minorities, and progress was 
achieved in terms of conscientization and citizenship formation. However, the new 
channels for direct political participation have not been fully utilized as yet, due to the 
weakness and fragmentation of civil society and its poor capacity to organize 
autonomously, which hinders its participation in the decision-making process as a 
strong interlocutor of the state.
Clientelism and corruption still typify the political regime. The traditional 
political class has attempted to dismount the reforms introduced by the new constitution,
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or has managed to evade the restrictions it imposed in order to legitimate Congress and 
political activity. The fact that the Pastrana government (1998-2000) and the 
independent political forces have attempted, unsuccessfully, to reform both Congress 
and the electoral system in the past three years despite the reforms introduced by the 
Constitution o f 1991, shows the limited transforming power that legal norms or "formal 
institutions", as North denominates them (1990), have had in these matters. According 
to North, historic change is the result of the interplay between formal institutions which 
can be modified by the intentional actions of actors, and the resistance opposed by 
informal norms constituted by the culture, which resists all attempts at intentional 
modification. From this point of view, it can be said that the new constitution's efforts to 
modify clientelism and corruption have been precarious indeed since they are the 
expression o f a pre-modem political culture that has existed for centuries. The conflict 
between the traditional political class and the new constitution, as noted by Feman 
Gonzalez, “demonstrates the lack of congruence between the more modernizing 
regulations and the concrete functioning of the institutions that operate in a more 
traditional world” (1993: 18).
On the other hand, the progressive and modernizing forces that gave rise to the 
constitutional process did not manage to consolidate either their predominance over the 
traditional political forces or the unity needed to obtain sufficient power to become an 
alternative o f change in the following stage. Suffering from a lack of popular roots, 
internal conflicts, or victims of the violence itself, they became weakened or fragmented 
politically, as in the case of the M l 9, EPL, and the Movement for National Salvation. As 
Manuel Jose Cepeda has said, although the Constitutional Court has attempted to
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maintain the reforming spirit of the Constitutional Assembly, "it has been the victim of 
the context. It lacked something that it could not create: a configuration of political 
forces similar to those that gave birth to the Constitution de 1991 (2000: 526).
Finally, despite the Constitutional Assembly's attempt to make Colombian 
society more equitable, social inequality has increased, as will be seen in the next 
chapter, as a result of the neoliberal economic reforms.
In recent years there have been several different interpretative attempts to explain 
the "failure" of the Constitution of 1991. Some of them, like that mentioned by Gonzalez 
(1991), emphasize the limitations of the legal norms to transform society in depth. Other 
interpretations attribute the failure to the weakness of the state and to the fact that the 
Constitution fell short o f fulfilling its goal of democratizing the political regime, 
especially with respect to internal democratization of the political parties (Bejarano, 
1994). Other interpretations consider the time factor and maintain that ten years is a very 
short lapse of time for new institutions to mature and become consolidated. Finally, a 
recent interpretation has argued that the Constitution of 1991 increased the 
ungovernability of the political system, due to the great number o f institutions that it 
created and, especially, to an excess of socioeconomic rights and transfer of resources to 
the regions that it stipulated. All o f this has generated expectations that the government 
cannot fulfill, obstacles to economic growth, and impediments and conflicts in the 
relations among state authorities (Alesina, Kluger y Rosental, 2000),
Nevertheless, the thesis presented in this dissertation is that the Colombian 
Constitution of 1991 did not succeed in putting an end to the country's political crisis, not
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merely because of its insufficiencies or excesses, but because it is a project to create an 
equitable society which has entered into sharp confrontation with another societal project 
of neoliberal inspiration. And to date, neither of the two has obtained sufficient consensus 
to impose itself due to their contradictons, the weakness of the state, the fragmentation of 
the elites, the weakness of civil society, and the limitations imposed by globalization.
The global context also contributes to making the new constitution ambiguous 
because, on the one hand, it reinforces the democratizing tendencies and respect for 
human rights (elements of the new worldwide political agenda) but, on the other hand it 
reinforces neoliberal tendencies which reduce, at the domestic level, the margin for 
manoevering of governments and political forces to undertake and demand social reforms, 
since they require what neoliberalism denies: orientational activity of the state in the 
economy, strong social spending, and progressive taxation.
Chapter 5
Colombian Societal Project II: Neoliberal Restructuring
In this chapter I will provide an intial reflection upon the prior socioeconomic context in 
which neoliberal reforms were inserted (5.1). Next I will describe the composition of the 
business groups which have been affected by changes in the Colombian economic model 
(5.2), and discuss their diverse reactions to this process (5.3). I will also analyze the 
dynamics and contradictions of such a process (5.4 and 5.5), and the way in which it
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contributed to political regime change and to the fragmentation o f the economic elite’s 
groups. Finally, I will refer to the way in which transformations in the economic model 
implied the breakdown o f political agreements with the labor class and the reduction of 
benefits obtained by it during the hey days o f import substitution industrialization (ISI), 
which also signified a change in the political regime (5.6).
5.1. Economic Liberalization: An Adequate Societal Project?
As shown in the theoretical framework, the new global technological, economic, and 
political conditions have led, in Latin America in general, and in Colombia in 
particular, to a series o f modifications of economic and state structures that, in turn, 
modify the relations among society, the economy and politics. From the national 
point o f view, neoliberal reforms are also due to the decisions o f the Colombian 
technocratic elite. This restructuring, as already mentioned, revolves around the 
points of the Washington consensus, i.e., a) reducing the state’s size by reducing 
public expenditures and privatizing public enterprises; b) decentralizing the state’s 
activity and transferring the responsibility for providing and financing public 
services to local governments; c) liberating prices and interest rates from state 
control, and deregulating economic activity; d) introducing regressive taxation; e) 
reducing tariffs and barriers to foreign trade; and e) making the labor force market 
more flexible.
These reforms were introduced in Colombia towards the end o f the Barco 
government (1986-1990) and during the Gaviria government (1990-1994), for the 
purpose of making the transition from the import substitution industrialization (ISI)
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economic model to one of liberalizing and internationalizing the economy. These two 
governments, and the Gaviria administration in particular, based their economic policy 
on the Washington Consensus' common diagniosis for all Latin American economies, 
i.e. that the excessive protectionism of the old ISI model is one o f the main causes of 
reduced productivity and the slow growth of the national economy (Presidency o f the 
Republic, 1991; Montenegro, 1991). However, it is necessary to point out two things 
regarding this diagnosis. In the first place, the economic liberalization policy in 
Colombia was not the result o f a need for severe economic adjustment programs in 
Colombia because, unlike other Latin American economies, Colombia had a lower level 
of foreign debt and therefore suffered less from the debt crisis of the eighties and had 
managed to maintain a moderate, stable economic growth rate and avoid hyperinflation. 
In fact, the average inflation in Colombia between 1970 and 1995 oscillated around 
22%, and the economic growth rate fluctuated between 3% and 6% during the 1950- 
1990 period (Misas, 2001: 115-116). According to some economists, this was thanks to 
the fact that economic policy during the second half of the twentieth century has been 
managed with prudence, pragmatism, gradualism and stability, as a result o f political 
and institutional agreements. If, as has already been mentioned, these agreements gave 
rise, from a political and social viewpoint, to a hybrid regime that blends elements of 
premodernity and modernity (in terms o f the coexistence of agrarian and industrial 
interests, along with clientelism and political rationality), from the economic viewpoint, 
it was expressed in a stable exchange rate, moderate inflation, and moderate fiscal and 
balance of payments deficits (Ocampo, 1992; Florez, 2001).
162
In the second place, various economists, historians, and political scientists have
pointed out that both industrialization and state interventionism were very weak in
Colombia due, among other things, to the weight o f agrarian interests and agricultural
production in the country's economic activity (Gomez Buendia, 1976; Palacios, 1980b;
Ocampo 1992). Therefore, neither state protectionism nor the inward development
model is the cause o f the Colombian economy’s structural problems. In this respect,
Ocampo affirms that
protectionism  clearly preceded industrialization but w as incapable in itse lf  o f  
inducing dynam ic industrial developm ent. Furthermore, once the 
industrialization process w as initiated, protection performed a secondary role, 
i f  com pared with the effects o f  the expansion o f  the internal market induced  
by the co ffee  bonanza at the beginning o f  the twentieth century, the external 
econom ies generated by the integration o f  co ffe  market into the international 
market, the effects o f  that integration on the traditional internal dom estic  
econ om ic structures, and the strong fluctuations in the real exchange rate 
generated by the co ffee  cycle  (. . .) the country made an early transition to a 
m ixed m odel that com bined the substitution o f  imports w ith the promotion o f  
exports (. . .) the serious problem s o f  industry in terms o f  productivity, 
structural dynam ism  and financial fragility only began in the m id-seventies 
w hen any import substitution strategy had been abandoned (. . .) already 
lacking any strategic concept o f  its role in the developm ent process, industry 
becam e very vulnerable to diverse external and internal shocks” (O cam po,
1992: 19).
But despite the fact that the country maintained a positive economic growth rate, 
without great traumatisms in the second half of the twentieth century, except for the past 
four years, during which the economy has experimented the worst recession of the 
century, its growth dynamic was not sufficient to integrate a large part o f the population, 
redistribute income, or modernize its productive structure. This situation was due to 
various factors, including a symbiosis of the agrarian and commercial elites in the 
formation of the industrial entrepreneurial class, the small size of the internal market and 
the limited expansion of the salary relationship. This led to slow growth of the internal
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demand, and determined the formation of scarce, poorly diversified industries,
specialized in the production o f non-durable consumer goods, which suffered an early
process o f oligopolization. All of this created little need for enterprises to increase their
installed capacity or to incorporate technological advances in order to increase work
productivity (Misas Arango, 2001). When, at the beginning o f the sixties, the
Colombian state attempted to undertake a second, more intensive phase of the
industrialization process, characterized by the production of intermediate goods,
Colombian industrialists firmly opposed it. Only
the action o f  the state -  very sm all when compared with the rest o f  Latin 
A m erica -  and the association with certain multinational suppliers, made it 
possib le to introduce the petrochem ical industry, the chem ical industry, and 
other producers o f  intermediate inputs into the country (M isas Arango, 2001:
120).
If the Colombian state, despite its weakness, was the promoter o f this process, 
then excessive state interventionism in the Colombian economy cannot be blamed for 
the country's economic stagnation, but rather the fact that more of this type of 
intervencion was needed. In any case, the productivity of the Colombian economy has 
fallen drastically in the past three decades, and compared with other Latin American 
economies, it suffers from a technological lag of more than twenty years, its production 
has concentrated on the internal market, and it is in no condition to take advantage o f the 
opportunities the economic opening has provided for it to become integrated into the 
world market (Garay, 1998). This situation shows that, despite the supposedly wise and 
prudent management of economic policy by the economic and political elite, there has 
been neither leadership, nor clarity, nor vision of the future to orient the country's
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socioeconomic development. This affirmation is corroborated by Garay when he 
affirms that
C olom bian society  has traditionally been a society  characterized by a culture 
adverse to investm ent and capital accum ulation, and more prone to 
consum ption and negative savings. In the past thirty years the rates o f  savings 
and private investm ent has never surpassed a very moderate average level (. .
,) in contrast with econom ies that have had to significantly increment (triple 
or quadruple) their levels o f  savings w ith respect to the gross dom estic  
product, in a period o f  tw o or three decades, in order to develop  (1999: 148).
Thus, what Max Weber called the “spirit of capitalism”, i.e., the accumulation o f capital 
based on the values of productive work and investment and the “ascetic life”, i.e., 
savings with foresight for the future, has been absent in Colombia, and adoption of the 
neoliberal model o f economic liberalization has contributed to making this evident.
Therefore, it can be deduced that the ISI and state interventionism per se di not 
cause the lack of dynamism and growth in the Colombian economy, but rather a 
complex articulation of historic factors. Hence, the desirable societal model in 
Colombia, from the economic and social viewpoint, would be the strengthening of the 
productive structure through the incorporation of new technologies, expansion o f the 
internal market, and incorporation of large sectors of the population that have been 
excluded from the market and the opportunity to consume. Nonetheless, global 
tendencies have imposed the articulation of the Colombian economy with the world 
economy. This explains why the policy makers of the Gaviria government, ignoring the 
history of the Colombian economy, assumed the inadequate diagnosis of the Washington 
Consensus, and made the decision to change the economic model. This resulted in a 
paradox since in order to change the country’s political-institutional structure by means
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of the Constitutional Assembly, there was an ample consultation process with the 
participation of almost all the political and social forces, the adoption of the neoliberal 
development model was done unilaterally and with no consultation, which simply 
reinforced the confrontation between the those who favored one or the other of the two 
different societal projects.
5.2. The Main Colombian Business Groups
In this section I will sketch out the main economic interests that exist in Colombian 
society, in order to provide basis for understanding the distinct positions of the business 
sector facing changes in the accumulation model.
The interests of large farmers and landholders are represented by the Sociedad de 
Agricultores de Colombia (Colombian Farmers Society), SAC, founded intially in 1871 
and refounded in 1904, and by the Federacion de Ganaderos (Confederacy of Cattle 
Raisers), FEDEGAN, founded in 1963. Until the first half of the XXth century, SAC 
had a significant influence upon the economic policy; in the second half , however, it 
progressively lost its power (Urrutia, 1981). Nevertheless, its interests, as well as those 
of FEDEGAN, are over-represented in the Congress of the Republic (Hartlyn, 1985) due 
to the fact that such an institution, even today, largely represents the interests of the rural 
elite, in spite of the increasing urban composition of the Colombian population. Given 
that agrarian production received significant state protection and subsidies, this sector 
has been one of the most affected by the adoption of the free market model.
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The Federation National de Cafeteros (National Confederacy o f Coffee 
Growers), FEDECAFE, founded in 1927, represents, as its name indicates it, the 
interests o f coffee growers and exporters. Until the 1980s, it was Colombia’s most 
powerful business organization, given the importance of coffee exports for the growth of 
the economy. The coffee economy also established the bases for capital accumulation 
that enabled the development o f the country’s industrialization as of the 1930s. 
FEDECAFE controls more than the 50% of Colombian coffee exports; fulfills not only 
private but also a serie of state functions, such as the administration of the National 
Coffee Fund; owns a myriad enterprises and investments in the financial, agroindustrial, 
and air and maritime transportation sectors; and is the head of a series of 
socioeconomics institutions in the Colombian coffee regions. For this reason, 
FEDECAFE has been described for the analysts as "part business organization, part 
public company, and part industrial and financial conglomerate” (Urrutia, 1981: 143). 
However, FEDECAFE’s power has decreased notoriously, as it will be discussed below, 
due to the new political and economic national and international conditions, especially 
the breakdown of the International Coffee Agreement.
The Country’s industrialization and increased state interventionism which 
developed since the 1930s gave rise to the diversification o f social interests and to 
multiple organizations for representing new economic interests. Such change was 
presented in this manner by one Colombian analyst:
"private interests began increasigly to organize in a business-like way, to take 
advantage o f  the econom ic intervention o f  the state, and to be able to influence 
its decisions. At the same time these busineess groups served as a cohesive  
force to face the new social order, g iving way, especially  after 1938, to a kind 
o f  corporative economy" (Bejarano, 1985: 214).
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So farmers, cattle raisers and caffee growers had to share their power with a new 
business group, the Asociacion Nacional de Industrials (National Industrialists 
Association), ANDI, founded in 1944. It represents the interests of large national 
industries. The interests of small and medium industries are represented by the 
Asociacion Colombiana Popular de Industrials (Colombian Popular Association of 
Industrialists), ACOPI, founded in 1951. Given that these two sectors produce mainly 
for the internal market, they have been seriously affected by economic liberalization.
The interests of merchants are represented by the Federacion Nacional de 
Comerciantes (National Confederacy of Merchants), FENALCO, founded in 1945. The 
financial sector is represented by the Asociacion Bancaria de Colombia (Colombian 
Banking Association), ASOBANCARIA, founded in 1936, and by the Asociacion 
Nacional de Instituciones Financieras (National Association of Financial Institutions), 
ANIF, founded in 1974. Both of these sectors have been benefited from the politics of 
commercial liberalizacion and financial globalization.
As of the 1970 there has been a proliferation of business sectors guilds. From 22 
existing business groups in 1950, the Colombian business community grew to 81 
organizations in 1981, 106 in 1980 and 200 in the 1990s (Urrutia, 1981; Rettberg, 2000).
At the beginning of the 1980s and 1990s, the diverse guilds of the business sector 
tried to unify in a common organization, in order to strengthen themselves as 
interlocutors of the State, to fill the gap left by political parties, and to better face the
168
country’s political and economic crisis. This common organization was the Frente 
Gremial (the Business Front), created in 1981, whose existence was short-lived; and the 
Consejo Gremial Nacional (the National Business Counsel) created in 1991, that still 
exists but has failed in agglutinating the business community, given that of 200 guilds, it 
only represents 15 organizations. With the exception these efforts, it can be affirmed 
that the business community’s interest representation is highly disperse, given its 
incapacity to unify, which makes it weak and dependent upon the state. At the same 
time, the state’s stability depends in great part upon the business sector support, which 
gives to the political regime a certain corporativist character. However, it is an "ad hoc 
corporativism" (Gallon, 1982) given that it does not evidence a stable structure, and the 
economic rules of the game are negotiated for short periods, and sector by sector. Until 
the end of the 1980s, FEDECAFE and ANDI had, within such a state-businnes sector 
relations framework, a privileged position for negotiating their interests. Proof o f this is 
the fact that ANDI occupied a seat on the board of trustees of nearly 60 state entities 
(Osterling, 1989: 206). However, this privileged position was displaced in the 1990s by 
the Colombian four largest business conglomerates.
The largest entrepreneurial groups began to form in Colombia in the the 1970s, 
by means of fusions, acquisitions of some enterprises by others, and horizontal and 
vertical integration among them. These groups can be defined as “related firms held 
together through interlocking directorates, holding companies, cross-financing, and often 
continued family ownership” (Maxfield and Schneider, 1997: 45). At the end of the 
1970s there were ten o f these groups in Colombia (Silva, 1978), and there are about
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twenty at present. Nevertheless, the most significant and powerful groups in Colombian 
economy and politics are the so-called “big four". These are: a) the “Antioquia 
Syndicate”, composed of 118 firms that cover the following sectors, among others: 
financial (20 firms), food products (18 firms), textiles (10 firms), insurance (9 firms), 
cement (9 firms), investments (7 firms), and commerce (4 firms); b) The Bavaria 
Entrepreneurial Group, which originated in the country's oldest and largest brewery. It is 
made up of 80 firms in the following sectors: investments (11 firms), beverages (10 
firms), telecommunications and means of communication (9 firms), air transport (4 
firms), and services, among others; c) the Aval Group (Luis Carlos Sarmiento Angulo 
Organization), which includes 51 firms mainly in the financial sector (24 firms), 
investments (12 firms), industrial (6 firms), construction (5 firms), and 
telecommunications, among others; and d) the Ardila Liille Organization, which 
originated in the soft drink industry and now includes 46 firms in the following sectors: 
textile (12 firms), investments (9 firms), sugar (7 firms), telecommunications and means 
of communication (5 firms), financial (4 firms), beverages (2 firms), among others.
Together, these four large entrepreneurial groups own more that 295 of the 
country's enterprises, and reported 1,900,000 dollars in utilities in 1997 (Semana, May 4, 
1998, p. 83-90), which is equal to more than 2% of the GDP. This means that these four 
large groups constitute the main motor of economic growth in Colombia. These groups 
have benefited from the economic opening and liberalization policy, as it will be discuss 
subsequently.
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Finally, it is important to reiterate that economic stabilization and restructuring 
processes in America Latina have taken place not only due to the changes in the 
technology and in the world economy, but also to the rise o f new coalitions o f national 
interests. An important expression of such a phenomenon has been the growing 
influence of technocrats in the decision-making process (Centeno and Silva, 1998). The 
importance of teams of economic experts in Latin American governments increases to 
the extent in which they displace traditional politicians in the decision-making processs, 
political controls upon their activities are weakened, and their social insulation grows. 
This situation guarantees the autonomy o f such teams, since the the content o f economic 
restructuring programs can be justified as the result of technical decisions. Therefore, in 
this decision-making style, political negotiations and ideological fights tend to be 
displaced by criteria o f scientific rationality. In point 3.3 I showed how this 
phenomenon was produced gradually in Colombia since the mid-20 century. The 
technocratic elite has been, therefore, one o f the main actors of changes in the 
accumulation model in Colombia, and its appearance on the political stage has 
fragmented, still more, the Colombian elite. But far from being a unified actor, state 
economic teams also exhibit splits and confrontations, as will be illustrated 
subsequently.
5.3. The Early Stage of Economic Liberalization: Ambiguities and Oppositions
The economic liberalization model had already been adopted during the government of 
Lopez Michelsen (1974-1978), who wanted to turn Colombia into the “the Japan of 
South America.” But at that time, the country's industrial structure was not prepared to
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face the competition o f external industries that competed on the international market in 
prices and quality, by virtue of technological advances (Misas Arango, 1994 and 2001). 
Years later, the Barco government's (1986-1990) development plan again referred to the 
need to adopt a model o f liberalizing and internationalizing the economy. The Barco 
government intended to iniciate the process in mid-1989, but decided to postpone the 
decision, due to the crisis of the coffee economy, produced by the rupture of the 
International Coffee Pact, and the need to concentrate efforts and resources on the war 
on drug-trafficking which was then at its most intense level.
At the end of February 1990, the government officially announced the 
implementation of its economic liberalization policy through a report to the head o f the 
National Planning Department to the mass media, who affirmed that economic 
liberalization was a fact that was “unpostponable, imminent and irreversible” (La 
Republica, February 19, 1990, p. IB). The basis of the liberalization policy was a 
document (Conpes-DNP, 1990) that took up the recommendations o f a study o f the 
Colombian economy, done by the World Bank, which called attention to the need to 
turn the external sector of the economy into the motor force of development, by means 
of liberalization of the economy that will allow the country's full insertion into the 
world market (World Bank, 1987). That document was based on the Washington 
Consensus' diagnosis for all Latin American economies, according to which the ISI 
protectionist development model had been exhausted and had not generated any 
significant economic growth, nor any competitive participation o f the Colombian 
economy in international markets. The recommendations made by the study in mention
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included liberation o f the exchange rate as a major instrument for regulating foreign 
commerce, the reduction o f tariffs, and the replacement o f the pre-importation license by 
a more flexible mechanism. The Barco government accepted, without question, this 
diagnosis and considered that the protectionist model had produced a distortion in 
relative prices, and had not generated incentives for national industry to introduce new 
technologies, which was manifested in low levels of efficiency and productivity. In 
order to initiate the process, the government announced measures such as the provision 
of financial resources for the technological modernization o f industry, the reduction of 
tariffs, and the gradual and selective transfer of goods that could not be imported under 
the previous importation regime to a regime of free importation, that measures were to 
enter into effect within a period of five years.
The government’s decisions generated a great debate about the scope and the 
opportuneness o f the economic liberalization policy. The Colombian Association of 
Small and Medium-sized Industries, ACOPI, through its president, Juan Alfredo Pinto, 
has expressed its concern and confusion with respect to what it considered to be a lack 
of clarity on the part o f government regarding a decision as important as the change of 
economic model and did still not understand why the decisions on a topic of such great 
transcendence should be made known by means of a mere report. ACOPI called for a 
clear official pronouncement, made by the President of the Republic or the Minister of 
Economic Development and not just "any functionary who thinks him- or herself 
authorized to talk about the subject” (La Republica, February 19, 1990, p.IB). The 
Minister of Development, Maria Mercedes Cuellar, tried to tranquilize businessmen by
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telling them they would not be affected by the new foreign exchange policy, since the 
resources for financing the economic opening, coming from foreign loans, would be 
granted in pesos in the country and not in dollars, and there would be ample deadlines 
for payment..
ACOPI considered the economic liberalization to have been imposed by the 
International Monetary Fund, which demanded the adoption of that policy as a condition 
for granting foreign loans. Furthermore, it asked the government to revise the criteria 
with which it assigned the quotas of funds for importing, since the way they were 
designed negatively affected small industry (La Republica, May 5, 1990, p. 1A-2A), and 
the elimination of all regulatory and political obstacles that the state imposed on the 
country’s entrepreneurial and productive activity (El Colombiano, May 20, 1990, p.7A), 
Despite these requests, ACOPI did not reject the opening on principle; on the contrary, it 
affirmed that “one would have to be blind not to see that the opening is a necessity in 
Colombia” (La Republica, February 19, 1990, p. IB). According to that association, it 
was the only alternative for achieving GDP growth rates higher than 6%. Nevertheless, 
ACOPI feared that the policy adopted by the government, with the support of the World 
Bank, would lead to the bankruptcy of a large number of firms, and the subsequent 
development of a modernization policy for those that manage to survive.
The National Association of Industrialists, ANDI, on the other hand, was openly 
opposed to the economic opening policy. Its president, Fabio Echeverri Correa, affirmed 
that it was a policy imposed by the World Bank that could lead to the bankruptcy of
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many Colombian firms, produce unemployment rates of 18% or 19%, and favor the 
occupation of Colombian workers in countries like Venezuela, Korea, Taiwan and the 
United States. The ANDI demanded clarity from the government in its formulation of 
economic policy and steps to achieve a common accord with the private sector, so that 
the economic liberalization would not affect its interests (La Republica, February 12, 
1990, p. 10A). For the ANDI, the economic liberalization should be gradual and 
selective and the country's transport and communications infrastructure should be 
improved as a prerequisite. Furthermore, the vice president o f the ANDI, Jorge 
Bustamante, pointed out that it was not so clear that the ISI model had been exhausted 
since there had been no studies that demonstrated the fact (El Tiempo, February 12, 
1990, p. 5A). The ANDI also indicated that in order to deal with economic 
liberalization, it was necessary to carry out a series of labor law reforms, in order to 
reduce the costs of the labor force and flexibilize the labor market. In exchange, the 
industrialists proposed the creation of unemployment insurance for workers who lost 
their jobs because of the liberalization (El Espectador, April 23, 1990, p.p 1A, 7A). In 
the economic liberalization policy, entrepreneurs now saw the opportunity to concrete a 
series o f demands regarding reduction of the costs of contracting workers and 
flexibilizing the labor market, that they had been presenting to the government since the 
early eighties (Orjuela, 1984). The ANDI, which represents the interests of big 
industries, criticized the accelerated pace at which foreign commerce was being 
liberalized. Big industry aspired to contain the free importation of products that 
threatened national production, and to maintain certain levels o f protective tariffs (La 
Republica, July 4, 1990, p.p. 1A-2A). In relation to the opportuneness o f the decision to
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open the economy, ANDI president Fabio Echeverri, indicated that it did not take 
account o f the situation of national industry, or the country’s lack o f adequate 
infrastructure to face international competition. Therefore, Echeverri demanded 
resources to achieve technological modernization, in order to increase productive 
efficiency, reduce costs, and make Colombian exports competitive in the international 
market (La Republica, April 27, 1990, p. 1A). Finally, the ANDI demanded that the 
government reach a serious agreement with entrepreneurs and workers before permitting 
the intervention o f international financial agencies (El Tiempo, May 20, 1990, p. 12B). 
Workers supported these petitions (El Siglo, May 2, 1990, p. IB).
The National Federation o f Merchants, FENALCO, was initially in favor of 
economic liberalization and shared the government’s diagnosis that it was the only 
option to respond to the exhaustion of the ISI model, which manifested itself in the 
scarce growth rate o f the GDP and industrial exports. With the reduced growth rates of 
the Colombian economy, FENALCO president, Sabas Pretelt de la Vega, said that the 
country would take 50 years to achieve the GDP of Argentina, 80 years that o f Mexico, 
60 that of Venezuela, and 600 to reach that of Germany (El Colombiano, February 11, 
1990, p,9A), Nonetheless, FENALCO considered that many more financial resources 
would be needed to develop the economic liberalization policy and proposed that the 
government adopt measures to legalize the nationalization of Colombian capital 
deposited in the international financial system. According to its calculations, there were 
18 billion dollars that could returned to the country and used to finance the opening, 
modernize the productive structure, and conquer external markets. In any case, 
FENALCO emphasized the need to provide diverse types of support for the economic
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actors and to open the economy gradually and selectively. Failure to do so would be 
counterproductive for business (El Tiempo, April 15, 1990, p. 1A, 8C).
Jorge Mendez Munevar, president of FEDEMETAL, the metalworks industry 
association, also affirmed that the internationalization of the economy was due to the 
demands of the international economic agencies that were willing to offer loans of 500 
million dollars to Colombia if it reduced its tariffs. The industrialists of the metalworks 
sector affirmed that the liberation of imports could end protectionism, which they 
considered the last hope for Colombian industry. FEDEMETAL also rejected the 
unilateral and non-consulted way in which the Barco government adopted the economic 
opening policy, without considering the opinion of the nation’s entrepreneurs (La 
Republica, July 18 de 1990, p. 1A-3A).
Land transport entrepreneurs, associated in COLFECAR, pointed out that for the 
opening to be possible, it was necessary to modernize the ports and construct a much 
more technified and modem highway network to integrate the country's diverse transport 
systems. They also requested resources and incentives for the replacement of old 
vehicles through low-interest loans and reduced taxes (La Republica, April 16, 1990, p. 
3A).
In turn, ANDIGRAF, the association of graphic industry entrepreneurs, 
expressed its concern over the radical character the government was giving to the policy 
of liberalizing and internationalizing the economy and criticized its acceptance of the
177
guidelines handed down by the international finance agencies. It pointed out that the 
economic opening should be selective, i.e., limited to goods that are not exported or to 
productive sectors that are not linked to external markets (El Tiempo, April 19, 1990, p. 
5B).
CAMACOL, the construction industry association, which benefited from state 
plans for the construction of housing and infrastructure, warned about the dangers to the 
construction industry implicit in a policy to cut social spending in order to contain 
inflation, produced by the accelerated devaluation by means of which the state sought to 
increase the competitiveness of Colombian exports. CAMACOL also expressed its 
concern over the World Bank’s demand that the Colombian government adopt more 
radical measures in the economic opening process, as a condition for the disbursement 
of loans already contracted with that entity. According to CAMACOL, that would 
represent a threat both to the stability of public investment and to the general dynamics 
of the economy (El Colombiano, May 10, 1990, p. 7A).
Eliseo Restrepo, president of the Agricultural Society of Colombia, SAC, 
indicated that the Colombian economy was not yet in condition to undertake such an 
opening, since it had great technical deficiencies, produced at high costs, and was not 
prepared to meet the demands of the external market (El Espectador, May 1, 1990, p. 
7A). The SAC and the National Federation of Cattlemen, FEDEGAN, considered that 
the lack of protection for the agricultural sector would expose them to disadvantageous 
competition from the subsidized production of the highly developed countries (La
178
Republica, February 15, 1990, p. 10A). Therefore, the SAC considered it necessary to 
adopt an agricultural modernization program that would make it possible to compete 
internationally, to introduce mechanisms for more efficient commercialization of its 
products and to establish more adequate tariffs than those that had been in effect until 
then (El Tiempo, February 23, 1990, p. 10A).
The Barco government’s Minister of Finance, Fernando Alarcon Matilla, was 
emphatic in rejecting accusations that the economic opening policy was a demand of the 
international finance agencies, and affirmed that the government was autonomous in 
defining economic policy. He explained that Supplement VIII of the "Challenger" 
contract with the IMF, to accede to multilateral credit resources, only implied the normal 
annual visit that the Fund makes to every member country and which results in an 
internal report that is binding for rich and poor countries alike. Furthermore, the 
Minister pointed out that the economic opening should not be understood as a simple 
liberalization of import, but rather as an effort to modernize the country’s productive 
structure, in order to achieve higher growth rates. Nonetheless, he made it clear that the 
government could not say how far it would advance in this regard. (La Republica, 
February 12, 1990, p. 7A). But the Barco government, which was about to leave office, 
decided to leave the task of developing and deepening the initiated process of opening 
and internationalizing the economy to its successor.
The Gaviria government (1990-1994) continued broadening the politics of 
opening and internationalizing the economy, on the basis of the Washington Consensus
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diagnosis. Therefore, the government also argued the change of economic model was a 
consequence o f the loss of dynamism o f growth and the low productivity o f the 
Colombian economy due to the obsolescence o f the national productive infrastructure 
(Montenegro, 1991). Gaviria's government adopted a series o f deregulatory policies 
which, while aimed at increasing the efficiency of state administration and the economy, 
resulted in social exclusion. These policies included: a) the flexibilization o f the labor 
market through the reduction of workers' benefits like elimination of indefinite- term 
contracts and privatization o f the state social security system; b) reduction o f import 
taxes and duties, and the establishment of regressive taxation in which the consumption 
tax replaced the income tax as the principal source of financing of state activity; c) 
privatization o f public enterprises in the fields of maritime ports, airports, railroads, 
telecommunications, and social security which resulted in the loss o f thousands o f jobs 
in the public sector and d) the political, administrative and fiscal decentralization process 
through which a great number of the central government's functions were transferred 
to municipalities and their fiscal responsibility was increased.
Labor organizations took a stand against the economic opening policy and 
affirmed that it was an imposition of the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund, that it would have negative effects not only on production but on the living 
conditions o f the workers, and announced the creation of a “common front” to oppose 
the policy of flexibilizing the labor market and liberation of imports. Public employees 
were especially affected by the policy of privatizing state functions and enterprises. This 
meant the firing of around 30,000 workers, according to the National Government, and
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more than 77.000 according to the Unitary Central of Workers, CUT (Archila, 1995: 
263). Regarding the privatization policy, the National Federation of Workers in the 
Service o f the State, FENALTRASE, manifested that it “eliminates institutions that have 
have performed important public tasks in order to transfer them to the private sector, 
which endangers social function fulfilled by these institutions.” They also manifested 
that the measures taken by the government ignored “all social and labor rights” (El 
Tiempo, December, 30, 1992, 8A).
There were two tendencies in the Gaviria government’s economic team: those in 
favor o f total, accelerated opening, led by the Minister of Finance, Rudolf Hommes and 
the Director o f the National Planning Department, Armando Montenegro; and those in 
favor of a gradual, selective opening, led by the Minister of Economic Development, 
Ernesto Samper. President Gaviria did not take sides publicly but was in favor of 
accelerated opening. Business associations and workers supported the gradualist 
position o f Minister Samper, with whom they identified regarding the inadvisability of 
abruptly exposing national production to foreign competition. Only FENALCO, the 
merchants’ association, supported the government’s decision for total, accelerated 
opening. FENALCO’s only objection was related to the exchange rate, because it 
considered the pace o f devaluation to be too fast (La Republica, August 24, 1990, p. 
3A). This position was due to the fact that the merchants would benefit from the 
elimination o f the restrictions on foreign commerce, but could not take advantage o f it 
because a high rate of devaluation would increase the price of imports, which would 
diminish the volume of its associates’ operations.
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A significant difference between the Barco and Gaviria governments is that the 
latter decided to apply the opening policy to the entire agricultural sector as well. In 
fact, the Gaviria government announced that the protection of this sector would be by 
means o f variable, automatic tariffs based on international prices, and not as had been 
done previously, by means o f quotas and import licenses. Thus, the private sector would 
have a broader field in which to commercialize imported agricultural products, which 
would make it possible to privatize a state agency, the Agricultural Marketing Institute, 
IDEMA, the function of which was to guarantee sustained prices for agricultural 
producers, regardless of the costs and risks, which were assumed by this institute. 
Sustained prices would therefore gradually lose their importance, and the costs and risks 
would be assumed directly by the producers and investors, as in any other private 
activity. Credit for fomenting the agricultural sector would be granted only to finance 
commercialization infrastructure and transfer of technology (El Tiempo, August, 23, 
1990, p.p. 1A, 7A and 8A).
Associations of agricultural entrepreneurs like the SAC and FEDEGAN, and 
peasant organizations such as the National Association of Non Proprietary Peasants, 
ANUC; y the National Agrarian Federation, FANAL, among others, united to demand 
that the government change its agricultural policy. These associations considered that 
the sector should not be exposed to the international competition of farm products that 
are highly subsidized by the industrialized countries, and that the farm sector could not 
be expected to bear the weight of the government’s anti-inflationary policy, one of the
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mechanisms of which was massive importation of food products to contain the 
generalized rise in consumer prices. (El Tiempo, August 30, 1990, p.p. 1A y 6A).
The government’s position regarding these claims was ambiguous. On the one 
hand, President Gaviria, in a speech before the National Agricultural Congress, attended 
by more than 1500 delegates from 80 agricultural associations, promised to compensate 
the sector for forty years of abandonment by the government, and for the negative 
effects of the economic policy. For this purpose, he announced that the economic 
opening policy would be gradual and without traumatisms for the agricultural sector. On 
the other hand, in the same congress, the Minister of Agriculture, Maria del Rosario 
Sintes, detailed the President's generic affirmations in affirming that the development of 
the agricultural sector would be done on the basis of “the options offered by the 
international market,” and that the objective of the agricultural policy was to achieve a 
higher level of income for the producers, on a sound basis that would guarantee the 
consolidation and broadening of agriculture in Colombia (El Tiempo, September 20, 
1990, p. 12A). However, the Minister manifested that so as not to affect agricultural 
production, the pre- importation license and taxes on imported agricultural products 
would be eliminated gradually, in such a way as to establish a certain level of protection, 
for the medium term, and a variable system of tariffs, for the long term, the purpose of 
which would be to achieve a progressive adjustment of the costs of national production 
to the real costs of the international market (El Tiempo, November 3 de 1990, p. 13B). 
This mechanism was not clear to the agricultural producers, who indicated that the 
government only emitted “signs of disconcert” (El Tiempo, November 20, 1990, p. 7A).
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For the associations within the agricultural sector, the above-mentioned positions meant 
that the government abandoned the goal o f achieving alimentary self-sufficiency in the 
country, that noncompetitive sectors would be sacrificed, and that the nation's 
agriculture should become specialized in those products in which the country could take 
advantage o f the possibilities o f the external market.
On the other hand, the Minister of Development, Ernesto Samper, trying to 
respond to the numerous objections to the economic opening policy, affirmed, within the 
framework o f the First Mixed Foreign Commerce Commision, that the economic 
opening would not be done behind the back of the entrepreneurs (El Espectador, 
September 26, 1990, p. 7A) and that there would be foreign credit resources, in the 
amount o f 1,100 million dollars to finance technological renovation and industrial 
relocation projects to foment exports and promote small and medium-sized industry. 
Furthermore, the National Planning Department announced programs to develop 
transportation and communications infrastructure. That announcements were received 
with skepticism by the producers, since they considered the amount announced by the 
Minister o f Development to be insufficient, given that the mere renovation o f equipment 
for the textile sector alone to enable it to compete in the international market would cost 
500 million dollars, and the cost of industrial renovation projects in their entirety 
amounted to 4,500 million dollars (Revista Negocios, March, 1990, p. 26)
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5.4. The Deepening o f the Economic Liberalization
During 1991, three facts characterized the development of the Gaviria government's 
economic opening policy: a) the creation o f the National Gremial Council on the part of 
the business sector, b) the tensions and contradictions between the the policy to reduce 
inflation and the policy to stimulate the growth of the economy and exportations, and c) 
the acceleration o f the policy of liberalizing internationalizing the economy.
The creation of the National Gremial Council was the result o f an initiative of the 
Gaviria government's Minister of Development, Ernesto Samper, who sought to create 
an institution that would group together the business sector, in order to more effectively 
concert and discuss the measures o f the new economic model and the initiatives for 
economic integration with other countries of the region (Cepeda Ulloa, 1994, and Pretelt 
de la Vega, 1994). For the entrepreneurs, the organization had, in addition, a double 
purpose: on the one hand, as mentioned in a previous chapter, they sought to fill the gap 
left by the political parties in relation to the need to deal with the problem of the 
deterioration of the social order, and on the other hand, they sought to achieve the 
unification of forces to face the government, in order to better confront the economic 
opening policy and defend themselves from it. The Council was integrated by fifteen of 
the most representative entrepreneurial associations, such as the National Association of 
Industrialists, the Agricutural Society of Colombia, the National Cattlemen's Federation, 
the Sugar-Growers Association, the National Association of Exporters, the Colombian 
Association of Flower Exporters, and the Banking Association, among others. However,
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this number is very small if one considers that the country has more than one hundred 
entrepreneurial associations.
In relation to the industrial sector, the economic opening policy included, in 
addition to the liberation of imports, promotion of export development, technological 
modernization of the productive structure, and the foment of new productive sectors 
with possibilities of technological development. These objectives were assumed by 
common accord with the private sector. Furthermore, two funds were created: one to 
finance new investment projects, and another destined to help workers who were fired, 
in order to grant them anticipated pensions, temporary unemployment aids, retraining 
programs, and credit for the creation of micro-enterprises (El Tiempo, July 9, 1991, p. 
8A). Nevertheless, the policy of financial support for technological modernization of 
enterprises and of construction and improvement of the transportation and 
communications infrastructure of the country was scarcely developed.
To initiate the policy of support for technological modernization of Colombian 
industry so that it could compete in the international market, the government defined 
seven basic industrial sectors: iron and steel, automobile, metalworks, leather, textiles, 
and clothing manufacturing industries. Tributary stimuli were established for these 
industries, reduced tariffs on the importation of capital goods and raw materials, and 
internal and external credit, the latter in the amount of one billion dollars El Tiempo, 
March 6, 1991, p,14B). One of the most significant measures was that related to the 
automobile industry. In fact, this industry had been highly regulated by the state in
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relation to the models and the number of cars that could be assembled in the country, 
and it was in the hands of just a few firms that dominated the national market, thanks to 
the very high protective tariffs on the importation of foreign cars. However, consumers 
did not benefit in terms of options, quality or prices, compared with the international 
market. To correct this situation, the government decreed total freedom for the 
establishment of automobile-producing and -assembling companies, and substantially 
reduced tariffs on imported spare parts (El Tiempo, May, 16, 1991, p. 8A).
An exogenous factor that had an influence on accelerating the opening and the 
making of the above-mentioned decisions, was the series of negotiations for the 
commercial integration of Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela, in order to form the 
“Group of the Three”. In fact, as a result of these negotiations the elimination of tariffs 
was accelerated in the metalworks, automobile, steel, and petrochemical industries. 
These sectors suffered, in the short lapse of eight months, the process of eliminating 
tariffs on foreign commerce, which was supposed to be carried out over a period of four 
years. This caused conflicts between the Minister of Development, Ernesto Samper, 
who defended slow and gradual opening, and the industrial associations, despite the fact 
that the former was considered by the latter to be the defender of their interests within 
the government. According to the Association of Steel Industrialists, INACERO, the 
elimination of tariffs was harmful to the country, since many metalworks companies 
would have to close, with the following social effects, since that sector generated
700,000 direct jobs and 350,000 indirect jobs (El Tiempo, April 1, 1991, p. 7B). Other 
trade associations such as the ANDI and ANALDEX, and the plastic producers
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criticized these negotiations since they considered it inadvisable to enter into agreements 
with a country like Mexico, which had a much stronger and more developed economy 
and infrastructure of ports, roads, and communications than Colombia (El Tiempo, June 
25, 1991, p.lOB). It could be said that in this case the integrating tendencies o f the 
“geoeconomy” prevailed over domestic interests.
In relation to the agricultural sector, the Gaviria government sought to stimulate 
the production of goods in short supply and great demand in the international market, 
promote the creation of associations of cultivators to strengthen their national and 
international competitiveness and reduce tariffs on cereals from 30% to 20% within a 
lapse o f six months. This measure was severely criticized by farmers, who considered 
that six months was too short a period to prepare the sector to face international 
competition, and demanded a greater degree of gradualism in the process o f eliminating 
tariffs on foreign commerce (La Republica, July 6, 1991, p.8B). The Minister of 
Agriculture, Maria del Rosario Sintes, announced that the main objective o f the 
agricultural policy was to incorporate this sector into the economic opening and to 
introduce market mechanisms into it and, therefore, the subsidized credit and the 
sustained prices, guaranteed by the state, would end and would be left at the level of 
international prices. Furthermore, tariffs on the importation of agricultural supplies 
would also be eliminated in order to help to reduce production costs. The Minister said 
that the agricultural sector's efficiency would not increase if the producers did not try to 
make greater investments and to modernize the technologyused in agricultural 
production (La Republica, July 10, 1991, p.p. 1 A, 8A).
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These announcements were criticized by agricultural producers' associations, 
who manifested that Colombia's agricultural production was not yet in any condition to 
compete on the international market and, therefore, it was necessary to maintain 
sustained prices and tariff protection for somewhat longer (El Tiempo, October 10, 
1991, p.p. 1A, 3A; and Novembre 28, 1991, p.6C), and to achieve this, they were ready 
to strongly oppose the government. According to Gustavo Cano, president o f the 
National Farmers Association, the government was proceeding unilaterally by not 
consulting fanners on the policies relating to the agricultural sector. According to Cano, 
the planting o f wheat and barley was suspended due to the lack o f favorable conditions, 
while the government stimulated the importation o f food products (El Espectador, 
January 16, 1991, p. 8A). In the meantime, Dario Bustamante, manager of the 
Agricultural Marketing Institute, IDEMA, a state agency, speaking in the name of the 
government, denied the lack of support for the agricultural sector and said that EDEMA 
was willing to buy the crops at sustained prices. At the same time, he affirmed that the 
government had the right to formulate an agricultural policy based on the free market, as 
a mechanism for determining prices (El Tiempo, January 22, 1991, last p. section A).
But the plans and programs for modernizing the agricultural sector were not well 
developed and did not produce greater technical development or increased productivity. 
According to data from the Foreign Commerce Institute, INCOMEX, farm machinery 
purchases decreased by 28 million dollars between January and September of 1991, 
which meant the greatest fall in recent years, despite the radical tariff reduction on
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imported machinery and the elimination o f many administrative obstacles (El Tiempo, 
November 13, 1991, p. 12A). According to agricultural sector entrepreneurs, this 
situation was explained by the fact that they were not willing to make investments while 
there was economic uncertainty and problems o f violence and public order (Ibidem). 
This position was not accepted by the government and President Gaviria referred to the 
fact in the annual assembly of the SAC. For Gaviria, the signs o f recession were 
transitory and the measures adopted to internationalize the agricultural sector were fully 
justified. Furthermore, stabilization o f the opening process would open broad horizons 
for investment and productive development o f the agricultural sector (El Tiempo, 
November 28,1991, p. 6C).
In response to the criticism from the agricultural sector, the Minister of 
Agriculture indicated that farmers could not continue justifying their low 
competitiveness with the argument o f the subsidies that the most industrialized countries 
grant their agricultural products, and that they were not taking advantage of the benfits 
the government was offering them to acquire technology and supplies, a fact that was 
reflected in their inefficient production (El Tiempo, July 6, 1991, p. 8B). But the most 
important point in the confrontation between the government and the agricultural 
producers was with the cotton-growers, when almost two hundred o f them carried out a 
protest that included the blocking of an important national highway. The cotton-growers 
demanded that the government intervene to improve their situation caused by the high 
costs of supplies, decreased demand due to the fact that the textile industry was using 
synthetic fibers, and low prices o f natural fiber in the national market. In response to the
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cotton-growers, the Minister o f Agriculture insisted on the need to modernize 
agricultural production and accepted that it was necessary to adopt measures to improve 
the situation o f the sector, but the decisions regarding the economic opening policy were 
beyond the reach of the Ministry of Agriculture (El Tiempo, July 9, 1991. p. 9B).
As can be observed, positions regarding the economic opening policy were very 
polarized and, for that very reason, given the lack of spaces for agreement, and 
ambiguity on the part of the government, the adoption of new measures generated 
confrontations among the actors. The new Minister of Agriculture, Alfonso Lopez 
Caballero, seemed to grasp this situation and, upon assuming office, announced that he 
would continue the process o f economic liberalization in the agricultural sector, but 
“without academic rigidity” and with the spirit of listening to the agricultural sector's 
concerns, in order to make the restructuring process as little traumatic as possible (El 
Tiempo, July 9, 1991. p. 9B).
5.4.1. Tensions between Anti-Inflation and Liberalization Policies
In 1991 the economic situation was characterized by a vacillating opening policy that 
was highly confronted by the business sector; a decrease in international reserves, and an 
annual inflation rate o f 32%, the highest in recent decades. In order to reduce inflation, 
the government adopted monetary measures that restricted credit, controlled demand, 
and permitted the accumulation o f foreign currency by attracting capital from abroad 
(Giraldo Samper, 1993). This situation originated a contradiction between two 
objectives of the Gaviria government's economic policy: the objective o f achieving
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general economic stability, sought by the Minister of Finance, the National Planning 
Department, and the Monetary Board, and the objective of achieving greater economic 
growth of the different productive sectors which the Ministries of Economic 
Development, Labor, and Agriculture pursued more directly.
The monetary policy decisions adopted by the Ministry of Finance were oriented 
to preventing increased inflation, but they made credit more expensive, which worked 
against the entrepreneurs' need for an adequate flow of resources to finance their 
production. Furthermore, the lower rate of devaluation, which in practice amounted to a 
progressive reevaluation of the peso with respect to the dollar, was considered by 
exporters to be an obstacle to the success of the economic opening policy, if it was 
indeed to be understood as an effort to substantially increase Colombian exports, and not 
just as greater freedom for importation. This fact was percieved by industrialists and 
farmers as a a grave situation of uncertainty for the economy, and as an abrupt, unilateral 
change in the rules of the game that the government had announced at the start of the 
economic opening process.
The government's decision to control inflation by reducing the prices of imported 
goods was highly criticized by exporters, who were the most affected by this measure. 
Jorge Ramirez Ocampo, president of the National Association of Exporters, ANALDEX, 
manifested that that measure meant a revaluation of the peso and a denial of the 
economic opening policy and that, if it were not possible to advance in this objective in 
an inflationary environment, reduced inflation could not be achieved at the cost of the
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producers; nor did they consider valid the government's argument to justify that 
measure, according to which it was now necessary to revaluate the peso because the 
devaluation o f previous years had been excessive (La Republica, July 2, 1991, p. 8A). 
According to the vice-president of the ANALDEX, Javier Diaz, the government had 
changed the rules o f the game for exporters, to the degree that it had revaluated the peso, 
reduced tax stimuli such as the reimbursement o f taxes on exports, and increased interest 
rates on loans from the Fund for the Promotion of Exports, PROEXPO (El Tiempo, July 
11, 1991, p. 14A). Furthermore, the Federation o f Metalworks Industries,
FEDEMETAL, pointed out that the exchange measures threatened fulfillment o f the 
economic integration agreements particularly those relating to the Andean Pact. This 
was due to the fact that the adjustments generated by the exchange policy increased the 
price differences among the member countries (El Mundo, November 8, 1991, p. 4A) 
and exposed Colombian products to disadvantageous competition in the sub-regional 
market. On the other hand, the Confederation of Chambers o f Commerce, the 
Colombian Chamber o f Book Publishers, the Graphic Industries Association and the 
Clothing Manufacturing Industries Association, indicated that the revaluation of the peso 
with respect to the dollar, generated by the anti-inflationary policy, created an 
environment favorable to the increase o f speculative activities, which was harmful to the 
economy as a whole (El Tiempo, 1 November 11, 1991, p. 4C, and November 15, 1991, 
last p.A).
Despite the industrialists' protests the government's priority was to curb inflation, 
the increase o f which threatened the stability of the economy in general, and it was
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determined to do so, even at the cost o f affecting private sector interests and generating 
uncertainty in the short term. The Director o f PROEXPO, Carlos Caballero Argaez, 
expressed himself in this sense in defending the government's anti-inflationary policy. 
Caballero accepted that the anti-inflation measures had generated high costs for 
exporters, but considered that this situation would be transitory. He affirmed that the 
first thing to seek was price stability, but recognized that without the stimulus o f the 
exchange rate, the objective o f fomenting exports would not succeed (El Espectador, 
July 20, 1991, p. 7B).
Industrialists joined exporters in their criticism o f the anti-inflationary and 
exchange policy. The National Association of Industrialists, ANDI, for example, 
pointed out that there were great contradictions between the economic opening and 
technological modernization policy and the short term objectives, aimed at counteracting 
the inflationary tendencies. The effects of that contradiction were not the best: credit 
cuts and the consequent increase in interest rates (on both commercial credit and credit 
to foment exports), revaluation o f the peso, and reduction o f tax incentives such as the 
reimbursement of taxes for exports. The ANDI argued that it was impossible to fulfill 
the economic opening policy objectives in these conditions, and therefore necessary to 
adopt a series of measures to permit a return to a balance between the monetary policy 
and the exchange policy, without hurting exports (El Tiempo, August 19, 1991 p. 12A).
The Association o f Financial Institutions, ANIF, pointed out that the 
government’s restrictive measures had produced negative effects, such as $450,000
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million cut in investment, an increase in banks' lists of defaulting debtors, that was 
growing at an annual rate of 13%, and a reduction in savings deposits. This situation 
partly explained the avalanche o f dollars that were entering the country and that had 
produced an increase in foreign currency reserves of more than $ one billion dollars in 
just seven months. All of this meant that, given the lack of credit in the country, 
businessmen were resorting to foreign financing (La Republica, August 13, 1991, p. 2B).
As far as the Banking Association is concerned, its president, Florangela Gomez, 
considered it necessary to eliminate the marginal reserve requirement in order to 
normalize the flow of commercial credit, which had fallen $200,000 million during 
1991, as a consequence o f the anti-inflationary measures. It was evident that it was very 
important for the banks to have access to the resources taken out o f circulation through 
the reserve requirement, in order to undertake a larger number of brokering operations. 
But the banks also realized that the scarcity o f credit resources could cause a dangerous 
increase in the defaulting debtors' lists (La Republica, August 24, 1991, p.p. 1A, 4A).
Merchants supported the financial sector's request that the government modify 
its anti-inflationary policy, so as to consolidate the commercial opening and promote 
economic growth. Therefore, they proposed that the government adopt measures, such 
as eliminating the marginal reserve requirement, reducing tariffs on the importation of 
capital goods, eliminating exchange certificates as a form of payment to exporters, 
permitting Colombians to hold bank accounts in dollars within the country, establishing
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stimuli for firms that modernize their technology, and fully promoting the privatization 
process (El Tiempo, August 26,1991, p. 2B).
The Gaviria government's economic team was not unanimous in its opinion 
regarding the advisability o f the measures to combat inflation. That, as mentioned above, 
was due to the existence o f two different focuses on the economic liberalization and 
internationalization policy: that o f Finance Minister, Rudolf Hommes, and that of 
Development Minister, Ernesto Samper. The latter requested the former to modify the 
anti-inflationary policy, since it negatively affected fundamental industries for the 
economic opening process, and to abolish the ninety-day period established for 
converting the Exchange Certificates into pesos17, in order to provide greater liquidity to 
exporters (El Tiempo, August 12, 1991, p.p. 1A, 8A). The Finance Minister responded 
that the export-related exchange measures would not be modified, arguing the 
inadvisability o f  that decision (La Republica, August 13, 1991, p.p. 1A, 12A). In this 
way, the disagreement within the government's economic team was made evident.
On the one hand, the Minister o f Development, Ernesto Samper, made his anti­
monetarist and gradualist position clear and proposed a reduction o f  the marginal reserve 
requirement o f  10%, a percentage which, in his opinion, would permit adequate 
management o f  an anti-inflationary policy (El Tiempo, August 28, 1991, p. 1A). Such a 
decrease would imply the release o f 400,000 million pesos, which would be an 
important flow o f resources for investment in industry (El Tiempo, August 29, 1991, p.
17 A market money instrument representative o f  foreign currency, issued by the state to exporters, which 
could not be cashed in until after ninety days.
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9A). This position was supported by Roberto Junguito Bonnet, member o f the board of 
directors o f the Bank o f the Republic, who considered it necessary to modify the 
monetary policy, since in his opinion it was already showing signs o f exhaustion as an 
anti-inflationary mechanisms and had negative effects on economic growth and on the 
credit flow to the productive sector. Junguito thought it evident that the weight o f the 
monetary stabilization efforts had fallen excessively on the control o f productive credit. 
Furthermore, control o f the expansion o f the means o f  payment through open market 
operations, on the part o f the state, caused fiscal deficit, since it obliged the government 
to cover the high cost o f these operations with public resources. Junguito concluded that 
the monetary control policy exerted excessive pressure, causing interest rates to rise, 
affecting productive investment, and leading to the massive entry o f capital from abroad. 
(El Tiempo, August 29, 1991, p. 9A). Finally, the pressures, both internal and external, 
led the government to propose to the Board o f Directors that the Bank of the Republic 
release $175,000 million pesos through the gradual dismounting o f the marginal reserve 
requirement, so as not to affect the objectives o f  the economic opening policy (El 
Tiempo, August 30, 1991, p. 13A).
It is necessary to emphasize the Board o f Directors o f the Bank o f  the Republic's 
opposition to the Ministry o f Finance's monetary policy, since both entities have 
traditionally acted in common accord on this topic. This significant fact, together with 
the confrontations between the Bank and the Constitutional Court mentioned above,
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originated in the autonomy the Constitution o f 1991 granted the central bank in relation 
to the management o f monetary policy.
In synthesis, during the second semester de 1991, there was great tension 
between the two objectives o f the economic policy; the objective o f consolidating the 
commercial opening, and the objective o f achieving macroeconomic stability. To 
guarantee the former, the government should offer industrialists favorable conditions, 
including an adequate flow of financial resources at acceptable interest rates, that would 
permit investment in productive projects. It was also necessary to increase the 
competitiveness o f national industry in the international market, which would require 
resources to finance projects for the technological modernization o f industry, and a 
favorable exchange policy for farmers, industrialists, exporters and merchants. Within 
the government, this position was represented by the Minister o f Development and, 
partially, by the Minister of Agriculture. However, the Minister o f Finance and the 
National Planning Department were in favor of a macroeconomic stability policy o f a 
monetarist type, that advocated the reduction of inflation through control of the money 
supply, even if  this policy affected national producers in the short term. The acceleration 
of the opening, which took place in the second semester of 1991, meant the defeat o f the 
gradual opening position, defended in the government by the Minister o f Development, 
Ernesto Samper, and the definitive triumph of the more radical positions, defended by 
the Minister of Finance and the Head o f the National Planning Department.
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5.4.2. Acceleration o f Liberalization
Despite the fact that in July o f 1991 the government had rejected the Monetary Board's 
recommendations to carry out a more radical liberalization, and had affirmed that it 
would not modify either the taxes on exports, or the exchange and foreign trade policy 
before January 1994 (El Tiempo July 26, 1991, p. 13A), in August of 1991 the Minister 
o f Finance announced acceleration of the economic restructuring process. Thus, the 
measures that were not supposed to enter into effect until 1994 were introduced ahead of 
time, and national products entered into open competition with imported goods. The 
decision to accelerate the opening implied a substantial tariff reduction, a decrease of 
two points in the surtax on imports, increased devaluation and agilization of 
privatization programs and the modernization of ports and o f the highway network. 
Tariffs were also eliminated on the importation of supplies, raw materials, and capital 
goods for industry. The agricultural sector was also included in the government's 
decision to open the market.
Among the reasons the government adduced to accelerate the economic opening, 
was, in the first place, the stagnation of exports, which businessmen attributed to the 
general uncertainty created by the lack of definition and clear direction in the opening 
policy; in the second place, the need to increase the supply o f imported goods, since the 
government thought that it would have a rapid and positive effect in reducing inflation -  
its main objective- and thus reduce the annual inflation rate to 22%. The substantial 
reduction in investment and production costs due to the reduced of tariffs on imported 
raw materials and capital goods would also contribute to this objective. The government
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considered that the decision to accelerate the opening would clarify the rules o f the 
economic game. The policy was supported immediately by exporters. But the National 
Association of Industrialists, ANDI, considered that the decision introduced new factors 
of uncertainty into productive activity, because it affected the planning of production 
processes that were already underway, which had been undertaken with the criteria and 
deadlines pointed out previously by the economic authorities. The ANDI considered 
that the decision to accelerate the opening had been made unilaterally by the 
government, without consulting with the private sector, and requested a return to the 
previous tariff policy. Furthermore, they considered that the increase in international 
reserves was due not just to less dynamic exports but also, mainly, to the restrictive 
monetary policy that had prevented greater economic growth and propitiated the entry of 
speculative capital, stimulated by the high interest rates (El Tiempo, August 27, 1991, p. 
13 A).
The industrialists were joined by the construction industry firms, organized in the 
Colombian Chamber of Construction, CAMACOL, who thought that acceleration of the 
opening would have only negative effects on the Colombian economy. For CAMACOL, 
the government measures generated uncertainty in business, deteriorated the credibility 
of the economic policy, reduced the expectations of project investors, produced ups and 
downs in the planning of business firms and traumatisms in the modernization process 
(El Espectador, September 3, 1991, p. 8D). Given the force of the facts, the 
industrialists could only express, once again, their intention to oppose the national 
government. According to the president of the ANDI, Juan Guillermo Angel, the
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industrialists at least had the right to request real and effective participation in the 
decision-making process that affected their activity, and that right had been violated by 
the government. Furthermore, the business community demanded coherence and 
continuity in government policies, as well as clear and stable rules o f the game to permit 
the long-term planning and realization o f their economic activities, and to avoiding be 
subject to fluctuations that made it impossible to create a climate favorable to productive 
investment.
Finally, in relation to the role of the Congress, the whole series of economic 
reforms needed to adopt the free market model in internationalization o f the economy, 
was approved with very little opposition. This is explained by the following facts: in the 
first place, the scarce interest in economic or, more precisely, macroeconomic matters in 
the Congress. Given the clientelist nature o f the Congress, an economic law is approved 
if it implies an allocation o f associated public funds to the regions or the interests of the 
congressmen. In the second place, the Congress was threatened with revocation o f its 
mandate on the part of the Constitutional Assembly o f 1991 at the time of adoption of 
the new economic model. Given this situation, the Congress, in approving the main 
economic projects of the government, hoped to gain the support o f President Gaviria, 
who had arisen through the rank and file o f clientelism. In the third place, the approval 
of the new constitution and the winds of democratization that it introduced, contributed 
to creating a climate that appeased the potential opposition within the Congress among 
the representatives o f the social sectors that would be affected by the adoption of the 
new economic model (Cepeda, 1994). Although the reforms that affected workers were
201
approved, due to the reasons mentioned above, to the lack o f representatives o f the 
working class in Congress, and to the weakness of organized labor since union 
membership consists o f less than 6% of the Colombian labor force (Urrutia, 1994).
The government o f Cesar Gaviria was followed by that o f Ernesto Samper (1994- 
1998). Consequent with the position he had assumed as Minister of Development during 
the former government regarding adoption of the new economic model, Samper tried to 
introduce gradualism in adopting the model and to make it more equitable in nature. 
With respect to industry, he designed a policy aimed at fomenting technological 
development and the formation of human capital. In relation to the agricultural sector, 
he developed programs to moderate the effects of the commercial opening and to 
promote rural development. He also attempted to improve the country's transport and 
telecommunications infrastructure. To make the objectives o f reducing inflation and 
improving the situation of the social sectors most affected by the new economic model 
compatible, Samper propitiated a reapprochement among producers, workers and 
consumers, so as to reach an agreement on prices, salaries and productivity. 
Nevertheless, the scandal of the filtration o f a considerable amount o f drug-traffickers' 
contributions into his presidential campaign funds, produced a chain o f events that 
polarized the country politically and gravely affected its govemability, to such an extent, 
that none of his proposals actually developed significantly. From this point of view, the 
Samper government can be considered Colombia's lost quadrennium.
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In the academic world and the “think tanks” there has also been a debate on the 
advisability of adopting the model of liberalization and internationalization of the 
economy, that led to the same polarization observed within the government and between 
it and the business sector. On the one side, there are the academics who sustain that to 
solve the problems of Colombian economy “it would be enough to follow the policies 
suggested in the Washington Consensus" (Echavarria, 2000: 122). Nonetheless, this 
analysts argue that “in most fields the reforms were not profound and became stagnated 
during the Samper administration (1994-1998) that opposed his ‘social model’ to the 
‘neo-liberal’ policies of the previous government” (Ibidem: 123). On the other side were 
those who considered the crisis and the economic imbalances to be due precisely to the 
adoption of the policies recommended by that consensus, since the commercial opening 
contributed to the systematic deterioration of national industry. Instead of an industry 
that is competitive in the international market, “sectors have arisen that are highly 
dependent on imports and have little capacity to generate employment. Furthermore, 
their possibilities of expanding are limited” (Sarmiento Palacios, 2000: 51).
In synthesis, practically all the workers, businessmen from the different sectors 
of production, and certain academic sectors expressed their reservations and fears 
regarding the neoliberal economic policy. All of this belied the affirmation of some 
comparative-politics analysts to the effect that individual interests had lobbied in favor 
of the neoliberal policy of restructuring the economy, and confirmed the conclusions of 
Geddes (1995) in the opposite sense. It is clear that the liberalization and 
internationalization of the economy had to affect individual economic interests
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negatively, since half a century of implement o f the inward development model, had 
meant a series o f advantages and benefits, the abrupt abandonment o f which would 
affect them profoundly and negatively. Failure to take this structural background into 
account is what leads many analysts to overestimate the strategic decisions o f the actors. 
On the contrary, a “rational actor” would seek a strategy to avoid measures that affect 
their vested interests, or a very slow supression o f the old economic structures, in order 
to mitigate the negative effects.
5.5. From Optim ism  to Crisis
Prior to the adoption of the new model of free market and internationalization o f the 
economy, there were a series of economic conditions in Colombia that fomented 
speculation, such as: a) the production and commercialization of cocaine; b) the massive 
entry of dollars resulting from the commercialization o f cocaine abroad and facilitated 
now by the flexibilization of foreign currency exchange and the deregulation of foreign 
trade; c) the laundering of illegal dollars through the importation of luxury consumer 
goods, the construction o f housing, and the purchase of landholdings; and d) speculation 
with the assets o f existing enterprises, which led to a lack of real, new investment in the 
productive sector (Misas, 1994) and to a lack of technological renovation in the 
productive structure o f Colombian firms. If to this we add the already mentioned 
structural difficulties associated with the introduction o f the new model, which made its 
implementation slow and difficult, it can be said that, in practice, the new economic 
model degenerated into a promotion of speculative capital, with financial and
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commercial systems, both legal and illegal, that became the new source of capital 
accumulation.
This dependence with respect to speculative activity gave the Colombian 
economy certain characteristics and a dynamism that it maintained until 1995, and that 
would otherwise be inexplicable, such as relatively high growth rates for a Latin 
American country; accumulation of foreign currency despite the fact that Colombia 
became more of an importing country than an exporting one; exportation o f capital; 
revaluation of the peso at the same time that domestic production was too weak to 
compete in the international markets; increased public and private spending due to the 
availability of cheap credit, and a simultaneous decrease in internal savings. In 
synthesis, the economic model in fact became a tacit model of accelerated accumulation 
of money capital in the short term, that did not benefit the productive sectores and was 
therefore condemned to an ephemeral and conjunctural life.
In fact, as of 1996, the first recessive symptoms began to appear in the economy. 
All the above-mentioned factors generated a series of macroeconomic imbalances, 
increased importations with respect to exports, and an unemployment rate that reached 
20% in the year 2000 (Sarmiento Palacios, 2000). The abundant capital that entered 
from abroad generated a “dance of millions” that was channeled through the banking 
system by means of the offer of cheap credit, and towards importations, superfluous 
consumption, and the purchase of housing (Florez, 2001). But when the interest and 
unemployment rates increased, the result could not have been clearer: companies deeply
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in debt or en bankruptcy, homeowners unable to pay their mortgages, and increased lists 
of defaulted debtors in the banks, above tolerable levels. The Bank of the Republic, 
which should have acted as a "monetary policeman”, given the autonomy granted it by 
the new Constitution, adhered to the will of the government, and thus also contributed to 
creating the conditions o f liquidity needed for the the above-mentioned expansion of 
spending and the revaluation of the currency in the first half o f the nineties (Florez, 
2001). The economy began to show recessive symptoms since 1996, for which reason 
the government introduced a series o f measures to detain the crisis and recover the real 
exchange rate that, as already mentioned, had been strongly reevaluated in the first half 
of the nineties.
The end o f the “dance of the millions” revealed the vulnerability o f the economic 
measures of the first five years o f implementation of the new economic model. The 
growth rate of the economy plummeted and the construction and manufacturing sectors 
entered into crisis. This situation worsened in 1998, when the economy experienced the 
effects o f the Asian and Russian crises, examples o f external shocks that have multiplied 
and have become more intense through the effects of globalization. These effects were: 
deterioration o f the country's terms o f exchange, with adverse implications for national 
income; restriction and the increased cost o f foreign financing; the flight o f capital; and 
strong pressures to increase exchange rates and interest rates. Towards the end o f 1998, 
the Pastrana government (1998-2002) found it necessary to declare an economic 
emergency to confront the crisis o f the financial sector, due to the increased number of
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defaulting debtors, particularly in the housing-financing system, whose users could not 
continue to meet their payments when interest rates increased.
The above provided ground for homeowners to create an organization to pressure 
the government to reform the housing-financing system, which had become very 
onerous. For this purpose, they questioned the legitimacy of the housing law before the 
Constitutional Court, which decided in their favor, invoking the fundamental right to 
housing, established in the Constitution of 1991. Given this double pressure, the 
government had to intervene in favor o f the users, which led to a serious confrontation 
between the Bank of the Republic economists and the government's economic team on 
the one hand, and the Constitutional Court Justices and the defenders o f the new 
constitution on the other. This confrontation will be the subject of analysis in the next 
chapter.
In 1999, financing possibilities, both external and internal, became even more 
restricted. The private sector's demand was reduced significantly and the economic 
growth rate fell abruptly. Whereas between 1993 and 1995 the GDP grew at a rate o f 5% 
annually, between 1996 and 1998 it was only 2% per year, and in 1999 it was negative 
by 4% (Florez, 2001: 48). Due to the above circumstances, the Pastrana government had 
to sign a formal agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), aimed at 
recovering macroeconomic stability, gaining credibility in international markets, and 
achieving support to obtain new external credit resources. This agreement with the IMF 
also implied a confrontation with some of the norms of the Constitution of 1991. As
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mentioned earlier, this established a series of transfers of the central state’s resources 
towards the regions and municipalities, to finance educational and health services. These 
transfers amount today to almost 50% of the state's current revenue. One o f the points 
of the agreement with the IMF was the elimination o f those transfers of resources, with 
which the confrontation between the two societal projects becomes even more evident, 
which will be analyzed in the next chapter.
5.6. The Effects o f  the Change o f Economic M odel on the Political Regime
As already mentioned in the theoretical framework, the adoption of the neoliberal 
accumulation model also implied a transformation of the political regime. The 
Analysis o f this phenomena requires seeing this model as something more than a series 
of macroeconomic policy measures and to consider it as a “societal project” . This is 
understood as the model o f accumulation from the perspective o f the conception of 
relations among the state, civil society, and the economy on the part, o f the social 
sector or sectors that aspire to lead the process of social transformation. This 
conception implies, in turn, a redefinition o f the rules of the game among the different 
social classes, and between these and the state, which constitutes a modification of the 
political regime. It thus requires surpassing the traditional definition of political regime 
as an ensemble of rules and institutions that regulate the struggle for political power, 
and the relations between the different branches of public power. From the perspective 
of this dissertation, an important function of the political regime is to act as an element 
of articulation between the state and the accumulation model, generating the possibility
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of establishing alliances among different social sectors, in order to orient the social 
process.
The above-mentioned concepts of regime and economic model as societal projects, also 
have consequences for the concept of “autonomy of the state.” In its traditional 
conception (Poulantzas, 1969; Skocpol, 1979 and 1985), thar autonomy has been 
understood as the state's capacity of the state to distance itself with respect to partial 
interests of civil society. On the contrary, the existence of a societal project demands 
that state action be the result of a combination of internal strength of state institutions 
and their articulation with key sectors of civil society that aspire to lead the process of 
social transformation (Evans, 1995). In this sense, the political regime is the link 
between the state and the accumulation model, and makes it possible to present the latter 
as a societal project or to impede or obstruct its implementation.
To elaborate that concept of political regimes as the organizing principle of 
society, it is necessary to base it on Antonio Gramsci’s concept of hegemony. From his 
perspective, the ruling class not only execises domination but a "moral and intellectual 
leadership” in society as well (1971, p. 57), i.e., it is a question of trying to exert 
domination not just by means of force but of consensus as well. Max Weber's (1968) 
works also contribute to structuring the concept of political regime, to the degree that for 
this author, the process of capital accumulation demands a series of cultural conditions 
relating to an ethic of the ruling class without which no development is possible. These
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1leadership and consensus should be obtained through compromises and reforms in which 
the interests of different social groups should be taken into account.
From the previous perspective, the change o f change o f economic model renders 
inoperative the old agreements between the elites and social classes, which sustained and 
made possible the functioning of the previous model of industrialization for substitution 
of imports, and imposed the need to generate new agreements that express the new 
correlation o f social forces. In the Colombian case, the magnitude o f that change and 
the difficulty o f achieving these new agreements has been pointed out by Carlos 
Caballero Arguez, one of the most renowned technocrats in the economic teams o f the 
governments of the nineties, and defender o f the adoption o f the neoliberal model, when 
he affirmed that
in C olom bia it has taken us great effort to understand the im plications o f  the 
changes that took place in the world in the past decade and, naturally, those 
o f  the process w e call ‘open ing’, initiated in the early nineties in this country.
It w as not sim ply a question o f  opening the econom y to trade and foreign  
investm ent -  com m ercial opening and financial liberalization -  but 
som ething much more profound. N am ely, the m anagem ent o f  politics and o f  
econom y in the world at the end o f  the twentieth century (. . .) But change 
involved and still involves risks. In this specific case, it affected traditional 
politicians, that had seen their power and capacity to do favors, and to collect 
on favors, dw indle. They w ere equaly obliged  to m odify their w ay o f  acting.
L ikew ise, productive enterprises and econom ic groups faced the need to 
redesign their strategies, to redefine the sectors w here they should be, to 
increase investm ent to com pete and open up to the world. The change w as 
also difficult to transmit and to sell to people, because it generated nostalgia  
for the past (El T iem po, July 24, 1998, p. 5 A ).
5.6.1 Fragm entation o f Economic Elite
In Colombia, the possibilty of achieving these new agreements, consensus and leadership 
has been [imitated for two reasons. In the first place, because, in addition to the division
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between the political and economic elites mentioned above (Chapter III), it is necessary 
to mention the division between the economic elites themselves, due to the model o f 
opening and internationalizing the economy. These elites have been dividided into those 
that have incorporated technological advances and have been connected to the world's 
productive and financial circuits, and less competitive ones that act on the basis of the 
national market. While the former advocate free trade and internationalization o f the 
economy, the latter are in favor o f protectionism or gradual opening. In the second 
place, through the exclusion of subordinated social sectors due, among other things, to 
the reduction o f public social spending, state subsidies, and labor rights and guarantees, 
and to increased unemployment. Both dimensions of the economic restructuring process 
limited the possibilities of the elites to make alliances among themselves and with other 
social sectors, in order to democratically construct new rules of the game that regulate 
the relations between the social and political actors.
From the above-mentioned perspective, the opening o f the Colombian economy 
to the international market, not only signified a profound reformulation o f the 
development model in effect until 1990, but a regime change as well, to the extent that 
the political agreements to maintain the prudence and gradualism on which management 
of the ISI-model economic policy had rested were broken. Prior to economic 
liberalization, the business sector had exerted a significant influence on the state 
institutions in charge of formulating economic policy. The state dispensed benefits to 
entrepreneurs and protected them from foreign competition and, in turn, the economic 
elites offered their unconditional support for the state action. The elites therefore
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established agreements to divide the markets and share the public resources that the state 
transferred to them through production subsidies and tax exemptions. Furthermore, 
control of the mass media, financing of election campaigns, and the permanent flow of 
leaders o f different business sectors to high government positions, especially to the 
institutions responsable for managing economic policy, enabled the entrepreneurial elite 
to design economic policy in accordance with their interests. However, as already 
mentioned, the low growth and investment rates, the growing pressure of international 
agencies, and the inevitable tendency of economic globalization, made continuity of the 
old economic model and the political agreements that sustained them, impossible.
To all of the above must be added the 1990 election of Cesar Gaviria, in 
circumstances of increased violence and anomie in the country, which gave his 
government great autonomy in relation to the economic and political elites. Gaviria and 
his economic team were convinced of the need for and the advisability o f opening and 
deregulating the nation's economy, as was being done or had been done by other Latin 
American governments, and the autonomy they enjoyed because of the circumstances 
mentioned, gave them a margin to maneuver to change the economic model, to isolate 
themselves from social and political pressures, and to assume the political cost it 
represented.
The decision to change economic policy also aggravated the institutional 
fragmentation of the state’s decision-making process. This fragmentation was manifest 
in the primacy of the technical instances such as those of the Ministry of Finance, the
212
National Planning Department, and the Bank of the Republic, and the subordination of 
other entities such as the Ministries of Development, Agriculture, Labor, and Foreign 
Trade, which, regardless of the political weight of those who headed them, should 
submit to the decisions adopted by the dominant decision-making institutions.
The change of economic model took the business sector by surprise, which was 
very fragmented, without a single instance of articulation or representation of their 
interests and, consequently, lacking the force needed to impose itself as interlocutor of 
the government. The entrepreneurial sectors played only a reactive role and did not have 
any long-term proposed goal, accustomed as they were to negotiating with the 
government, sector by sector, on the specific aspects of economic policy that affected 
each sector. Therefore, when, due to adoption of the new economic model, the rules of 
the game changed abruptly, the private sector’s associations to unite in the National 
Gremial Council, but did not manage to formulate general proposals and limited 
themselves to requesting a slowing-down of the liberalization and internationalization of 
the economy, an extention of the deadlines for the elimination of protective tariffs, and 
the continuity of production subsidies.
Furthermore, the new economic model produced a fragmentation of the country's 
entrepreneurial ruling class. Traditionally, it had been divided between the big business 
sector, represented by the National Association of Industrialists (ANDI), and the small 
and medium-sized business sector, represented by the Colombian Association of Small 
Industrialists, ACOPI. In the nineties, However, big business has become divided
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between the sector of the so called “big four economic conglomerates”, whose interests 
are linked to the internationalization of the economy, and the sector that represents 
national industry, which is being affected by the internationalization itself. This fact thus 
explains the distancing that has occurred in the past four years between the ANDI and 
the National Gremial Council, on the one hand, and the big four largest economic 
conglomerates on the other. This fragmentation is documented in Gabriel Misas' study 
on national industry (1994). He argues that the most outstanding characteristic of capital 
accumulation in Colombia in the past three decades has been the formation of large 
financial-economic groups and the accelerated growth of financial savings. These two 
phenomena show that the logic of accumulation has not focused on expanding 
manufacturing production, i.e., Those groups have dedicated themselves to acquiring the 
property of existing enterprises rather than to generating new real assets. Thus arose an 
entrepreneurial sector with large financial surpluses, situated in a position of control 
with respect to a great number of national enterprises and that benefits from a policy of 
economic opening and privatization of state functions, above all in realtion to the 
financial, telecommunications, electric energy, and exploration for and refining of oil.
All four groups, but especially the Bavaria Group, the Ardila Lulle Organization 
and the Luis Carlos Sarmiento Organization, have benefited from the economic opening 
policy since they have taken advantage of new conditions to make investments in 
Europe and the United States, especially in the brewery, soft drinks, and financial 
sectors. They have likewise benefited from the privatizing of state functions, especially
214
from the sale o f state banks and from liberalization of the telecommunications sector and 
TV transmission sector, which were highly controlled by the state until 1991.
Furthermore, as an analyst of the Colombian industrial sector has pointed out, the
main assets of these groups are concentrated in non-tradeable goods, i.e., those that
cannot be provided by external suppliers. For the Colombian case, goods like beer, soft
drinks, sugar, cement, and processed foods, behave as if they were non-tradeable goods,
and they constitute the main manufacturing production of the great groups mentioned
above. In relation to non-tradeable goods, such as textiles, these groups
had managed to articulate them selves favorably with the international 
market, and therefore the policies implemented have not affected them very 
unfavorably. In brief, the opening and its related policies could not negatively 
affect the enterprises that produced non-tradeable goods and, on the contrary, 
it offered them great possibilities o f  benefits (M isas, 1994: 186-187).
With respect to the industrial sector that acts on the basis of the national market, 
represented mainly by the ANDI and the National Gremial Council, one can say that it 
has been subordinated to the “four big” economic groups, strongly affected by the 
economic opening, since it was in no condition to compete on the international market, 
and has lost power in relation to the orientation of macroeconomic policy. A study by 
Luis Jorge Garay (1998) has shown that the productivity of the Colombian economy has 
fallen drastically and presently that, in comparative terms, it is suffering from a 
technological lag of twenty years, in which national production has concentrated on the 
internal market and has not taken advantage of the opportunities the economic opening 
has offered for it to become inserted into the world market. This fact would indicate that 
despite the supposedly prudent and intelligent handling of the economy on the part of
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the technocratic elite in decades prior to 1990, there was no accord or any clarity to 
orient the country's economic development.
Economic opening has also affected the agrarian sector, both that which produces 
for the internal as well as for the external market. The most dramatic case is that of the 
coffee sector, which represented 80% of the country's exports in the fifties and fell to 
simply 18% in the nineties (Misas, 1994: 188). Therefore, the drastic reduction in 
agricultural sector’s participation in generating foreign currency has simultaneously 
signified, for this sector as well, a considerable loss of power in the orientation of 
macroeconomic policy and at, the same time, this situation is affecting its capacity of 
political influence and social mobilization.
The above-mentioned division of the Colombian entrepreneurial elite, became 
evident in 1996, on the occasion of the crisis of the government of Ernesto Samper 
(1994-1998), due to accusations that his presidential campaign had received large sums 
of money from the drug-trafficking mafias. On January 22, 1996, Defense Minister 
Fernando Botero admitted in a television interview that President Samper did know 
about the entry of that funds into his campaign chest. The following day, given the 
evident destabilization, the political parties' inability to find solutions to the crisis, the 
polarization of society, Colombia's decertification by the United States, and the fear that 
the U.S. would impose economic sanctions on the country, the Nacional Gremial 
Council demanded the president's resignation. However, the four major entrepreneurial 
groups publicly expressed their disagreement with the Council's demand, supported the
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President, and applied pressure to produce a reconciliation between the two sides, as a 
result of which Samper was strengthened and was able to finish his mandate (Rettberg, 
2001). Thus, the four major economic conglomerates became a new factor of power in 
Colombia and showed that a fragmentation of the economic elites exists, in displacing 
the country's traditional economic-sector associations that, although they filled the 
vacuum left by the political parties, saw their power and leadership dimininished, due to 
the internal divisions, loss of affiliations and credibility, and the weakening produced by 
the model of liberalization and internationalization of the economy.
5.6.2. The Breakdown of Labor Agreements
Adoption of the neoliberal accumulation model has also implied breaking the 
agreements among the state, the entrepreneurs, and the working class, which had made 
it possible to develop a national market, and guaranteed workers minimal basic living 
conditions, rights and job stability, however precarious.
These labor guarantees and rights first developed in the mid-thirties, when liberal 
president Alfonso Lopez Pumarejo (1934-1938) assumed power with the support of the 
working class, to develop a project of political and economic modernization and 
industrialization of the country. Labor legislation arose, thus, in that period amidst of an 
environment of strong state intervention, protection for incipient national industy, 
formation of a national market, and constitution of citizens and consumers (Tirado, 
1989). Protection for workers, the right to a minimum wage and a maximum workday, 
and the regulation of collective labor relations by means of institutionalization of the
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right to union membership and the right to strike, were examples of the new attitude
assumed by the state, given the practically non-existence of salary relations in the
Colombian economy and the repressive treatment of labor conflicts on the part of
employers and governments at that time. As Archila affirms,
in those years workers' desires to construct an organization to have a 
presence in the public scenario, coincided with the liberal governments' 
intention o f  having an ally in its modernizing projects. With the 
institutionalization o f  the labor conflict, the working class obtained its 
citizenship papers. The type o f  identity constructed during those years 
referred basically to the imaginary horizons o f  the factory worker (1995:257- 
258).
Thanks to this labor legislation, workers, at least in the formal sector of the economy, 
achieved a series of rights and benefits such as overtime pay; extra charge night work; 
15 working-days paid vacation each year; a bonus of a half month's salary each 
semester; the right to severance pay, which consisted of one month's salary for each year 
of work, liquidated retroactively according to the worker's last salary, which was to be 
paid when the work contract finalized, or before, in case the worker required it to 
finance the purchase of a home or for higher education; employer's payment of 12% 
annual interest on the funds accumulated for workers' severance pay, entrepreneurs' 
contributions to the social policy system, distributed as follows: 12.3% of workers' 
salary for social security, 3% for the Family Welfare Institute, 4% for Family 
Compensation Funds, and 2% for the National Labor Training Service. Altogether, these 
benefits and contributions represent about 45% of the workers' basic salary. In 
enterprises where workers were organized in unions, these benefits increased and were 
broadened through additional benefits. Over time, and especially in the second half of 
the twentieth century, union action was directed to the defense of these rights and labor
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stability, especially in what refers to maintenance of indefinite term labor contracts, and 
retroactivity of severance pay, which, in the opinion of the entrepreneurs, rigidified both 
the legislation and the labor market.
Nonetheless, the dynamics of relations among the state, the entrepreneurs, and 
the workers began to be transformed in the eighties and, more clearly, at the beginning 
of the nineties. The globalization process, the effects of technological changes in 
production and the adoption of the new neoliberal accumulation model, required 
flexibilization of the labor market and labor relations, all of which affects stability in the 
work place, the systems of labor remuneration based on fixed social benefits, and 
allowances oriented toward workers' welfare, that tend to be replaced by labor relations 
schemes based on increases in work productivity.
The Gaviria government and the legislators at the beginning of the nineties 
responded to these new economic, productive, and labor conditions, with Law 50 of 
1990, which sought to flexibilize the labor market. This law eliminated retroactivity in 
calculating the amount of severance pay, flexibilized labor contracts, and introduced the 
possibility of paying an integral salary (with no social benefits or allowances) above a 
certain salary level (Arenas, 1991). Law 100 of 1990 modified the social security 
system to broaden its coverage, but also to privatize it and to introduce market 
mechanisms in the offer of retirement pensions and health services. The arguments of 
policy-makers at that time were based on the fact that the previous labor law was too 
rigid and prevented the flexibility firms needed to be able to respond to a more open and
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competitive economy, both in the domestic and the international spheres, and to the new 
technological conditions that required highly qualified workers. In synthesis, labor law, 
which had been an instrument of protection for worker, becomes a means of regulating 
the labor market based on the needs of the enterprises. At the present moment, amidst 
the country’s economic crisis, the government and the business sector have proposed an 
even greater flexibilization of labor legislation to permit payment of the minimum wage 
without social benefits, the elimination of overtime payments, and extra pay for night 
work, among other things. They have also proposed suppressing the so-called 
"parafiscal" contributions that weigh upon the payment of salaries, such as the 
percentages for the Family Welfare Institute and for the National Labor Training 
Service.
The result of all o f this is the loss of influence of the working class in general, 
and organized labor in particular, in national politics and economics, especially in what 
refers to the capacity to maintain its standard of life and employment stability. It is a 
lesser power in relation to the orientation of social policy, business administration, the 
labor environment and productive processes. Organized labor is no longer a valid 
interlocutor before the state and the the business sector.
The Unions and the large centralized labor organizations (the Unitary Central of 
Workers, CUT, and the General Confederation of Democratic Workers, CGTD) are not 
prepared nor have they acquired sufficient force to effectively oppose the above- 
mentioned restructuring processes and to offer viable alternatives. Although the level of
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union membership has traditionally been low in Colombia, the growing informalization 
of labor relations, the flexibilization of legislation and the labor market, the privatization 
of the state and the dismounting of social policies have aggravated this tendency even 
more. While in 1970 16% of the economically active population was unionized, the 
percentage fell to 8.24% in 1984, to 7.9% in 1990, and to 7.7% in 1994 (Archila, 1995). 
Despite this weakness, thel labor centrals unions and the strongest unions (those of state 
workers, teachers, and oil-industry workers) carried out 41 general strikes between 1997 
and 1999 in protest against the economic and social policy of the neoliberal governments 
(Cambio, August 30, 1999, p. 24). The strike carried out in 1999, involved not only 
workers but other social sectors as well, such as defaulted debtors in the housing 
financing system purchases, transporters, peasants, rice-growers, and bank employees, 
amongst others.
Nonetheless, these protests have not been strong enough to modify the 
government's economic and social policy, or to give workers and the popular sectors a 
better negotiating position in the neoliberal restructuring process. This has led workers 
and organized unions to seek direct political participation through party and 
parliamentary action. Thus, for the congressional and presidential elections of 2002, the 
organized workers' movement and other social sectors organized the “Social and 
Political Front”, whose presidential candidate was Luis Eduardo Garzon, the former 
leader and president of the CUT. With one year of its existence, that movment has had 
unprecedented success for the left, since its congressional candidate, former 
Constitutional Court Justice Carlos Gaviria, obtained one of the highest votes, and his
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presidential candidate, Luis Eduardo Garzon, has obtained the support of the main 
independent and leftist congressmen and voters. This will probably give the Social and 
Political Front more than a million votes in the presidential elections at the end of May 
2002. Although it is not possible for Luis Eduardo Garzon to presidential elections, his 
political movement is already taking shape as an important social-democratic force, with 
great possibilities of constituting an alternative to the neoliberalism that has 
predominated in the country throughout the nineties. This also contributes to eroding 
bipartisanship and to further democratizing Colombian political regime.
Chapter 6 
The Conflict between 
Project I and Project II:
Legitimacy versus Efficiency
In this final chapter, an analyis will be done of some of the main contradictions 
resulting from the two societal projects that were undertaken simultaneously in 
Colombia since the beginning of the nineties: the Political Constitution of 1991 and the 
process of neoliberal economic restructuring. These contradictions, as will be seen 
farther on, are associated with attempts to reduce public spending versus an increase in 
the size of the state (6.1), to the attempts to improve and legitimate political 
representation versus fragmentation of the political forces and the survival of old clientelist 
practices (6.2), to the attempts to strengthen and extend the markert as coordinator of 
social relations versus the social, economic, and political heterogeneity of Colombian
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society (6.3, 6,4 and 6.5), and to the disagreement between the two societal projects 
regarding the criteria for distributing social goods (6.6 and 6.7).
The evaluation of said reforms has polarized analysts, decision makers, and the 
social actors, which, in itself, is already first evidence of the degree of sharpening of the 
social fragmentation to which the reforms of the nineties had led. With respect to the 
Constitution of 91, chapter IV showed that opinion was divided three ways: in the first 
place, those that considered that the constitutional norms alone were unable to transform 
society (Gonzalez, 1993); secondly, those who considered that the Constitution fell short 
in its purpose of democratizing society and the political regime (Bejarano, 1994); and 
finally, those who considered that the Constitution increased the ungovernability of the 
political system (Alesina, Kluger y Rosenthal, 2000) or compromised the economic 
stability and functioning of the free market (Kalmanovitz, 2001; Clavijo, 2001).
With respect to economic restructuring, opinions became radicalized around two 
positions. On the one hand, there were those who considered that the internationalization 
and liberalization of the economy were based on adequate diagnoses and criteria, but the 
negative effects were due to the fact that this process was not carried out in the 
necessary depth, or with the necessary speed or skill (Echavarria, 2000). On the other 
hand, there are those who consider that the assumptions on which the economic 
liberalization policy is based are mistaken and have been the cause of the economic 
crisis that the country has suffered since the mid-nineties (Sarmiento, 1998 and 2000). 
Other positions (Gonzalez, 2001; Misas, 2001; Florez, 2001) considered that the cause
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of the problem was not to be found in liberalization or in economic opening as such, but 
in the way in which it was justified and the context in which it was implanted, which led 
to a very biased and partial consideration of the effects of industrialization for 
substitution of imports m odel, in order to provide evidence of the need to adopt an open 
market model. According to Gonzalez (2001), since adoption of the industrialization for 
substitution of imports model began, its success was believed to depend on the 
development o f an exporting dynamics that would permit the generation of foreign 
currency reserves needed to modernize national industry. Furthermore, as of 1968, with 
the program to promote exports and achieve Colombia's entry into the Andean Pact, it 
was considered that the local production of final and intermediate goods should be 
directed not only to the domestic market, but to the international market as well. 
Nonetheless, the country did not manage to increase its export capacity significantly, 
due to structural limitations, which is different from saying that the substitution of 
imports was synonimous of a closed and inefficient economy (Gonzalez, 2001: 402), as 
the Gaviria government would have us believe.
It is common practice to measure the success or failure of political, economic and 
social reforms by the degree to which they managed to advance in achieving the purpose 
and the rationality of their authors. Thus, for example, if the objective was to reduce the 
size of the state and it was not reduced, it is considered that this was due to the deficient 
or insufficient application of the measure in question. However, in this dissertation I 
assume a position that goes beyond said focus. As I pointed out in the chapter 
corresponding to the theoretical framework, the dynamics of the social processes surpass
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the intention of the actors, or go even farther beyond. It is the context of forces and
social structures in which action is inscribed that determines their destiny. The economic
reforms, such as the change of accumulation, or political models, such as the
Constitution of 1991, are based on postulates of rationality that are not necessarily
fulfilled in social reality. It is not possible to determine ahead of time the consequences
that a decision would unleash; as Herbert Simon has said,
in an important sense, all decision is a matter o f  compromise. The alternative 
that is finally selected never permits a complete or perfect achievem ent o f  
objectives, but is merely the best solution that is available under the 
circumstances. The environmental situation inevitably limits the alternatives 
that are available, and hence sets a maximum to the level o f  attainment o f  
purpose that is possible (1947: 6).
Individuals make decisions that may or may not be rational, but society, understood not
as the sum of the individuals but as the ensemble of individual interactions, generates
forces that wind up limiting the individual's field of action. As Marx said, “men make
their own history, but not of their own free will in circumstances they have chosen, but
in circumstances they encounter directly, that exist and are a legacy of the past”(1973:
408). From this perspective, decisions taken by actors who propelled the economic
liberalization policy found a limit in decisions taken by those who promoted the
Constitution of 1991 and vice versa. In turn, contexts of structural heterogeneity and
fragmentation that characterize Colombian society, and of globalization processes in
which it is inscribed, affected the course of both societal projects.
6.1 Reduction Versus Increased Public Spending
As has been established in previous chapters, one of the objectives of the neoliberal 
restructuring was to reduce the size of the state, whereas the objectives o f political
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restructuring was its strengthening and re-legitimization, increasing and improving the 
channels o f political representation and the party system, and increasing and improving 
guarantees of fundamental rights of citizens. The interaction of both processes produced 
an interesting result: the size of the state, measured in terms of public spending as a 
proportion of the GDP, increased from 20.4 % in the 1990 to 37.7 % in 2000 (table 1).
Table 1
Public Sector Spendig as Proportion of GDP
Y ear C en tra l
G o v ern m en t
Socia l S ecurity  
System
N ational D ecen tra lized  
S ec to r and  Public  
E nte rprises
R eg iona l and  L ocal 
G o v ern m en ts
T ota l
1990 5 .4 2.6 4.3 8.1 20 .4
1991 6 .4 2.7 4.5 8.1 21 .6
1992 7.5 2 .7 4 .8 8.1 23.1
1993 6 .6 3.3 5.7 8.8 24.3
1994 6 .6 3.9 6.0 9.5 26.1
1995 6.8 4 .7 6.9 9.7 28.1
1996 7.7 5.6 7.6 11.8 32.7
1997 8.2 6.1 7.3 12.4 34.1
1998 8.2 6.8 6.7 12.3 33.9
1999 8.9 7.7 5.8 14.2 36 .6
2000 10.7 6.5 6.9 13.6 37.7
(pr)
Source: D N P, C O N F IS , B a n co  de !a R epu b lica , C ord i (1998) 
Pr: p re lim in ar
One could think that the Colombian state's tendency to grow was due to 
insufficient or deficient application of neoliberal policies of privatization, deregulation,
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and reduction o f state functions and personnel. However, although that could be 
comparatively true18, this tendency is similar to that of practically all states throughout 
the world. In fact, neither the United Kindgom nor the United States could escape it 
during the governments of Margaret Thatcher (1979-1991) and Ronald Reagan (1980- 
1988), which were the governments that most attempted to reduce state intervention in 
their countries. In England, the public spending share of GDP rose from 31% from 
1961 to 1973 to 40% between 1981 and 1990. In the United States, said proportion rose 
from 29.5% to 34.9% in the same period (Institut Francaise des Relations 
Internationales, 1991: 401-407). Graph No. 2, taken from the World Bank (1997: 22), 
presented the worldwide tendency to increase the size of the state between 1960 and 
1994. As can be observed, this tendency held constant throughout the second half o f the 
twentieth century, for the developed as well as the developing countries. For the former, 
the public spending share of GDP rose from 25% between 1970 and 1974, to 37% 
between 1990 and 1994, which was precisely the period of most profound application of 
neoliberal policies. For the latter, the tendency is less pronounced but also on the 
increase, rising from 21% to 27% in the same periods. While the increase in public 
spending has been constant in developed countries, a slight decrease has been observed 
between 1990 and 1994 in developing countries, but there has been a clear tendency to 
increase during the 34 anos taken into consideration. In Latin America and the 
Caribbean, the tendency is similar to that of developing countries, but while for the
18 If the Economic Freedom of the World Index, o f the Fraser Institute is considered as an indicator of the 
degree o f economic liberalization, which is measured on a scale ofO a 10, Colombia has a ranking o f 92, 
with an index o f 5.6 , below Chile's ranking o f  15 and index of 7.5, Argentina's ranking of 30 and index 
of 7.2, Peru’s ranking of 45 and index de 6.9, Bolivia's ranking o f 51 and index o f 6.7, and Venezuela's 
and Brazil's ranking of 82 and index of 5.8 (Fraser Institute, 2002).
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latter, considered altogether, the size o f the state has increased by 27% between 1990 
and 1994, for the Latin American region that increase has been a slightly lower 23% in 
the same period.
Graph 1 
Central Government Spending 
by World Regions (% GDP)
01960-64
01970-74
□  1980-84
□  1990-94
Source: World Bank (1997: 22)
Three conclusions can be reached from analysis of the above figures: in the first place, 
developed countries, despite the fact that they had adopted neoliberal policies to reduce 
the size of the state, have not been able to limit growth of public spending nor to 
dismount the welfare state. Secondly, in Latin America and the Caribbean there has been 
a relatively greater tendency to reduce the size o f the state in comparison with other 
regions of the Third World. In contrast, southeast Asia, which has achieved greater
2 2 8
economic and technological development in comparison with the rest of the Third 
World, has not shown any tendency to reduce the size of the state. Thirdly, 
multinational finance agencies, in order to achieve a global market economy, have 
pressured Third World countries to reduce the size of their public sector, a policy that 
has not yet functioned in the developed capitalist countries.
More than the insufficient application of free market policy, the explanation of
the fact that throughout most o f the world, neoliberal governments have increased public
spending more than during previous governments o f Keynesian orientation, is rooted in
the contradiction between political legitimacy and economic efficiency. In fact,
legitimacy and efficiency are the most important factors of state activity (O'Connor,
1973; Offe, 1993) and determine the state's capacity to integrate society and distribute its
resources. This contradiction is rooted in the fact that the state has to try to
simultaneously fulfill
the conditions in w hich profitable accumulation is possible [and] to maintain 
or create the conditions for social harmony. A  capitalist state that openly  
uses its coercive forces to help one class accumulate capital at the expense o f  
other classes lo ses its legitim acy and hence undermines the basis o f  its 
loyalty and support. But a state that ignores the need to assist the process o f  
capital accumulation runs the risk o f  drying up the sources o f  its ow n power, 
the econom y's surplus production capacity, and the taxes drawn from it for 
this surplus. (. . .) B ecause o f  the dual and contradictory character o f  the 
capitalist state, nearly every state agency is involved in the accumulation and 
legitim ization functions, and nearly every state expenditure has this tw ofold  
character” (O'Connor, 1973: 6 and 7).
Much government spending has a positive effect on the process of capital accumulation, 
in reference to reducing the cost of labor and increasing the productivity of capital in 
general. In relation to the former, the state socializes costs that, in absence o f a social
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policy, would have to be assumed directly by entrepreneurs, such as medical attention, 
labor training, social security etc. In relation to the latter, state spending on education, 
research and development; energy, transport and telecommunications infrastructure, and 
the search for markets and investment opportunities contribute to reducing the 
investment costs for private investors and to increasing the productivity of the economy 
as a whole. Therefore, it is incorrect to think that this activity of the state, although it be 
only indirectly productive, is onerous for the economy as a whole. These functions 
explain the impossibility o f drastically reducing public spending, together with the fact 
that the provision o f collective services by the state is institutionalized and converted 
into citizen's rights, which, in turn, influences their perception and acceptance of the 
social order. Therefore, the suppression o f state spending and services has a high social 
cost in terms of the erosion of legitimacy of the state.
Given that the costs of production are socialized and social needs increase, while 
the funds needed to finance them are private (rate of profit, income, salary, etc.), the 
need for political representation arises: “No taxation without representation” was the 
slogan that fostered parliamentary government in the western world. Therefore, the 
principle of public representation is fundamental for the legitimacy o f the state's 
extraction o f resources needed for fulfillment of the public functions o f contribution to 
the accumulation o f capital and production of a legitimate social order. Thus the 
demand for quality and effectiveness of the function of political representation.
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In the Colombian case, the contradiction between legitimacy and effectiveness is 
the result o f three factors. In the first place, the interaction between the political and 
economic elements o f restructuring the state; i.e., of the contradiction between a new 
constitutional order that demands “more state” as a condition for overcoming the crisis of 
legitimacy o f the state and integration o f society, and a new model of economic 
development that requires “less state” in order to permit the free allocation of social 
resources by the market. In the second place, of the contradiction between the deficient 
quality of the function of political representation and the neoliberal demands for effective 
and transparent institutions. And in the third place, of the contradiction between a state that 
does not effectively guarantee the political and socioeconomic rights of its citizens and an 
exclusionary economic system, on the one hand, and a government that needs to reduce 
public spending and deregulate the market on the other. While the Gaviria administration 
(1990-1994) privatized state enterprises and attempted to reduce public spending, the new 
constitution increased the number of institutions and turned equity, distribution, and 
democracy into the cornerstone of the new political and economic order.
The neoliberal objective of reducing public spending was affected by the great 
importance attributed by the Constitutional Assembly to the policy of strengthening the 
state, broadening democracy and achieving equity by means of a policy of increasing and 
descentralizing public spending, especially in education and health. Due to the demands of 
the Constitution of 1991, the participation of social spending in GDP increased from 8% in 
1990 to 15% in 1997 (World Bank, 2002: 68 ).
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But despite the efforts of the Constitutional Assembly o f 1991 to strengthen the 
state and increase its legitimacy, which was translated into increased public spending, 
among other things, the Colombian state is still very weak in its function of providing 
cohesion for society, integrating the territory and providing security and justice for its 
citizens. The problem does not derive solely from the possible deficiencies of the 
Constitution of 1991, but rather, as already mentioned in previous chapters, from the 
incapacity of the political and economic elite to conceive and undertake a project of social 
integration, colonization, and socioeconomic development of the national territory as a 
whole, and from the fragmentation o f power resulting from the different fractions of the 
dominant class to constitute a hegemony. The reason for this, as already mentioned, is the 
strong tradition o f autonomous regional powers which, from the beginning of independent 
political life at the start of the nineteenth century, produced a rejection of any attempt to 
impose a central hegemony or strong national power. Over the years, this trait of 
Colombian politics became one of the pillars of the political regime and one of the principal 
causes of the weakness of the state.
6.2 Political Representation Improvement Versus Political Forces Fragmentation
Political exclusion, the deficient quality o f the legislative function, corruption and the 
clientelism of the Colombian congress, have affected not only the legitimacy of the state 
itself but the functioning o f the Colombian economy as well. According to institutional 
economic theory (North, 1990), the market economy functions due to formal and informal 
institutions, which reduce the uncertainty and the costs of information and transaction. 
The institutions orient and regulate the behavior of the agents, establish property rights,
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facilitate contracting, offer information on prices and, in general, create a social 
environment that can favorably or unfavorably influence economic development. The most 
important of formal institutions is the law. Thus the parliament and its legislative activity 
are essential in the constitution of a market economy.
For the above reasons, the Constitutional Assembly of 1991 sought to legitimize and 
improve the channels of political representation but, paradoxically, the result was the 
sharpening of the fragmentation of the system of parties and representation, and an increase 
in the ungovernability of the Colombian political system. As mentioned in Chapter IV, the 
Constitutional Assembly of 1991 was based on a diagnosis, according to which the 
restrictions of the system of representation and the negative effects of the long 
predominance of bipartisanship, had led to the exclusion of other political and social forces, 
and stimulated the formation of subversive political organizations. Therefore, the 
Constitutional Assembly proposed opening the system of representation to the political 
forces excluded by the bipartisan agreement.
Although the purpose of eradicating the liberal and conservative hegemony, and of 
incorporating new social and political forces into the state's system of representation was 
positive, this was done not only by means of the establishment of spaces for the 
participation ethnic and political minorities, but also through the establishment of a lax 
normativity to permit the founding of political parties and movements, and much greater 
opportunity to postulate candidates for elections. Due to that constitutional norms and their 
legal developments (Political Constitution, articles 103, 107-108; law 130 of 1994), the
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number of political parties increased from 8 in 1990 to 80 in 1998, and that of political 
movements rose to 64. Likewise, between 1986 and 1998 the number of lists inscribed for 
Senatorial and Congressional elections rose from 202 and 330 to 319 and 692 respectively 
(Pizarro, 2001: 102). The result has been an atomization of the political forces and a 
consequent increase of fragmentation of the political system, since the aggregation of 
interests, the formation of significant majorities and minorities, and the formation of solid 
political support for the government, or a solid opposition, is impossible. In the 
parliamentary sphere and in the Colombian political process in general, the traditional and 
third forces are not an instrument of aggregation of collective demands and interests today, 
but an instrument of de-aggregation of social interests. No party, force or political 
movement represents a social sector, a classs, or a significant class fraction in Colombia 
today. The fragmentation of political forces is such that for the congressional elections of 
1998 there were 222 lists that did not obtain a single seat, despite the fact that they obtained 
a total of 2,540,000 votes altogether (Pizarro, 2001: 103). This fragmentation even works 
against the objective of obtaining a more effective and profound democracy, since it does 
not favor third forces that have arisen as alternatives to bipartisanship, given that they have 
been divided into a diversity of small, weak parties and movements of the most diverse 
political, religious, ethnic and regional nature.
6.3 Implementation of Neoliberal Economic Model 
Versus its Unintended Consequences
As mentioned in Chapter 5, from the beginning of the nineties Colombia has adopted a
series of measures to introduce the free market model. They include the following: a)
commercial opening and internationalization of the economy, b) elimination of currency
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ex ch a n g e  con tro l, c ) flex ib iliza tio n  o f  the labor m arket, d) adoption  o f  indirect and 
reg ress iv e  taxation  that is d isp lacin g  p rogressive  taxation , e) privatization  o f  so m e  
public enterprises, e sp ec ia lly  in the area o f  te lecom m u n ica tion s, f) p o litica l, 
ad m in istrative, and fisca l d ecen tra lization , for w h ich  a great num ber o f  financial 
fu n ction s and resou rces o f  the central govern m en t w ere transferred to the m u n ic ip a lities, 
and g ) the p o lic y  o f  red u cin g  the fisca l d e fic it in order to d im in ish  the “ s iz e  o f  the state .” 
T h e p u rp ose  o f  sa id  reform s w as to increase the com p etitiven ess o f  national production, 
accelerated  eco n o m ic  grow th, and greater eco n o m ic  and social w ell-b e in g  for the 
population. N everth e less , e lev e n  years after its adoption, the neoliberal eco n o m ic  m odel 
has not m anaged  to im prove the country's d evelop m ent conditions as a w h o le . T o the 
contrary, the grow th o f  the econ om y has fa llen  annually over the past six  years, 
cu lm inating in 1999 w ith  a n egative rate o f  4.2% .
Graph 2
The Fall of the Economic Growth Rate (%)
Source: B anco de la R epublica - DNP
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According to the logic of the neoliberal model, commercial and financial liberalization 
should be accompanied by a decrease or at least a stabilization of real salaries and a severe 
reduction of spending, in order to generate surpluses for foreign trade. However, as will be 
shown now, the Colombian economy was opened up to the world market at the same time 
that both public and private spending as well as real salaries increased. The increase in 
public spending, as already mentioned, is associated with the provisions of the Constitution 
of 1991, to the extent that it created new state institutions, increased social spending, and 
established new socioeconomic rights for citizens. Public spending also increased due to 
the servicing o f the foreign debt, as will be seen below, above all since 1995.
Liberalization o f foreign trade was significant in Colombia, since the average 
tariff descended from 33.4% in 1980 to 11.8% in 2000 and imports subject to the 
restriction of quotas went from 73.8% in 1992 to 1.7% in 1998 (Echavarria, 2001: 64). 
These figures are similar to those for other Latin American and Asian countries in the 
same period (Fraser Institute, 2002).
But the liberalization of foreign trade is done not only to increase imports but 
also to increase the exports that would generate the growth o f the economy. This did not 
occur, however, since at the start of the opening, in 1993, imports grew 48% while 
exports grew 3% (Misas, 2001: 116) and during the entire decade of the nineties, exports 
grew at an annual pace of 30% while exports grew at 13% annually. But although 
Colombian exports have grown and diversified, 66.4 % of them still consisted of
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agricultural and mining products (Sarmiento 2000: 53). The result has been a loss of 
economic dynamics, which led to a severe recession in the second half of the nineties. 
According to economic analysts, this lack of dynamics was also due to the contradiction 
between commercial and currency exchange liberalization, and the type of goods that 
Colombian industry produces.
Graph 3
Average annual Growth Rate of Exports
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Source: B anco  d e  la R epub lica , D N P, E C LA C
In relation to the goods produced by Colombian industry, it is necessary to say 
that the economic restructuring was done on the basis of the the idea that opening up to 
foreign competition would oblige domestic producers to adopt new technologies and to 
produce with the current standards in force in the international economy. This conduct 
was supposed to correspond to the rationality of the actors, since to act otherwise would 
imply losing competitiveness in the world market. But in this aspect, the decision 
makers failed in not taking account of the specific context in which the free market
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model was implanted: in Colombia, around 50% of all industrial goods are non-tradeable
or behave as such (Misas, 1994). Non-tradeable are goods or services that cannot be
replaced or substituted by external suppliers, for which reason the incidence of external
competition is minimum or nil; therefore the commercial liberalization did not produce
the expected results in Colombia. On the contrary, the production o f tradeable goods
were negatively affected by both external competition and the revaluation of the
Colombian peso, which was the cause of the fact that these products could not compete
with those coming from abroad. The profitability rates of the production of tradeable
goods were reduced significantly
giving place, on the one hand, to a great migration o f  capital from the 
tradeable goods sector to that o f  non-tradeable goods and, on the other hand, 
to the fact that firms that produced tradeable goods stopped producing part o f  
them and began importing them, taking advantage o f  their knowledge o f  the 
market and the distribution networks they had (M isas, 2001: 117).
Therefore, in practice, the neoliberal model degenerated into a “de-industrialization” of 
the Colombian economy, since industry's participation in the GDP fell from 23% in 
1985 to 18% in 1995 (Florez, 2001b: 163).
The Constitution of 1991 was based on a supposed autonomy of the state in the 
management of monetary and fiscal policy. But at the same time, Gaviria's economic team 
opened the capital account and liberated both foreign trade and the currency exchange rate, 
which implied a reduction of the autonomy of the state in the management of these policies, 
since the latter began to depend on external factors. To carry out these two openings 
simultaneously is considered a mistake by diverse analysts (Edwars, 1998; Misas, 2001). 
In the Colombian case, it generated two negative effects: in the first place, the greater pace
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of the growth of imports as compared to exports led to a large deficit in the trade balance. 
In the second place, the opening of the capital account increased the entry of capital, largely 
of illicit origin, into the country. Because of this, the international reserves grew by 68% 
between 1991 and 1992 (Misas, 2001). All of the above led to the fact that between 1990 
and 1998 the Colombian peso would suffer a revaluation of around 20%, in real terms. 
This revaluation also contributed to increasing imports, lowering the growth rate of exports, 
and orienting investment toward the non-transable goods sector. All of the above, together 
with the increased fiscal deficit that reached 5% in 1999, forced the Bank of the Republic to 
adopt a financial restriction policy, which led to the present economic recession. The 
interest rates were raised to try to slow down the flow of capital but this, too, produced the 
opposite effect. In turn, the increased capital flow produced an expansion of credit, with 
the consequent inflationary pressure, which obliged the monetary authorities to change 
their policy as of 1994. In the second half of the nineties, the recession and the crisis of the 
private sector exploded, due to the indebtedness produced in the first half of the decade. 
Thus, the opening of trade and of the capital account required state capacity to generate a 
fiscal superavit in order to avoid inflationary pressures and the flight of capital, a capacity 
that the Colombian state simply did not have. As far as the Gaviria government is 
concerned, it underestimated the effects of the fiscal imbalance, due to its confidence in the 
abundance of recourses that would result from the exportation of the country's large oil 
reserves. Supposedly, these resources would make it possible to balance both the 
commercial and the fiscal deficits, but it eventually became known that these reserves were 
not as large as they had been believed to be and the resources never arrived ( Misas, 2001: 
118).
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According to the postulates of the neoliberal model, as has been mentioned, 
commercial liberalization and internationalization of the economy are incompatible with 
increases in real salary. In this field there was also a contradiction between the Constitution 
of 1991 and economic restructuring, since the increase of state institutions, together with 
revaluation of the exchange rate and the increased demand for skilled labor, required by an 
economy that experienced a certain degree of technological development, although slight, 
induced an increase in salaries in Colombia. Between 1990 and 1998, real salaries in the 
public sector grew 50% (partly due to Constitutional Court decisions, as will be seen 
further on), and those of the industrial sector grew 44% for employees and 13% for 
workers (Echavama, 2001: 170). One of the manifestations of the economic crisis is the 
high rate of unemployment which rose from 10.6% in 1991 to 20.5% in 2000. For some 
analysts, the lack of flexibility of the labor market and the increased real salaries have been 
the causes of unemployment (Echavarria, 2001: 72). Other analysts, argue that 
employment has increased in commerce and services, sectors that form part of the non- 
transable goods group, whereas in industry, mining and agriculture it has diminished and, 
therefore, the cause of unemployment must be sought not in real salaries but in reduced 
demand (Gonzalez 2000).
In synthesis, in decision making regarding liberalization of the economy, the 
magnitude of the influx of foreigh capital that would enter the country was not taken into 
account. This effect was foreseeable, given the highly speculative nature of the Colombian 
economy and the significant weight ot the illegal activities that link the economy to illegal
240
international activities. Given these circumstances, the commercial opening should have 
been done first and the capital account opening later, in order to avoid phenomena like 
revaluation, speculation and indebtedness. However, external forces did not leave any 
margin to manoever and, instead, simultaneously implanted all the points of the 
“Washington Consensus”; the particular context in which they would be put in place was 
ignored, and this produced “unintended consequences.”
6.4 The Neoliberal Model Versus Economic and Social Heterogeneity
The neoliberal model has resulted in a notable increase of social inequality and in the 
sharpening of enormous differences in the population's access to the market. This clearly 
shows that the contradiction between the two societal projects underway in Colombia since 
the beginning of the nineties: while the Constitution of 1991 tried to democratize society 
politically and socially, the neoliberal model excluded ample sectors of the population from 
the benefits of economic development.
The neoliberal reforms seriously affected the distributive function of the state 
which, in turn, affected its capacity to reconcile the interests of the different social actors. 
This situation gave rise to a distributive conflict and growing polarization of society. This 
is very serious if one considers the fact that Colombia has been a characterized by highly 
concentrated income. Recent data show that this tendency has sharpened with the 
introduction of the neoliberal economic model, since the Gini inequality coefficient rose 
from 0.467 en 1988 to 0.510 in 1997 (graph 4). In fact, in the early eighties, considered 
by economic analysts to be the era of greatest equity, the 20% richest portion of the
2 4!
population received 49% of the national income, while the poorest 20% received 6.6%; 
whereas in 1996 the richest 20% of the population received 54% of the income, while the 
poorest 20% obtained only 6% (Fedesarrollo/Ser,1997: 42).
G raph  4
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From the viewpoint of income, the economic reforms of the nineties signified 
decreased pay for labor and a broadening of the breach between skilled and unskilled 
workers' salaries, this being one of the main causes of the deterioration in income 
distribution (Nunez y Sanchez, 1998). The unemployment rate rose from 8.7% in 1995 to 
20% in 2001. If the fact that subemployment has increased by 23% in the past decade is 
added to this, it can be said that 43% of the Colombian population is either unemployed or 
underemployed (Sarmiento Palacio, 2000a).
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The poverty level increased from 60% in 1995 to 64% in 1999 (World Bank, 2002). 
If  one considers that poverty had been decreasing from 80% in 1978 to 65% in 1988 and to 
60% in 1995, it can be said that in the last six years there has been a worsening of the living 
conditions of more than half the Colombian population, caused by the economic structural 
adjustments and, specifically, by the recession that has existed since 1996, induced by 
those adjustments, despite the fact that they sought to improve the growth conditions of 
the economy and the well-being of the population. Despite the increased poverty, the 
central government's spending on programs to assist the poorest sectors, remained 
around 1% during the nineties and decreased to less than 0.7% in 2000 (World Bank, 
2002: 10). According to the World Bank, this is an extremely low level of spending if 
one compares it with that o f other countries in a similar stage of development, such as 
Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela, and with the needs of specifically vulnerable 
groups that do not have access to key social-aid programs (Ibidem). In these 
circumstances, the World Bank considers that for Colombia to decrease its poverty to the 
level o f 1995, the economy should grow to at a rate of at least 4%, as the minimum goal 
for the year 2010 (Ibidem). However, it is not likely that the Colombian economy will 
reach that level of growth. After the negative growth rate (- 4.2%) of 1999, the GDP 
growth rate has been less than the population growth rate, since it was 1.5 % in 2001, 
and a growth rate o f less than 2% is foreseen for 2002 (Fedesarrollo, 2002)
The above figures make it possible to conclude that the neoliberal reforms do not 
confirm the neoclassic economic postulate, according to which free competition in the
243
market leads to neutral solutionss with respect to equity; “on the contrary, the greatest 
effects against income distribution occurs in the section with the greatest differences in 
participants' possibilities [in the market]” (Sarmiento Palacios, 2000: 329). This indicates 
that if the state wanted to increase its legitimacy it would have to implement a sound policy 
to redistribute income. However, the margin for manoever is very small. With diminished 
resources, the state has less capacity to respond to social pressures. In the present 
circumstances, there are three reasons why it has been difficult for the country to carry out 
an income distribution policy. In the first place, Colombia has a low imcome tax-paying 
rate. This is partly due to the fact that since the end of the eighties, as an effect of adoption 
of the neoliberal model, an indirect and regressive taxation has been introduced (taxing 
consumption rather than income) which represented 62% of all state revenue in 2002. In 
the earl of 1970s the progressive or direct taxation (income tax) represented 51% of total 
revenues. (Garay, 2002: 686). This generated inequitable effects in the distribution of 
income, since it concentrates tax payment on the whole population and not on the highest 
income sectors. In the second place, the economic crisis makes it difficult for the state to 
obtain resources through a tax reform, in order to direct them toward social investment, 
since the business sector is in no condition to pay more taxes. Furthermore, the armed 
conflict not only obliges the national government to seek new resources, but to channel part 
of the already existing ones to security and defense. In fact, spending on defense and 
security, as a proportion of the national government's spending, has increased from 10% in 
1985 to 12% en 1995; and the intensification of the conflict due to the breakdown of peace 
negotiations between guerrilla groups and the Pastrana government (1998-2002), made it 
possible to foresee that this increase would accelerate in the coming years until it reached
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15%. One of the priorities of the Uribe government (2002-2006) is to convince the 
members of congress and the business sector of the need to approve and subscribe the so- 
called “war bonds” that are to provide additional resources to combat subversion. In the 
third place, an income redistribution policy would require a coalition of progressive 
political forces to support and promote it. However, the formation of this coalition is not 
possible in the present situation in Colombia. On the one hand, the exacerbation of the 
armed conflict has contributed to creating a more conservative and authoritarian climate, 
prone to trying to solve things by the use of force, that does not favor mobilizations of 
social sectors in favor of vindicating socioeconomic rights. Social movements and the labor 
movement have been victims of the violence of different armed actors. On the other hand, 
the progressive forces are a minority in the Congress and, as shown above, they are very 
fragmented, which makess the formation of coalitions difficult. Furthermore, the Congress 
as a whole will concentrate its attention, in the next two years at least, on two of the main 
policies of the new government of President Alvaro Uribe: the search for new taxes to 
increase resources in order to deal with the armed actors, and reform of the political system, 
which includes, among other things, the elimination of one chamber of congress and the 
possible revocation of the mandate of the current members of congress, which does not 
generate a propitious environment for discussing great social reforms in the quest for 
equity.
In synthesis, in the late nineties, the neoliberal model presented adverse results: a 
slow-down in economic growth, crisis of the productive sector, massive unemployment, 
increased economic informality, and increased social inequality. The economic benefits
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and the market opportunities remain concentrated in the high income sector of the 
population. This reduces the possibilities of increasing demand and, therefore, the 
possibility of generating a positive effect in terms of growth and production. Instead of 
increasing access to the market and income, the neoliberal adjustment has increased the 
requirements and makes access more difficult for the majority of the population. This 
results in the exclusion or the unstable insertion of the population in the economic 
process and the impossibility of achieving sustained growth based on productivity, 
technological innovation, and better employment of the country's human resources. But, 
instead of greater productivity, innovation and equity, new spaces arose for speculation 
and commercial and financial intermediation, patrimonial ist appropriation of social 
benefits, and opportunism and clientelism in contracts in both the public and the private 
sectors.
This is not an attempt to sustain a reductionist thesis that blames neoiberalism for 
all of the country's problems. As has been shown throughout this dissertation, the 
change of constitutional norms, the weakness of the state, the armed conflict, the drug 
trafficking, the heterogeneity and the fragmentation of Colombian society have also 
been factors in the political and social crisis. Nonetheless, what is underscored here are 
the unintended consequences of the application of neoliberal measures in a context of 
heterogeneity and fragmentation. From this perspective, the problem has not been 
caused only by the economic model per se, but also by its incapacity to modify the 
conditions of heterogeneity and assymetry existing in Colombia's society, market, and 
productive structure, at the time of its adoption. Given the lack of structural correctives,
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the neoliberal adjustment induced a type o f development that contributed to making the 
country's political, economic, and social conditions even more heterogeneous. 
Therefore, the decision makers failed in applying the neoliberal model since they 
basically and implicitly assumed that Colombia's society and economy were 
homogeneous and structurally symmetrical. This supposition o f homogeneity led the 
policy makers to adopt policies based on the principle o f neutrality regarding the 
divergent conditions of the agents who participate in the market.
Instead of opting for a selective and gradual insertion o f the Colombian economy 
into the global economy, that would prepare national production to face external 
competition, the Gaviria government (1990-1994) opted for an internationalization of 
the economy that opened the domestic market to foreign products, with the consequent 
negative effect on domestic capital and labor. The multinational companies introduced 
their intermediate components and products into the country for them to be assembled in 
the national market. In fact, as shown in Table No.2, the average annual growth of 
direct foreign investment (DFI) in Colombia increased from 12% in the 1990-1994 
period to 27% in the 1995-1996 period (Fedesarrollo, 1998: 145).
Table 2
Average Annual Growth of Direct Foreign Investment 
in Colombia (%)
Year 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995 1996
Total DFI 10.5 12.8 13.8 12.1 23.3 26.9
US DFI 12.1 14.3 20.2 8.3 12,6 9.5
Source: Fedesarrollo (1998)
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The consequence o f this opening was, as already mentioned, that imports 
increased and exports did not increase, due to the fact that Colombia has certain 
comparative advantages in the production of goods for which there is no demand in the 
world market (Misas, 2001), a fact that contributed to generating the economic 
recession. In the Samper government (1994-1998), the manifestations o f the crisis were 
already notorious: growing deficit in the current balance of payments account, 
revaluation of the peso, high interest rates, increased foreign debt, etc. But although said 
government recognized the gravity o f the problem (Presidency o f the Republic-DNP, 
1994 and 1995), it did not take the necessary measures to correct the structural 
imbalances, because it did not have either the necessary legitimacy or the margin needed 
to manoever, due to the crisis generated by accusations that the Samper campaign had 
received large amounts o f money from the drug lords, and the great political, social, and 
international pressures the President had to face as a result. During the Pastrana 
government (1998-2002), efforts were concentrated on trying to reduce unemployment, 
but above all, on developing the agreements reached with the International Monetary 
Fund regarding reduction of the fiscal deficit, reform of the pension and retirement 
system, and reduction o f tranfers of fiscal resources from the central government to 
departmental and municipal governments. However, the only area in which the Pastrana 
administration had any success was in achieving the last of these reforms, as will be 
shown below.
In these conditions of indiscriminate opening, the industrial sectors that had 
traditionally been the leaders of national production such as textiles, clothing, leather,
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and certain capital goods, had clearly come to a standstill, and even entered into a 
retrocession due to their technological backwardness, their inability to compete in the 
international market, and their displacement from the domestic market by foreign 
products. The difference between exports and imports was financed with foreign credit 
obtained at interest rates o f over 10%. At the end of the nineties, the economic situation 
worsened because, in addition to the foreign trade imbalance, the interest payments on 
the foreign debt amounted to 6.5% of the GDP in 1998 (Sarmiento, 2000a: 53). As 
Sarmiento has pointed out, the neoliberal economic model led to results that were the 
opposite o f the goals it pursued, since it implied
a large balance o f  payments deficit financed with foreign credit at interest 
rates higher than the econom ic growth rate, w hich provoked growing 
indebtedness. A t present, it amounts to 50% o f  the GPD and, as in 
Argentina, it has reduced the country's access to international markets (El 
Espectador, June 2, 2002: 13A).
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Graph 5
Colombian Foreign Debt (%)
T he internal p u b lic  debt a lso  increased  as an e ffec t o f  n eo lib era l p o lic ie s , 
e sp e c ia lly  as an e ffe c t  o f  th e m on etarist em p h asis o f  th is eco n o m ic  m o d el. D uring the 
n in eties , th e  B an k  o f  the R ep u b lic  g a v e  priority to red ucing  the am ount o f  m o n ey  in  
circu lation  in  order to d ecrease  in flation . T he em iss io n  o f  internal debt b on d s w a s the 
m ech an ism  the bank u sed  for that purpose. T o the ex ten t that the b alan ce o w in g  on  the 
internal deb t in creased , the interest increased  as w ell. T herefore, the resources obtained  
from  later e m iss io n s  o f  b on d s to take m on ey  out o f  circu lation  had to be u sed  to  p ay the 
interest on  earlier e m iss io n s , to the point that by the m id -n in eties, c lo se  to 96%  o f  the 
value o f  the n e w  em iss io n s  w en t to  serv ic in g  the debt (C ontraloria G eneral de la  
R ep u b lica , 199 6 ). T h u s the govern m en t w as not g o in g  into debt to in vest in w orks o f
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infrastructure, foment productive activities or pay public employees, but to respond for 
previous debts that were largely originated by a monetary policy o f a contractionist type. 
In addition to the high fiscal cost, the internal debt also had a negative impact on 
economic activity because it stimulated financial speculation. This was due to the fact 
that the General Treasury of the Nation and the Bank of the Republic competed with the 
financial sector for private savings, and in doing so, they contributed to increasing 
interest rates. The rise in the internal interest rate led many entrepreneurs to go into debt 
abroad. Throughout the nineties, private external debt grew from US$2,000 million to 
US$16,000 million. This is a very grave situation because private enterprises contracted 
this debt when the dollar was worth $1,000 Colombian pesos and now they must pay it 
with the dollar values at closer to $3,000 pesos. In synthesis, this management of the 
internal public debt produced three negative consequences: a) it increased the fiscal 
deficit, a problem aggravated by the fact that the resources obtained had not served to 
increase public investment; b) it stimulated the speculative tendency of the economy; 
and c) it stimulated the external indebtedness of the business sector.
6.5 Strengthening of Social Hybridation Social
All o f the above factors have reinforced the political, economic, and social 
amalgamation of rationalities and both traditional and modern patterns of legal and 
illegal behavior that characterized Colombian society throughout the past decade. 
Traditional patterns refer to the existence of privileges, clientelism and patrimonialism 
in economic activities, in both the public and the private sector. Modern patterns refer to 
the limited conditions of competition in the market and of technological innovation, and
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to the displacement o f unskilled labor by skilled labor. The illegal patterns refer to the 
presence of illegal funds in Colombian economic and social activities, and to their 
erosive effect on the productive culture and Colombians' relation to the law and the 
public sphere. Thus, instead of becoming democratized, the economic process remains 
in the hands of those who are in condition to benefit from the assymetries and the 
economic and social heterogeneity, i.e., in the hands of the four major national economic 
groups, multinational enterprises, and the illegal economy. In fact, in the previous 
chapter it was shown that one of the characteristics of Colombian industry in the nineties 
was the formation of four large economic conglomerates (the Bavaria, Ardilla Lulle, 
Aval and Sindicato Antioqueno entrepreneurial groups), which currently control the 295 
largest firms in the country, a fact that allows them to obtain annual profits that represent 
a little more that 2% o f the GDP. This control permitted these conglomerates to place 
themselves in conditions to make strategic alliances with transnational capital and 
enterprises (Misas 2001:128).
Another characteristic of the Colombian economy over the past twenty years, has 
been the growth of the illegal economy (Thoumi, 1994: 98) and, given its clandestine 
nature, it has been very difficult to calculate its size and economic impact. The few 
available studies have calculated that the illegal economy represented 8.7% in 1985 
(Ibidem). However, it is possible to think that illegal activities in the Colombian 
economy have increased in the nineties due to the liberation of trade and foreign 
currency exchange. The situation described above has been clearly described by Luis 
Jorge Garay, who affirms that
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in Colom bia, the prevailing productive culture does not correspond to a true 
capitalist culture, but rather a culture that has inclined to a certain extent to 
the search for profit and the satisfaction o f  selfish exclusionary objectives in 
favor o f  certain groups, achieved by means o f  the use o f  individual privileges 
related to their position in the country's political, econom ic and social 
structure. Even more, this culture manifests typically rent-seeking traits; i.e., 
practices through which the dominant groups privilege their obtention o f  
profits as a result o f  their position in the social structure rather than as the 
fruit o f  work, savings, investment, innovation and risk (1999:24).
For this reason, in order to overcome the rent-seeking nature of the economy and its
harmful effects in Colombian society, it is necessary acclimatizing an entrepreneurial
culture that will make it possible to advance toward modernization and efficiency of the
productive apparatus so as to generate true social wealth and to set the bases for
economic growth accompanied by distributive justice. This will require, as a group of
Colombian scholars led by Garay asserted recently, Colombian entrepreneurs and all
agents involved in the productive process to assume
greater responsibility and an active com m itm ent. . . that is not just limited to 
the fulfilm ent o f  their tax-paying and labor responsibilities, but must also  
include decisive actions to improve productive conditions and to assume 
collective responsibilities for system ic com petitiveness, so as to propitiate the 
participation o f  other social groups in the definition and implantation o f  
actions that w ill guarantee greater social inclusion(Garay, 2002: 35).
In synthesis, the Colombian social and economic amalgam consists in the fact 
that the precariousness of the country's industrial and market development, the 
exclusion, and the old clientelist and patrimonialist practices are not eliminated by the 
new forms of economic action and their corresponding regulatory institutions, but are 
instead juxtaposed beside the former. This is the main characteristic of Colombian 
society: the dichotomies of tradition-modemity, development-underdevelopment, and 
inclusion-exclusion, which have been strengthened by the adoption of the neoliberal 
model.
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On the other hand, neoliberal adjustment has produced a disconnection between 
economic and social policy that has contributed to fragmenting social relations even 
more. The new economic policy has not considered social heterogeneity either, or its 
effects on income redistribution. The deterioration of the latter has sharpened the social 
integration crisis, which is manifested in the existence of ample sectors of the population 
excluded from both the market and socioeconomic development, or that have been 
precariously inserted into them. Indicators of this exclusion and precarious insertion are: 
in the first place, the unemployment rate that, as has been mentioned several times, 
began to increase in 1995 until it reached a level of 20% in 2001. Secondly, the informal 
sector of the economy and the underemployment that represent about 50%. Thirdly, the 
Gini inequality coefficient which rose from 0.467 en 1988 to 0.510 in 1997. And finally, 
the poverty rate which, as has already been mentioned, reached 64% in 1999. If the 
social situation did not worsen even more in the nineties, it was thanks to increased 
public spending in education and health, propitiated by the Constitution of 1991. 
However, as will be seen in the following section, the agreement the Pastrana 
government signed with the International Monetary Fund reduced public spending in 
these very sectors. In synthesis, the excluded population has no possibilities of 
contributing to the formation of social wealth because they are unemployed or contribute 
in a precarious way because they are underemployed or because they do not have the 
necessary level of education or vocational training, due to the fact that the Colombian 
process of capital accumulation is characterized by a socialization of costs and a limited
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or concentrated appropriation of social benefits. This contributes to increasing the social 
fragmentation and the detonating elements of the political and economic crisis.
This precarious insertion of the majority of the population into the economic 
process, has also affected the process of building citizenship, by imposing limits on the 
expansion and on the maximization of human capacity since, as shown above, it is 
under-utilized for economic and social development, which does not favor increased 
production, social wealth, and human development. It is therefore necessary to seriously 
consider the problems derived from the insufficient demand, which not only constitute a 
source of restrictions for the continued growth and socioeconomic development, but also 
for the process of constructing and extending citizenship. The construction of 
citizenship requires not only the political recognition of the social actors and their rights, 
it also requires the development of an active policy to generate employment and income, 
broadening of social security, formation of human resources and redistribution of 
income and wealth. And it is precisely these policies that have least reached the most 
unprotected sectors, which presently constitute a large proportion of the population. 
Therefore, when mechanisms of competition are introduced into the economy without 
correcting the preexisting asymmetries in social relations, the discriminatory tendencies 
of the market are sharpened and the economic possibilities of the majority of the 
population are reduced. The effects of modernization in the functioning of the economy 
are thus concentrated in the privileged sectors of society. On the one hand, a very 
reduced sector of individuals and enterprises (the above mentioned Four Large 
Economic Groups: Bavaria, Ardila Lulle, Aval and Sindicato Antioqueno) receive the
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concentrated benefits of economic activity and change generated by the new model 
while, on the other hand, the political, economic, and social fragmentation of the country 
is increased.
The exclusion or precarious insertion of the majority of the population into the
economic process, aggravated by the neoliberal model, is one of the obstacles to the rise
of “infrastructural power of the state, defined as its capacity to implement decisions,
penetrating civil society with infrastructures by means of which the it extracts resources
and provides resources (Mann, 2002: 3). This is a characteristic that Colombia shares
with the rest of the Latin American states. According to Michael Mann, the main
challenge of the states of the region
remains essentially the sam e as it was alm ost 200 years ago as they achieved  
their independence. It is how  to incorporate their diverse populations into a 
genuine citizenship, w hich can sustain infrastructurally powerful states, 
which can becom e finally democratic. The biggest obstacle is not political 
conflict between ethnic or religious groups fighting over w hose state it is ( . . . )
Rather, it is essentially the level o f  domestic inequality existing between 
classes that generates the main problem (Mann 2002: 22).
6.6 Disagreement over the Criteria for Distributing Social Benefits
The fragmentation of Colombian society has been aggravated by the inability of the 
diverse social actors to reach a consensus on the fundamental elements of social order. 
In this respect, the societal project arising from the Constitution of 1991 competes with 
that arising from the neoliberal economic model. The former was promoted by 
progressive socialdemocratic forces, while the latter has been promoted by the forces of 
globalization and by the new Colombian technocratic elite. These two projects have 
advanced in a parallel manner since 1991 and neither of the two has achieved enough of
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a consensus to impose its will. In the initial euforia of democratization resulting from the 
Constitutional Assembly, Colombian society did not realize that there were great 
contradictions in terms of concepts and practical application between the two projects 
and that they would therefore lead to the present situation due to the impossibility of 
reaching an agreement on the fundamental elements of social order and the criteria for 
distributing social resources.
The Constitution of 1991 introduced the series of changes that were mentioned 
in Chapter 4, but it also introduced others of which Colombian society has been less 
aware, such as the introduction of criteria of distributive justice and social liberalism in 
the allocation of social resources, and a new concept of law, less formal and rigid than 
that which had predominated in the country until then, where the interpreter of the law 
has an active role in creating law. Given the ambiguous relationship that Colombian 
society has traditionally had with the law (Gomez Buendia, 1999; Kalmanovitz, 2001), 
this new concept gave greater weight to law in structuring society and in guaranteeing 
individual rights, broadening its coverage to areas that traditionally had escaped it, such 
as the economy and Colombian citizens' relations with the public sphere. This new 
concept of law has required the support of a constitutional jurisprudence more commited 
to the culture of democracy and human rights than that which had predominated in the 
Supreme Court of Justice before 1990.
As already mentioned, the Constitutional Court was conceived by the 
Constitutional Assembly as an entity with the power needed to develop the content of
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social justice of the Constitution of 1991. This power altered the traditional balance of 
power between the different state institutions and gave rise to a new configuration of the 
political system. This explains the confrontations produced in the past decade between 
the different state institutions and especially between the Constitutional Court and the 
Bank of the Republic and the members of Gaviria's economic team.
The new criteria for the allocation of social resources, resulting from the political 
agreement of a socialdemocratic nature were expressed in the Constitution of 1991, the 
law, and the jurisprudential decisions of the Constitutional Court. Driven by this and by 
the injuctive actions interposed by citizens, the new constitution's societal project has 
struggled to develop. Nevertheless, it has not achieved enough consensus to become 
consolidated, because the neoliberal societal project harbors social forces and global 
tendencies that are adverse to it.
In its function of preserving the social-liberal character of the Constitution of 
1991, the Constitutional Court has preferred a series of controversial decisions, 
including the following: a) the Bank of the Republic's obligation to include production 
and employment among its objectives, rather than just monetary policy and control of 
inflation, as had been the case previously, b) modification of the mortgage system and 
permanent control of interest rates on home loans, in order to guarantee the right to 
housing; c) prohibition of bonos pensionales in private schools (by means of which a 
membership fee is charged for admission); d) equality of salaries in the public and 
private sectors, and the indexation of the minimum wage and the salary of state
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employees, and e) state health system coverage for so-called "catastrophic illnesses" 
which involve high costs for those who suffer from them.
These decisions, according to the critics, are opposed to the full operation of the 
“laws o f the market”, which are the only criteria the neoliberal accumulation model 
accepts for allocating social resources. Therefore, the above-mentioned decisions on 
economic and fiscal affairs have been rejected by the government's economic team, the 
Board of Directors o f the Bank of the Republic, the economists of the “thinks tanks” that 
advise the government on economic matters, the financial sector, and some membes of 
the business sector. In contrast, these decisions have found an echo among the 
minorities, the working class, and the disgruntled middle class.
The argument o f those who are against the decisions o f the Constitutional Court 
is that they generate macroeconomic instability and that they are both costly and 
inefficient. Co-Directors of the Bank of the Republic, such as Salomon Kalmanovitz 
(2001) and Sergio Clavijo (2001), have advocated that economic principles such as 
scarce resources, budget restrictions, normative restriction, transparence, and supply and 
demand should determine the allocation of social resources. In this regard, Kalmanovitz 
demands that the Constitutional Court assume
fiscal responsabilities when it is deciding about the services o f  the Colombian  
state, o f  w hich it is a key part, and w hose viability it should defend. It 
should recognize that there are budget restrictions and that the assignment o f  
spending should be rationalized, w hich leads to greater justice in distribution 
(K alm anovitz, 2001: 158).
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The authors mentioned have criticized the Constitutional Court for recognizing
social benefits for specific persons, in order to preserve the abstract equality o f a generic
right of citizenship, as if  this were not made concrete in the demand for real economic
and social rights. Many economists' criticisms o f the Constitutional Court have to do
with the decisions that go against the above-mentioned principles. In this respect, Sergio
Clavijo complains that
the basic task of economic and social development in Colombia is seriously 
threatened due to the so-called ‘juridical instability’, aggravated now by the 
activism of the Constitutional Court, particularly during the 1994-2000 
period. In fact, the Constitutional Court decided to alter the interpretation of 
the laws sanctioned years before and to accomodate principles o f a populist 
nature to diverse articles of the Constitution of 1991, understood as those that 
order increased public spending without considering the negative 
macroeconomic effects. In this sense, it is not surprising that the main state 
unions and political parties with populist inclination have supported the 
decisions of the court that imply greater public spending. These decisions 
will impede adequate re-dimensioning of the Colombian state, while they 
seriously debilitate the separation of powers through which the ordering of 
public spending was delegated in the congress. (Clavijo, 2001: ix-x).
Nevertheless, the technical dressing assumed in the neoliberal economists'
critiques fails to conceal the ideological nature o f the debate between the defenders of
each o f the two different societal projects. This is seen not only in the term “populist”
that Clavijo uses to describe Constitutional Court decisions, but also in demands that the
Court be modified to make it more “pluralistic”. In this sense, one critic considers that
the Court requires a better process for selecting its members and their ways 
of making decisions. It would be advisable to have a more interdisciplinary 
and pluralistic membership (which is clearly not the case today due to [the 
presence of] so many laborists and socialdemocrats) (Revista Dinero, 
November 10, 2000: 120. Emphasis added).
On the other hand, E. Sarmiento, an economist who is one of the most outspoken critics 
of the neoliberalisml, comes to the defense o f the Constitutional Court in affirming that
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it is not that the justices interfere with the dictates o f  the econom ic model, but 
that the econom ic m odel interferes with the Constitution. A  retrospective 
glance is enough to see that the Court’s most controversial decisions have 
been oriented to avoiding further aggravation o f  the inequitable effect o f  the 
present m odel. The use o f  fiscal resources to compensate for losses in the 
financial sector was rejected, the mortgage system that expropriated the 
hom es o f  a broad range o f  Colombians was declared unconstitutional, the 
Bank o f  the Republic s practice o f  lowering inflation at the cost o f  
unem ploym ent w as severely criticized and now the econom ic adjustment 
based on salary repression is denied. (El Espectador, October 2 9 ,2 0 0 0 ).
The high-ranking officials of the government and the Bank of the Republic do 
not take into account the fact that the Constitution of ‘91 took up the principles of 
distributive justice, which are based on allocation criteria that are not economic but 
extra-economic, i.e. political, as opposed to the principles of commutative justice, which 
are proper to the market. This, of course, affected public spending, but that is the 
consequence of a collective foundational decision, in which the criteria and the priorities 
to be applied in allocating social resources were decided politically. Macroeconomic 
stability is a basic condition for the growth of the economy, but it should not be allowed 
to obstruct society's political agreements, if it is to be democratized by providing 
effective access to the basic benefits of socioeconomic development to the entire 
population.
Therefore, the Constitution of 1991 asigned the Constitutional Court the function 
of overseeing the decisions of both the government and the central bank, especially in 
social, salary, monetary, fiscal, and currency exchange matters, to ensure that they 
adhere to the underlying principles of the new political pact. For this reason, the 
decisions of the Constitutional Court transcend the juridical sphere, they surpass the
261
logic of the market, and they have political and economic effects since, by recognizing
or assigning rights from a social democratic perspective, they alter the previous balance
of power. Thus it has been understood by the Constitutional Court which, through one
of the justices, has said that
the country has not yet understood the function o f  a constitutional tribunal.
The Court s decisions have not yet been assimilated sufficiently: decisions 
that have been made in law but which necessarily have political and 
econom ic consequences. And this does not mean that w e the judges or 
ju stices o f  the Court are usurping the functions o f  any other entity, but rather 
that our function necessarily has consequences o f  this type. It is said that the 
Court should not interfere in econom ic matters. But the fact is that econom ic 
legislation is not removed from the control that the Court must exercise over 
all laws, regardless o f  the topic they relate to. The decision, o f  course, 
produces econom ic effects. And at tim es these econom ic effects can cause 
problems. (Gaviria and Uprimny, 2000: 10).
6.7 The Agreement with the IMF and the Dismounting of the 
Constitutional Sources of Social Public Spending
As mentioned, the Constitution of ‘91 increased public spending, especially that of a 
social nature in education and health, by means of strengthening political, 
administrative, and fiscal decentralization. Fiscal decentralization began in Colombia in 
1983, through modernization of the municipal tax system and the increase of transfers of 
resources from the central government to local governments, since the municipalities 
had either lacked resources entirely or had only scarce resources until that year, a 
situation that did not allow local governments to adequately attend the needs of the 
community. Political decentralization began in 1986, with the popular election of 
mayors, who had been appointed by governors until that year, who, in turn, were 
appointed by the president. The Constitution of 1991 introduced the popular election of 
governors and permitted community participation in the management of municipal 
affairs through the election of Local Administrative Boards. Administrative
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decentralization also began in 1986 with the transfer to local governments of a large 
number of functions that had previously been the responsibility o f the central 
government. These covered a variety of different fields such as the construction and 
endowment of schools, contracting and payment o f teachers, construction and 
endowment of hospitals, construction of roads, aqueducts and sewerage systems, basic 
environmental improvement, agricultural technical assistance, elaboration of economic 
and social development plans at the local level, etc. However, the great problems with 
decentralization were the insufficient resources, the local governments’ lack of technical 
and administrative capacity, and the low level of social participation. (Orjuela, 1992). 
For this reason, the Constitutional Assembly of 1991 proposed improving the 
decentralization process through increased fiscal resources so that the departments and 
municipalities could extend the coverage of education and health services, and through 
political participation at the local level. This was intended to increase the legitimacy of 
the state, by facing the country's enormous inequalities and the need to deepen 
democracy, especially at the local level. Generally speaking, from the perspective of 
relations among the three levels o f government, it can be said that the constitution 
propitiates a process of redistributing powers, functions and resources of the central 
government, in favor of greater autonomy and leadership for the departments and 
municipalities and more direct community participation in the allocation of resources 
and management of local public affairs.
To achieve this purpose, the Constitution of ‘91, in articles 356 and 357, 
established a series of transfers of resources from the national budget to the departments
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and m u n ic ip a lities  to  fin an ce the p rov is ion  o f  ed ucation  and health  serv ices , esp ec ia lly  
for the p oorest sectors o f  the population . A t present, th is transfers represent 46 .5%  o f  the 
n ation ’s current in co m e. D u e  to th is con stitu tion a l ob liga tion , so c ia l public sp ending  
in creased  from  8.2%  o f  th e  G D P  in 1990  to  14.4%  in 1998; i.e ., 6 .2  p ercen tage poin ts, a 
figure that s lig h tly  su rp asses the grow th  o f  total p ub lic  spen d in g  (N ational P lanning  
D epartm ent, 2 0 0 0 ) . 1  h is  in creased  so c ia l p u b lic  sp en d in g  m ade it p o ss ib le  to  ex tend  the 
co verage  o f  ed u ca tio n  and h ealth  serv ices , as a result o f  w h ich  the form er rose from  68%  
in 1993 to  80%  in  1 9 9 7 , and th e  latter increased  from  24%  to 55%  in the sam e period, 
and to 65%  in 19 9 9  (D N P  -  P N U D , 2 0 0 0 ). C overage o f  w ater and sew erage  serv ices  
also  in creased . A s  a resu lt, the p op u la tion  w ith  u n satisfied  b asic  n eed s w as notably  
reduced from  37%  in 1993 to 26%  in 1999  (Ib idem ).
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Despite the above-mentioned advances, the decision makers on the government’s 
economic team considered that articles 356 and 357 of the Constitution, which 
permitted financing progress in social matters, constituted “a true drain on public 
finances (Ministerio de Hacienda, 2000) and one of the main causes of the state’s fiscal 
deficit, which is 5% of the GDP today. Therefore, one of the points of the fiscal 
adjustment agreement that the Pastrana government (1998-2002) signed with the 
International Monetary Fund in 2000 was the reduction and rationalization of the above- 
mentioned transfers to the departments and municipalities (Banco de la Republica - 
Ministerio de Hacienda, 1999). For this purpose, the government presented a bill to 
reform the Constitution, Legislative Act 012, which was approved by the Congress in 
August 2001. This reform generated a series of protests on the part of mayors, 
governors, the teachers' union (FECODE) and students. But despite the protests and the 
regressive nature of the reform, it was approved by the Congress, due to the fact that the 
national government resorted to the traditional practice of distributing “parliamentary 
aids, i.e., money from the national budget given by the government to the politicians to 
“invest” in their own regions in exchange for their approval of the government’s 
proposals.
Given that the Constitution linked those transfers to the growth of the Cnetral 
Government’s current revenues (consisting of tributary and non-tributary revenue, 
except for capital resources), the reform consisted of unlinking them from that parameter 
and linking them to the annual increase in inflation over a 7-year period, with which a 
significantly lower increase of transfers is achieved.
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With the above-mentioned reform, the Central Government sought to reduce the 
fiscal deficit by saving 7 billion pesos and, at the same time, recovering the flexibility of 
its revenues since the old scheme of calculating the transfers limited the national 
government’s possibilities of obtaining fiscal resources through a profound tax reform, 
since almost half o f the resources obtained this way would have to be transferred to the 
departments and municipalities. However, the transfers could not be blamed for the 
increase in the fiscal deficit since the national government's effective spending increased 
by 8.3% of the GDP between 1990 and 1999, while transfers to departments and 
municipalities represented only 2.2% of that increase. The remaining 6.1% was due to 
the growth of foreign debt servicing, which amounted to more than 40% of the national 
budget in 2001, and to the increased operating expenses of the central government 
(Contraloria General de la Republica, 2001). Therefore, the transfers do not represent 
even one third of the fiscal deficit, so the argument that they caused the imbalance in the 
state’s finances is not well founded.
The constitutional reform of the transfers not only has quantitive effects, in 
producing a decrease of 7 billion pesos in financing for social policy, but qualitative 
effects as well, to the extent the future growth of the economy and state income will not 
translate into significant increases of resources for social policy in the regions and 
municipalities, as established by the progressive social forces that approved the Political 
Constitution of 1991. The reform of the transfers will slow down the growth of the 
education and health sectors, since the reform was conceived in such a way that,
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according to the experts, the growth o f transfers will be inversely proportional to the 
growth o f the economy, i.e., the greater the growth of the economy, the smaller the 
increase o f the transfers. According to Jaramillo (2001: 7), it is not true that the reform 
is only for seven years, as “the government sold the idea”, for this would be 
unacceptable to the IMF. The design of the legislative act will make it possible for the 
transfers to be linked to the Central Government’s current revenues once again in 2008, 
but percent-wise these transfers will no longer be 46.5% of the Central state’s current 
revenues, but only 36% or even as low as 30%, so that even if economic growth 
improves, the percentage of income transferred to departments and municipalities will 
be lower. As a consequence of that reform, at the end of the seven years, there will be a 
reduction of around 870,000 places for students in primary education, and 1.9 million 
impoverished Colombians will have no access to public health care. (Jaramillo, 2001: 7).
In synthesis, what the confrontation between the neoliberal and the social- 
democrat societal projects are showing is that no fundamental agreement exists 
regarding the essential elements of the social order in Colombia, nor about whether the 
assignment of freedoms, goods, and social opportunities should be done on the basis of 
political criteria and legal norms, or on the basis of the laws of the market and the 
principles of economic science.
267
Chapter 7
Conclusions with Some Hints for Latin America
In these pages I have proposed to characterize the present Colombian situation as a crisis 
of political and social integration. In order to surpass the actor-centered focuses that 
have prevailed in contemporary political science, especially in the United States, I have 
established a structural relationship among three dimensions that I consider 
fundamental: a) the weakness of the state; b) the tensions between the tendencies toward 
integration and disintegration of society; c) the tensions and contradicition between 
political and social democratization which is inclusionary, and the neoliberal economic 
adjustment model which is exclusionary.
Likewise, I have proposed to go beyond the minimalistic and procedural 
concepts of democracy that predominate in political science and reduce its conception 
and practice to purely electoral and representative aspects. Nevertheless, beyond the 
technical problems posed by the election of those who are to govern lie the problems 
that constitute the essence of politics: collective and public deliberation regarding the 
distribution of resources, freedoms and social opportunities. The traditional concepts of 
democracy leave its social and economic dimensions aside precisely at the moment in 
which neoliberal economic restructuring has transferred the function of distributing 
social resources from the state to the market and limited the state s possibilities of 
producing a more egalitarian social order in societies like those of Latin America which 
are characterized by a high degree of concentration of income and wealth.
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For analytical purposes, I have defined society as an ensemble of social 
interactions resulting from the permanent tension between cooperation and conflict. For 
this reason, all societies present a tendency to a certain degree of disintegration, so that it 
is never possible to consider society as absolutely integrated. The integration crisis 
presents itself when profound social changes distort the relations among the different 
spheres that constitute the societal pattern (politics, economics, and culture), in such a 
way that the inter-systemic coordination of society, and the relations among the different 
social actors become difficult or even impossible. Based on the concept of societal 
pattern, I have attempted to express the mutual determination of politics, culture, and 
economics in the constitution of social relations and institutions. This focus is intended 
to provide an alternative to focuses based on the actor and its agency, that predominate 
today in the social sciences and neglect the structural aspects of social phenomena and 
unsought effects of individual decisions.
On the basis of said framework, I have shown that the crisis which Colombian 
society has suffered during the past ten years is a result of the convergence of tendencies 
toward political and social disintegration. The former were expressed, in the first place, 
in the violence which is the manifestation of a state that has not yet completed its 
formative process, and that has a limited capacity to regulate social relations, 
institutionalize conflicts, integrate the nation’s territory, and distribute its social 
resources. Secondly, in the exacerbation of clientelism and the persistence of traditional 
forms of social relationships, which make the transition from a type of conduct guided 
by personal loyalties and inclinations to one prescribed by general and impersonal norms
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very difficult. The social integration crisis is expressed in the ruling classes’ inability to 
elaborate and agree upon a societal project broad enough to articulate diverse social 
interests, in social exclusion, in the fragility of the social fabric, and in the degradation 
of the ways o f assuming conflict, diversity, and disagreement.
This two-fold integration crisis worsened in the nineties due to the confrontation 
between two different societal projects: that which arose from the Constitution of 1991, 
and that which arose from the neoliberal economic development strategy. Whereas the 
former was promoted by the progressive forces in the Constitutional Assembly, the latter 
has been promoted by the forces of globalization and by a new domestic technocratic 
elite. These two projects have advanced in parallel form since 1991, and neither one has 
achieved enough of a consensus to impose itself. In the initial euforia of democratization 
caused by the Constitutional Assembly, Colombian society did not realize that there 
were great contradictions between these two projects, and that they affected the 
possibilities of achieving an agreement regarding the fundamental elements of the social 
order and the criteria for the distribution of social resources.
The neoliberal model has advocated the development of a market logic in the 
allocation of resources and the insertion of the economy in the world market, all of 
which is reinforced by the imperatives of the globalization process, and has implied a 
loss of sovereignty and autonomy of the state in favor of the supranational regulatory 
agencies. However, adoption of the neoliberal strategy has sharpened the social 
fragmentation by introducing market mechanisms in a society like that of Colombian,
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characterized by a lack o f territorial integration which, in turn, has prevented the full 
constitution of a national market, and by strong tendencies of social exclusion that have 
not permitted complete constitution of the social actors as “consumers and citizens”.
The economic model has also led to a division among the economic elites, and it 
is exclusionary in nature due, among other things, to cuts in public social spending and 
state subsidies, and to the generation of unemployment. These elements have limited the 
elites’ possibilities of forming alliances among themselves and with other social sectors, 
for the purpose of constructing new rules of the game to regulate social relations 
democratically.
The situation described above aggravated the old division of the country’s ruling 
class, which had been split since the sixties into a political elite and an economic elite, 
with opposing interests. This in turn led to a fragmentation of state institutions: while 
the political elite expressed itself through the congress and the non-technical institutions, 
the economic elite did so through the technical institutions responsible for designing 
economic policy. The Constitution of 1991 also contributed to sharpening the political 
and social fragmentation, in altering the balance between the three branches of 
government, atomizing the system of parties and representation, and introducing non- 
market criteria in the allocation of social resources, which were in contradiction with 
those established by the neoliberal reforms.
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The way in which the neoliberal development strategy was adopted in Colombia 
contributed to generating a severe economic recession and a high degree of social 
exclusion. And for this reason, it entered into contradiction with the advances in matters 
of political and social democratization produced by the Constitution of 1991. The 
adoption of the neoliberal model was done behind society’s back and behind the back of 
the political institutions that articulate and aggregate interests, a fact which demonstrated 
the growing divorce between the mechanisms for the generation of consensus and 
legitimacy and the mechanisms for the formation and implementation of macroeconomic 
policies. Consequently, in excluding participation from the sphere of macroeconomic 
policy, which is precisely where the foundations can be laid for a society that is not only 
democratic but a just society as well, the path was opened in Latin America in general, 
and in Colombia in particular, to a type of legitimacy of a technocratic and efficiency- 
focused nature that is displacing political legitimacy. Nonetheless, the fact that it has 
not been possible to achieve ample participation in the formulation o f macroeconomic 
policies is also due to the fragmentation and weakness of the progressive forces and the 
lack of representativeness of the traditional Liberal and Conservative parties.
In synthesis, in Colombia, in the past decade, all of the factors mentioned above 
converged to produce an inconclusive process of economic modernization, but without 
political modernity, expressed in an ambiguous attitude on the part of society with 
respect to democracy, a lack of interconnection between politics, the economy, ethics 
and culture, and a relative and very partial social integration that generates, in itself, the 
social conditions for its own undoing.
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The focus developed in this dissertation for the Colombian case can be applied to 
the analysis o f other Latin American societies. The adoption of neoliberal restructuring 
processes throughout the region, and their convergence with the democratization 
process, have given way to contradictions between inclusion and exclusion, and are 
sharpening the fragmentation and the heterogeneity of Latin American societies. Albert 
Hirshman said, over a decade ago, “never has Latin America been lectured and advised 
as insistently as in the last few years on the virtues of the free market, privatization, and 
foreign private investment” (1987: 30-31), and never, for the same reason, had Latin 
America ever suffered such an economic and social crisis as the one it is suffering now. 
At the beginning of the nineties, Washington Consensus’ recipes predicted growth rates 
of between 4% and 6% for the economies of the region. After twelve years of severe 
fiscal, monetary and currency exchange adjustments, the situation could not be worse: in 
2001 Latin America barely grew 0.5% and the prognostic for this year is 0.7%. Even 
Chile, which had been presented as the ideal model of a market economy, has not grown 
since 1996. The free market also promised to rescue the region from underdevelopment 
and poverty. However, the number of the poor has grrown to over 210 million, 
increasing by one million each year, and 87 million are indigent (IDB, 1999). Of the 44 
million people in the region that were incorporated into the labor force in the past ten 
years, 20 million are employed in the informal sector or are underemployed and 10 
million are unemployed. This social regression is the region is further aggravated by the 
fact that the foreign debt grew from 450,000 million dollars to 740,000 million dollars in 
the course of the past decade.
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Most Latin American countries have very large deficits in their balance of 
payment current accounts, which limit their possibilities of growth and threaten financial 
and currency exchange stability. This is aggravated by the effect of the 
“interconnectedness of globalization, in virtue of which the enormous current account 
deficits of the Asian countries implied strong devaluation and a sharp fall in the prices of 
basic products. In 1998 Colombia registered deficits equivalent to 6% of the GDP, 
Brazil had a deficit of 4.5%, and Argentina and Mexico had deficits of 3%. In this 
field, the most illustrative case is, again, Chile, which has been presented as the model to 
follow, and now faces current account deficits of 6% of its GDP (Cepal, 2001).
In synthesis, the region’s economies have been exposed to structural balance of 
payments deficits which increase with economic growth and their correction is subject to 
substantial devaluations that imply a fall in real salaries. All of the above makes it 
possible to question those analysts who, despite the evidence, considered that “the 
politics o f economic adjustment” was undergoing a series of stages characterized as 
periods of “crisis, painful measures, monetary stability, recovery (stability and some 
growth); investment and sustainable growth” (Acuna and Smith, 1994, Joan Nelson). In 
even the best of cases, this scheme may have only precarious validity in terms of 
reducing inflation in Latin American countries.
The social deterioration and economic imbalances described above have led in 
many countries of the region to an increase in the fragmentation and anomie that are
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characteristic of Latin American societies. Mexico is divided is split into two societies: 
the modem and prosperous society o f the NAFTA and the premodem, indigenous, poor 
society of the Zapatista Movement; Venezuela is politically and socially polarized 
around the figure of Chavez; Ecuador faced a profound political destabilization that led 
to the overthrow of two presidents following strong protests and social uprisings; Pern 
also overthrew a president but did not manage to overcome the high poverty levels o f the 
population. Argentina is the last country in the region to explode socially and 
economically, with sharp manifestation of social anomie.
The crisis in which most Latin American countries find themselves immersed 
today has unleashed a wave of criticism against the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank. This comes not only from the transnational anti-globalization movements 
but from the Congress of the United States and from the Nobel Prize winner in 
economics and former vice-president of the World Bank, Joseph Stiglitz, as well. 
Stiglitz not only questions the International Monetary Fund’s technical capability and 
knowledge of Third World reality, but its role in the deterioration of democracy as well. 
According to Stiglitz,
in theory, the Fund supports democratic institutions in nations it attends. In 
practice, it undermines the democratic process through the im position o f  
policies. O fficially , o f  course, the IMF im poses nothing. It simply 
‘negotiates’ the conditions for receiving aid. But all the power is on one side 
in the negotiations —that o f  the IMF— and the IMF rarely concedes enough 
time to achieve an ample consensus or even extensive consultations with the 
congress or civ il society. At times the IMF dispenses with pretending to be 
totally transparent and negotiates secret pacts, (2001: 2).
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The Meltzer Commission expressed itself along the same lines in its report to the 
Congress o f the United States which pointed out that the actions o f the IMF not only did 
not bring about economic development in the countries that signed agreements with it, 
but that its programs actually impoverished the nations that received its aid, and its 
influence in domestic policy in fact undermined national sovereignty and often 
negatively affected the development o f democratic institutions in the countries that 
applied its economic recipes (Anif, 2002: 7). In addition to these criticisms, some voices 
have been raised in favor of reconsidering development theory, the problems of poverty in 
the Third World, and the inclusion of greater concern for political institutions, cultural 
aspects, and social cohesion (Birdall and Londono; Naim, 1999). However, this has not 
sufficed to change the formula, to judge by the IMF's demands of Argentina following the 
recent debacle. To these exogenous factors must be added other endogenous factors 
characteristic of Latin America such as economic and social inequality, clientelism and 
corruption, drug trafficking and violence. The region's economic calamity is due as much 
to these factors as to the international financial agencies' refusal to accept the lack of 
realism of its diagnoses and the error of their economic policy demands. Despite the clear 
evidence that the reforms they demand have not produced the expected results, their 
promoters and defenders justify maintaining them with the argument that protectionism is 
the worst option.
To the contrary o f what some comparative political analysts have attempted to 
show, what has become clear is that there is no relationship between structural economic
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adjustment and democracy. Instead, there has been a progressive weakening of 
democracy since the beginnings of the nineties, and not just in Latin America but 
throughout the rest of the Third World as well,, which manifests itself in many ways, 
among them: the loss of sovereignty of states in favor of supranational institutions that 
act without democratic control. The growing freedom of action that transnational and 
financial firms have acquired, the transnationalization of culture that homogenizes and 
dissolves all possibility of cultural and ideological diversity, the technocratization of 
political life and the corresponding generalization of a discourse on economics and 
political economy that defines them as spheres in which citizens' participation and 
political and ideological debate have no place. All of this is a clear expression of the fact 
that "neoliberal politics" has brought with it less democracy, reduced the decision­
making capacity of citizens, and sharply limited the power of the least advantaged 
sectors of the population to influence the course of social affairs.
Therefore, the decade of the nineties has not only been "another lost decade" for 
Latin America, but one of sharpened social and political fragmentation as well. To lay the 
foundations for a better future, the countries of the region will have to build social and 
political institutions that promote social cohesion, and economic institutions that promote 
savings, investment, especially in the development of human capital and scientific and 
technological development. The historical evidence shows that there are no common 
recipes nor any one single development model that is equally valid foi all who undertake 
this task. Economic development has taken place in societies with very diverse political and 
economic institutions. Countries like South Korea and Taiwan are an example of this fact.
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Therefore, counting on a "check list" of reforms, like that of the Washington Consensus, 
which are expected to be carried out unfailingly simply does not help at all. On the 
contrary, the reality of the facts and the social analysis suggests that these inadequate 
theories should be reconsidered and substituted by others that are more representative of the 
particular realities of diverse societies. It is not a question of switching back from 
neoliberalism to “cepalism” but rather of designing a model of one's own, that is more 
adequate and dictated by a long duree historical perspective and a more structural and 
systemic focus which overcomes the deficiencies of those based on voluntarism and 
methodological individualism. Latin America has to construct institutions that are adequate 
to its historical particularities, the aspirations of its peoples, and the nature of its economic 
policy.
Institutions matter, of course, but so does the nature of the socioeconomic system in 
which they are immersed. In societies like those of Latin America, characterized as they are 
by endemic discrimination and inequality, it is almost impossible to achieve social stability 
in the long run unless the institutions provide opportunities for participation and decision­
making capacity to those who have been excluded. Reduction of the undesireable effects of 
the economic process, such as inequity and poverty, depends on the political power 
structure within the society. Therefore, economic growth tends to reduce poverty only if the 
poorest sectors of the population have enough political power and access to education and 
to decisive institutions to be able to benefit from it.
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Therefore, the analyses traditionally used in comparative politics would do well in 
attempting to overcome their minimalistic concepts of democracy in order to achieve a 
better understanding o f reality, at least with respect to the Third World countries, since that 
reality has shown that formal democracy can co-exist with profoundly anti-democratic 
social and economic practices. Democracy is an integral concept: political, economic, and 
social.
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